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Chapter 1
THE ASSESSMENT OF PARENTAL FINANCIAL CAPACITY:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
27.5.84
Measurements of "financial capacity" or "financial status" are made continuously for
a variety of purposes. For example, a potential lender (e.g.. a bank) assesses the capa-
city of a would-be borrower to meet the repayment conditions of a loan, a prospective
parent-in-law assesses the financial prospects of a child's suitor, a thief assesses the
likely financial capacity of a potential victim in deciding whether or not to undertake
the risks of appropriating the victim's property, and a government assesses the finan-
cial capacities of its citizens both in levying taxes and in distributing the benefits of
governmental programs.
While the foregoing list of examples is arbilrary, it clearly indicates one central
point: Precisely how financial capacity should be assessed depends critically on the
purposes at hand. Thus, an individual with substantial, temporarilly illiquid but
pledgeable assets may be a good candidate for a short-term loan, but if he has poor
long-term prospects, he may not be a good candidate as a prospective son-in-law.
Similarly, a wealthy individual with excellent credit in the community (permitting her
never to carry cash) may be a very uninspiring target for a thief but may be an excel-
lent choice as a spouse. In short, a measure which is appropriate for one purpose may
be not only inappropriate but totally misleading for some other purpose.
Unfortunately, this dependence of the appropriate method of measurement on
the objectives to be served by that measurement is frequently given substantially less
serious attention than it warrants. This is the case, in part, because the ambiguities
associated with specification of a measure of financial capacity are often not
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superficially obvious. To say that taxes or program benefits should be distributed on
the basis of income seems, superficially, to be an unambiguous statement. Only when
one goes a step further and attempts to specify what is meant by "income" does the
awareness of ambiguity begin to emerge. As the history of the U.S. Internal Revenue
Code over the past half century demonstrates, ambiguities associated with the meas-
urement of income only increase as one confronts and attempts to resolve them.
In the present study the charge, as set forth by the National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES), was to assess the capacity of pa.nm.ts to finance the postsecondary
educational activities of their children. That charge is simultaneously narrowly
confining and extremely broad. The narrowness and confinement stems from the
emphasis on parental financial capacity, when it can be argued that parental finances
may be of only derivative relevance. positively or normatively, to the issue of the
financing of a child's education. However, given the focus on parental finances, the
ｴ ［ Ｚ ｨ ｡ ｲ ｩ ｾ ｾ ｳ ｲ ･ ｭ Ｎ ｡ Ｎ ｲ ｾ ｢ ｬ ｹ broad in ｾ ｢ ｡ ｴ noo ｲ･ｳｬｲｩ｣ｴｩｯｮｾ are placeQ op ｴ ｬ ｬ ｯ ｾ ･ aspects of
parental financial capacity which are to be addressed. While it 'Would certainly be
easier to answer a much more narrowly framed question, a narrowly focused study
would be less interesting. Of course, in the absence of infinite resources it has been
necessary for us to impose limits, but we have attempted to do this in such a manner
as to retain interesting possibilities.
Our response to the general charge has been determined, in some measure, by a
subsidiary condition imposed by NCES, that the study was to include empirical imple-
mentation and, moreover, that this implementation was to be based principally on the
"parent survey" undertaken by the National Opinion Research Center as part of the
High School and Beyond (HS&B) longitudinal study of 1980 high school sophomores
and seniors, sponsored by NCES. Fortunately, the HS&B parent survey is significantly
more inclusive and detailed than any other source of which we are aware which pro-
vides data on the finances of parents of college-age children. Nonetheless: this source
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is. perhaps inevitably, less than ideal. Most notably. it provides information at only
one point in time for parents of two closely-spaced cohorts of high school students.
Thus, we are able to say nothing about the stability of parental financial characteris-
tics over time (as a result of business cycle ftuctuations and/or secular trends) and to
say little about changes in these financial characteristics over the parental lifecycle.
In addition, the data are themselves complex, in some cases seriously ambiguous, and
frequen tly incomplete and/or erroneous.
Together, the general charge and the subsidiary restriction have largely deter-
mined our approach to the study. While we question the relevance of parental finan-
cial capacity to the financing of what is essentially an investment, we accept the
parental focus and attempt to clarify the alternative grounds on which parental
finances can be viewed as relevant to the child's educational investment, emphasizing
the very different implications of the conception of parental finances as the basis for a
"tax" for the support of the chilq.'s schooling versus the conception of tpe parents as
capital suppliers to the child in a situation in which external capital markets are
imperfect.
We have taken as the starting point for the analysis the manner in which parental
financial capacities are in fact measured in existing postsecondary student assistance
programs (notably in Federal Pell Grants). Implicitly, these programs indeed view
parental financial capacity as constituting the base for a tax (albeit voluntary) levied
for the support of the ｣ ｨ ｩ ｬ ｾ Ｇ ｳ postsecondary schooling. We then raise a series of ques-
tions concerning the established procedures by which financial capacity is conven-
tionally measured
One of the most important issues which we address in this study concerns the
tradeoJ!s between the elements entering into the programmatic measurement of
financial capacity. As retlected in the existing Pell Grant formula (and in conven-
tional "needs analysis" generally), financial capacity can be viewed as the combined
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result of taxes levied at specified rates on the income and wealth of the parents. with
gross income and wealth each subject to specified deductions in the derivation of
"taxable" income and wealth. However. the appropriate relationship between the
respective tax rates (on income and wealth) is not subject to objective detennination.
Rather. political determinations in this domain rest upon more or less well-founded
perceptions of the consequences of alternative teu rate configurations for the level of
program outlays and for the distribution of program benefits. To provide a firmer
basis for these essentially political decisions, we address the issue of the degree to
which one tax rate could be lowered if the other were increased. bolding outlays con-
stant. Similar iso-outLay analyses are then conducted in other dimensions of political
determination. with specific reference to "asset reserves'· (untaxed proportions of
wealth) versus the rate of wealth taxation, to the deductibility of employment
expenses (deductible proportion of earnings and maximum deduction) versus the
income tax rate, and to family size deductions versus income and wealth tax ｲ ｾ ｴ ･ ｳ Ｎ
We identify one dimension in which ftnancial capacity as currently measured for
programmatic purposes arbitrarily but very substantially benefits one class of parents
at the expense of another. Specifically. we demonstrate that measured financial capa-
city is highly sensitive to portfolio composition. Le., that simultaneous acquisition of
assets and ｬ ｩ ｡ ｢ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｳ will signiticanlly increase financial capacity as conventionally
measured. as will a systematic shift in the composition of assets from owner-occupied
housing to other assets. Thus. home-owners are rewarded at the expense of renters,
while those without liabilities are rewarded at the expense of those with liabilities. To
, , '
rectify this dependence of assessed financial capacity on portfolio composition. we
develop a comprehe'nsive measure of net (or adjusted) income. a measure inclusive of
implicit rental income on owner-occupied housing and net of interest on liabilities
which is, therefore, invariant with respect to portfolio composition.
More speculatively. we question the incentives with which even a portfolio-neutral
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system confronts parents to modify lifecycle labor-foree-participation and savings
behavior, or equivalently, the social equity of the rewards offered for what would oth-
erwise be particularly "unrepresentative" patterns of lifecycle behavior. This leads to
the development of a series of alternative measures which adjust parental income and
wealth for observed deviations of current and past labor-force-participation and sav-
ings behavior from norms for the population of parents of college-age children.
Finally. as previously suggested, we question the basic appropriateness of the
conception of parental support for postsecondary schooling as a "tax" levied in accor-
dance with a politically-determined conception of "ability to pay," especially in view
of the voluntary nature of this putative tax. As an alternative to this "taxation"
approach to parental financial capacity. we develop a very different investment-
orie nted measure of parental financial capacity, which we characterize parental loa.n-
a.ble funds (suggesting the possibility that the capacities of parents to compensate for
ｊ ｩ ｾ ｩ ｴ ･ ､ capital marltet aCCE;ll?S of lpeir chUdrep. may ｨ ｾ ｶ ･ sreater ｲ ･ ｬ ･ ｶ ｾ ｣ ･ than more
general income-cum-wealth measures).
In the following chapter of this report, a series of "accounting systems" required
to support the foregoing analyses are developed and implemented empirically.
Chapter 3 t.hen examines the consequences of the alternative accounting systems for
the distribution of the population of parents of college-age children in the financial
capacity dimension, focusing on marginal distributions. Differential implications- of
the alternatives for different classes of families (shifts in the central tendancies of
conditional distributions) are analyzed in Chapter 4. Implications of changes in leg-
islative formulae and in accounting systems of the Pell Grant program are examined
in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS
27.5.64
Limitations of data relevant to the assessment of the financial capacities of parents of
actual or potential postsecondary students have led to a virtually total disregard of
the complex issue of precisely how parental financial capacity is to be measured. Con-
fronting severely limited data. any conceivable, operational measures (e.g., wages and
salaries. total "money income," children's casual perceptions of socioeconomic
status) were better than none at all, and if only one measure was possible, there was
little to be gained from an etrectively academic consideration of the possible implica-
tions of alternative measures.
In this study, however, it is possible, in prin'Ciple and to a significant extent in
practice, to derive a range of alternative measures of parental financial capacity.
Thus, it is necessary to consider the conceptual issue of the accounting system to be
employed in the assessment of financial capacity. In this chapter we develop several
variants of two essentially different accounting systems. The fundamental distinction
is between ru:tual and potential financial capacity. Within each of these conceptual
frameworks, two components of financial capacity are identified: income and wealth.
In the case of the actual financial capacity assessments one measure of wealth (actual
current net worth) and two measures of income (money income versus adjusted
current income) are derived. With reference to potential financial capacity. two addi-
tional measures of wealth and five additional measures of income are derived, in each
case adjusting for observed deviations of a family's income-generating and wealth-
acculumlating behavior from norms for the population of parents or for an appropri-
:
ate subpopulation. An alternative to these income/wealth-based accounting systems
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is then developed. assessing the capacities of parents to act solely as "capital sup-
pliers" to children undertaking investments in postsecondary education. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of alternative actual postsecondary-expenditure and
sources-of-funds accounting systems.
1. Actual Financial Capacity
1.1. Currentlloney Income
Gross current money income is perhaps the most conventionally employed measure of
an individual's or family's financial capacity. 1 Thus, for example, gross current money
income is the only income measure which can be derived from the various statistical
series of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, e.g., the decennial Censuses of Population and
the Current Population SUfVeys. In the case of the HS&B survey, gross current money
income can be obtained quite directly from responses to the various financial items in
the Parept Questiorm!lire. 2
In anticipation of the subsequent elaboration of alternative accounting systems
and relationships, a relatively refined and disaggregated accounting of gross current
money income is employed This accounting system is outlined in Table 2.1. The prin-
ciple distinctions are between (a) labor income (further decomposed into wages and
salaries versus selfemployment income of the mother and of the father), (b) income
from financial assets (interest and dividends), (c) income from real assets (rent), and
(d) transfer payments (differentiating receipts from public and private sources).
IThe pervasiveness of current money income as a measure of financial capacity should not be interpreted as
an indication of conceptually desirable properties, as will be discussed. Rather, it would appear to reflect the
relative ease with which necessary information can be acquired trom economic units. , regardless of the
economic mea.I1in&fulness of tllat information.
2m this report various difnculties associated ll'itll the survey data are ignored, i.e., the exposition proceeds
lIS if there were no ambiguities in the returned questionnaires. In fact. this is far from true, 88 will be docu-
mented in a related Technice.l Report. However, in most cases it W88 possible, thro\1lh the imposition of
internal consistency checks, etc., to derive what appear to be reasonably accurate assesllIIlents of the
respondent family's f!nancie.l status. Fewer than 20 percent of all obllervations had to be dropped from the
lIJIll.1ysis because of "uncorrectible" errors or inconsistencies in the data.
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Gross current money income is simply the sum of these various elements.
Table 2.1
Gross Current Money Income and Components
Yl. Father's wage and salary income
Y2. Father's selfemployment income
Y13. Father's total gross labor income [= Yt + Y2]
Y3. Mother's wage and salary income
Y4. Molher's selfemployment income
Y14. Mother's total gr:L. ... s labor income [= Y3 + Y4]
Y12. Total selfemployment income (mother & father) [= Y2 + Y4]
Y5. Interest income
Y6. Dividend income
Y15. Total gross income lo financial assets [= Y5 + Y6]
Y7. Rent
Y16. Gross property-type income [= Y5 + Y6 + Y7]
YB. Social Security, pensions, etc.
Y9. Other "public" ｴ ｲ ｾ ｮ ｳ ｦ ･ Ａ Ｌ payments
. .
Y17. Total "public" transfer payments [= YB + Y9]
Y10. Private transfer payments
YIB. Total transfer payments [= YB + Y9 + YIO]
Yl1. Miscellaneous income
Y19. Gross current money income [= Y 1 + ... + Y11]
Several serious deficiencies of gross current money income as a measure of
parental financial capacity can be identified First, and perhaps most seriously with
reference to important subpopulations of college-age children, this measure of
income seriously understates the incomes of homeowners relative to renters, as can
be easily demonstrated Assume two identical families (identical, that is, apart from
home ownership). One invests in a home, foregoing the interest or other property-
type income which it could receive on the amount invested in the home were that
amount invested instead in other assets. The other rents its home, ｾ ｮ ｶ ･ ｳ ｴ ｩ ｮ ｧ its
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assets in property (e.g .. bonds. equities. real estate) generating observed current
money income. Assuming that the net rent of the latter is identical to the foregone
interest income of the former (i.e.. deducting from rent that component attributable
only to current maintenance and/or depreciation on the rented dwelling), the true
economic status of these two families will be identical. However, as measured in Table
2.1 by Y19, the renting family will appear to have income higher than that of the own-
ing family by the amount of income earned on the assets not invested in a home. The
positions of the two households could be equalized either by deducting rent from the
income of the renting family or by adding implicit interest income to the income of
the owning family. Because the rent or implicit interest income is more appropriately
conceived as personal consumption expenditure (as opposed to a negative adjustment
to income). and also because this treatment avoids the necessity of decomposing
gross rent into maintenance/depreciation versus pure-property-income components.
the alternative of ｡ ｵ ｧ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ ｩ ｮ ｾ the income of the homeowner by the amount of implicit
interest income on owner-occupied homes is in fact preferrable.3
The second inadequacy of this measure of gross current money income can be
viewed as a generalization of the first: It will be sensitive to portfolio composition
(Le., to variations in the level and composition of assets and liabiiities, given the level
of net worth). Thus. gross property-type income (interest, dividends and rent) is
included in income without an adjustment for interest expense. To appreciate the
potentially discriminatory implications of the inclusion of gross (positive) rather than
net interest income.. consider the assessed status of a family borrowing a given sum,
reinvesting it at the same rate of interest at which it had borrowed. Measured by
gross current money income. its tlnancial capacity would appear to have increased by
the interest earned on the borrowed funds, while its true ftnancial capacity or status
3m the absence of information on the rental payments of non-homeowners, the preferred solution is actually
tile only feasible solution. '
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is, obviously, unchanged. since gross interest income is just offset by gross interest
expense. In' this case derivation of a more neutral measure is somewhat ambiguous.
Clearly, interesl expense up to the amount of property-type income should be offset
against the latter, i.e., deducted from gross current money income. However, the
trealment of interest expense in excess of property-type income is less clear. On the
one hand, net positive interest expense can reasonably be considered a negative fac-
tor income ftow. On the other, net positive interest expense might be argued to be a
component of personal consumption expenditure, reflecting the difference between
the value of consumption of a given volume of goods now rather than in the future.
Essentially, this ambiguity arises from the attempt to define current income as
opposed lo lifetime consumption. For present purposes, a pragmatic consideration is
sufficient to suggest an appropriate procedure for derivation of an adjusted measure of
current income: It is likely that an excess of interest expense over property-type
income is associated with unobserved components of property-type income. ･ Ｎ ｾ Ｎ Ｌ
unrealized capital gains or unreported interest income. Thus, in the adjustment
derived subsequently, interest expense only up to the amount of property-type income
is deducted from the latter in the derivation of net income.
In order to derive a more neutral, comprehensive measure of actual current
income. however, it is necessary to deal explicitly with family wealth (net worth) and
its composition.
1.2. Actual Current Net 'Worth and Its Components
- -
Derivation of actual current net worth and its components is outlined in Table 2.2. Of
the elemenls entering inlo this accounting of assets, liabilities and net worth, several
are less lhan perfect and unambiguous. This is lhe case, for example, with reference
to one component of A2, designated "fixed income securities", which was specified in
the HS&B parent questionnaire as "amount invested in other marketable securities
(e.g.. olner [non-U.S.-government] 1:>onds or commodities)." It is apparent that tl:1is
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category was intended as a miscellaneous, "not-elsewhere-classified" category of
markelable assets. Classification of the entire amount as "fixed-income securities"
represents only a judgemental decision (specifically, the judgement that the average
parent is more likely to hold fixed-income securities than, e.g., commodities).
The derivation of gross real estate assets (A4) is also less than ideal. While other
categories of assets were specified by the questionnaire as gross, it is not clear what
the objective of the questionnaire designers was in this case. Specifically, the ques-
tionnaire requested "Amount of principal paid off to data on land and real estate
(other than home or apartment)." This amount (presumably the paid-off principal of
mortgages) bears no obvious or necessary relationship to the owner's equity in the
property. If, for example, the property was heavily mortgaged and if its value fell sub-
sequent to purchase. then "paid-off principal" would significantly overstate the
owner's equity (which might in fact be negative), while equity would be severely
understateq. if rnorteages were small or nonexistent and/or if the ｭ ｡ ｲ ｫ Ｚ ｾ ｴ value has
subsequently risen. However, in the absence of other information it is necessary to
treat the reported amount as a measure of equity.4 In light of the general secular
trend (at least through the 1970s) of rising market values of real estate. it can be rea-
sonably assumed that this measure will usually constitute a downward-biased estimate
of owner equity. and hence that the sum of this equity measure and outstanding real
estate debt (12) will correspondingly understate the gross market value of land and
real estate. Further ambiguities with reference to this variable arise in the case of.
farmers and other selfemployed individuals, as will be discussed.
The inclusion of reported parental .. savings" for the child's college education as
a distinct asset and net worth category also deserves comment. In principle, it would
"'rms is the interpretation stipulated by NCES and NORC in the Codebook of the HS&B parents' file, althoUih
no justification for this interpretation is provided. Thus, as in the case of the present study, the structure
and content of the underlying questionnaire eftectively determine the structure and content of the derived
accounting system. .
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Table 2.2
Actual Current. Net Worth and Its Components
ASSJ5'I'S
AI. Cash and cash-equivalents
A2. Fixed-income securities
A7. Interest-bearing assets [= A1 + A2]
A3. Equity securities
AB. Total liquid (marketable) assets [= A1 + A2 + A3]
A4. Real estate assets ("equity" + real estate debt)
A5. Business, farm assets (except real estate)
AB. Owner-occupied housing (market value)
A9. Total illiquid assets [= A4 + A5 + A6]
AlD. Accumulated savings for child's college education
All. Total assets [= Ai + ... + A6 + All]
IJABII.J'1"IES
L1- Current personal liabilities
L2. Real estate debt (except own home)
1..3. Business, farm debt (except. land and real estate)
LB. Total commercial debt [= 12 + L3]
14. First home mortgage
L5. Second home mortgage
L7. Total home mortgage debt [= 14 + L5]
LB. Total real property debt [= 12 + ... + L5]
1.9. Tot.alliabilities [= L1 + ... + LS]
NETWOImI
NWl. Net liquid assets [= AB - L1]
NW2. Net commercial property assets [= A4 + A5 - 16]
NW3. Net home equity [= A6 - L7]
NW4. Accumulated savings for child's college education [= AiD]
NW5. Net worth [= NW1 + NW2 + NW3 + NW4]
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be expected that this would already have been included in other categories of assets.
However. a comparison of reported accumulations for the child's college education (by
form or type of asset in which it was held) with corresponding reports of assets in the
balance sheet component of the questionnaire suggested that this component of
wealth was in fact systematically excluded from other assets, at least in a majority of
cases. Given tax inducements to transfer legal title to such assets to the child. this
exclusion may not be surprising. and in other cases the parents may segregate these
assets from other assets psychologically even if not legally. As a result, this "segrega-
tionist" interpretation of savings for college as a distinct category of asset, resulting
in a "maximalist" computation of net worth, appears more reasonable than any alter-
native.
1.3. Implicit Interest (Property) Income and EIpeDSe
In order to achieve a more neutral, comprehensive measure of current income, it is
necessary to derive several conceptually distinct measures of implicit interest, or,
more generally. property, income and expense. Only on this basis is it possible to
derive a measure of income which is not sensitive to the portfolio composition of the
family.
In the derivation of these implicit interest estimates, as developed in Table 2.3,
several assumed interest rates (denoted Ri) are employed The rate R1 is stipulated as
a relatively "low risk" (e.g., first-mortage) interest rate. R2 is a somewhat higher-
risk, secured rate (e.g .. second-mqrtgage, farm or business equiprnent). R3 ｾｾ then an
estimate of the consumer loan rate. Provisional values of these (circa. 1980) are also
indicated in Table' 2.3. Given these assumed rates, the subsequent items of interest
income and expense are derived.
The first of the indicated implicit interest income and expense measures will be
used to adjust the incomes of home owners to correspond conceptually to those of
renters. 5 Interest on "other real estate debt" (RY2) will be deducted from gross rental
ｾ ｴ ･ that the "actual" illterest rate on the fir.t home ｭ ｾ Ｆ Ｘ Ｎ i. u_d to obtain ｾ ewtimllte ｾ interesL
- - _..,:._ .... __._- -_. - _ .. - - ＮＭＧｾ --. --- ._- ."" - -
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Rl.
R2.
R3.
RY1.
RY2.
RY3.
RE1.
RE2.
RE3.
RE4.
RE5.
Table 2.3
Implicit Interest Rates, Income and Expense
DlPUCIT INTEREST RATES
Low-risk secured rate [= ｬ Ｒ ｾ ｝
Higher-risk secured rate [= ｬ Ｕ ｾ ｝
Consumer loan rate [= Ｑ ｂ ｾ ｝
IKPUCIT INTEREST (PROPERTY) INCOME
Owner-occupied housing income [= Rl . A6]
Business, farm (exc. real estate) asset income [= R2 . A5]
Business, farm real estate income [= R1 . A4]
IIIPIJCIT lNTKRES1" (PROPER'l"Y) EXPENSE
Mortgage interest [= ACT...RATE . £4- + R2· £5]
Other real estate debt interest
[= Rl . £2; = 0 if (Y12 > 0 and Y7 = 0)]
Business, farm (exc. real estate) interest expo [= R2 . £3]
Business, farm real estate expense
[= R3 . £2; =0 if (Y7 > 0 or Y12 =0)]
Current personal debt interest [= R3 . £1;
but ｾ Y1B + RY1 + RY2 + RY3 - REl - RE2 - RE3 - RE4-]
income to obtain a measure of net real estate income. Finally, the business-farm
components of implicit interest income and expense will be used in side adjustments
to decompose total selfemployment income into labor and capital components. The
only significant complication in the foregoing involves the decomposition of real
estate interest income and expense into business/farm and other ("pure real estate")
components. Essentially. it positive (presumably gross) rental income (Y7) was
reported. "pure" (non-business/farm- related) interest expense on real estate
paid. In fact, the procedure was lIOmewhat m.ore complicated. Respondents were to report (1) the original
principal of the m0J'tillle, (2) the principal remaining, (3) the interest rate and (4) the year in which the
mortillle was negotiated. Inspection of the data indicated that original principal was more accu:rately re-
poned than principal :remaining. The:refo:re, outstanding principal was obtained by mathematically deter-
mini.n& the remai.nin& principal. aBSUIDing a 25 year mortgage lakeD out ill the illdicated year at the indicat-
ed interest rate. In any case in which the interest rate was missiJ:l&, the modal value for the year in question
IRIS utilized. Only if the original m0Ttiage year and interest rate were missing was .the stated remaining
principal utilized. . .
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liabilities is assumed. However, if selfemployment income (Y12) is positive and rental
income (Y7) is zero. then interest on real estate debt is assumed to be attributable to
business or farm real estate. If both are zero, pure real estate interest is assumed to
be at least offset by unobserved real estate appreciation.
1.4. Adjusted Current Income
Because implicit business/farm interest (property-type) income and expense are
presumably included (on a net basis) in selfemployment income (Y12), the adjusted
measure of current income is not altered by the values of these components of impli-
cit interest income and expense; they are of relevance only in the decomposition of
selfemployment income into property-type and labor components, the latter of which
is further distributed between the father and mother in proportion to ｴ ｨ ｾ ｩ ｲ respective
total selfemployment incomes.S Other components of implicit interest income and
expense. however. do enter into the derivation of total adjusted current income, as
outlined in Table 2.4.
1.5. SlImmary of the Alternative ｬ ｉ ･ ｾ of Actual Current Financial Status
As developed in the foregoing sections of this chapter, the elements entering into the
assessment of actual current parental ftnancial capacity can be classified as falling
into one of two broad classes, incom.e and wealth (the former a "ftow" variable, the
latter a "stock" variable). The two are related in that (a) in general (but subject to
exceptions) wealth is the product of past savings out of income and (b) income
includes current returns to accumulated wealth.
Broadly speaking, income can be decomposed into three components: (1) labor
income, (2) capital (property-type or wealth) income. and (3) other income (including
6.rms procedure. it should be noted, permits the derivation of a negative labor component of selfemployment
income. Conceptually, the procedure could be reversed. with an estimate of pure labor elU'Ilin&s deducted
trom selfemployment income to obtain the net capital income component. Because the "true" economic op-
portunity cost of capital devoted to selfemployment can be determined more accurately than that of labor.
the procedure elected appearll to be more reasonable. .
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Table 2.4
Adjusted Current Income and Its Components
AYl. Net property component of selfemployment income
[= RY2 + RY3 - RE3 - RE4]
AY2. Labor component of selfemployment income [= Y12 - AYl]
AY3. Father's wage and salary income [= Yl]
AY4. Father's labor selfemp. income [= AY2 . Y2 / Yl2]
AYlB. Father's total labor income [= AY3 + AY4]
AY5. Mother's wage and salary income [= Y3]
AY6. Mother's labor selfemp. income [= AY2 - AY4]
AYl9. Mother's total labor income [= AY5 + AY6]
AY7. Gross interest income [= Y5]
AYB. Gross dividend income [= Y6]
AY9. Personal debt interest expense (negative) [= -RE5]
AY2D. Net securities' income [= AY7 + AYB + AY9]
AYID. Gross rental income [= Y7]
AYll. Real estate interest expense (negative) [= -RE2]
AY21. Net real estate income [= AY1D + AYU]
ａ ｙ ｬ ｾ Ｎ 01!t1er-occ. housing implicit into income [= RYl]
AY13. Owner-occ. housing interest expo (negative) [= -"REl]
AY22. Net owner-acc. housing income [= AYl2 + AY13]
AY23. Total net property-type income [= AY1 + AY7 + ... + AY13]
AY14. Social Security, pensions, etc. [= Ye]
AY15. Other "public" transfers [= Y9]
AY24. Total Ｂ ｰ ｵ ｢ ｬ ｾ ｣ Ｂ ｾ ｲ Ｒ Ａ ｄ ｬ ｩ ｦ ･ Ｂ [= AYl4 + AY 15 = Y17]
AY16. Private transfers [== YIO]
AY25. Total transfer payments [= AYl4 + AY15 + AY16 = Y1e]
AY17. Miscellaneous income [= Yll]
AY26. Adjusted net current income [= AY1 + AY3 + ... + AY17
:: Y19 + RYI - REI - RE2 - RE5]
public and private transfers and any other "unclassiftable" income). Precise
ditIerentiati.on between these. and especially between labor and capital income, is not
unambiguous, and it is for this reason that two somewhat different accounting sys-
terns for current income have been developed.. The first. designated the "Y" system,
might be characterized as a "conventional" accounting, while the second. designated
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the "AY" system, can be characterized as a "comprehensive economic" accounting.
In the conventional accounting, labor income is defined as the sum of reported
(a) wages and salaries and (b) selfemployment income. For the household, labor
income thus-defined, denoted YL, is equal to the sum of Y13 {father's labor income}
and Y14 (mother's labor income). The economically undesirable feature of this meas-
ure is that reported {presumably net} selfemployment income includes a component
which should actually be considered income to capital invested in the business or
farm {the value of business/farm equipment. real estate and other assets}. Thus. the
comprehensive measure of labor income, denoted AYL, differs from the conventional
measure in that net capital income incorporated in reported selfemployment income
is deducted from selfemployment income to arrive at an estimate of "pure" labor
income.
Under the conventional accounting system. capital income is defined. simply. as
the sum of reported {a} gross interest income. {b} gross dividend income. and {c}
gross rental income. which together can be designated YK. The disadvantages of this
measure of capital income are that (a) it is a gross measure which fails to take into
account negative elements of capital income. e.g., interest expense. and hence is sen-
sitive to the asset/liability composition of the family's portfolio. {b} it excludes the
capital element of selfemployment income. and {c} it excludes implicit rental income
on owner-occupied housing (understating the incomes of owners relative to renters).
For these reasons, the comprehensive measure of capital income. designated AYK (=
AY23), adds to the conventional measure {a} the capital component of selfemployment
income. {b} implicit rental income on owner-occupied housing, and deducts {c}
interest expenses.
The residual element of income consists of total {public and private} transfer pay-
ments {Y18 = AY25} plus miscellaneous {unclassiftable} income {Yll = AY17}. result-
ing in a total YT = AYT. Thus, the conventional and comprehensive accounting sys-
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terns differ only in their estimates of labor and capital income. The AY measure of
labor income will necessarily be less than or equal to the Y measure, in that the capi-
tal income component of selfemployrnent income is deducted from the lalter to obtain
the former. The relationship between the conventional and comprehensive measures
of capital income cannot be determined a priori. in that there are both additions and
substractions in moving from the former to the latter.
In contrast to current income, which can be determined and decomposed subject
to two alternative accounting systems, there i,s a single accounting ｭ ･ ｡ ｾ ｵ ｲ ･ of wealth
or net worth, equal to gross assets less gross liabilities, denoted W (= NW5). Empiri-
cally, there are indeed ambiguities in the derivation of wealth or net worth, especially
with reference. to discrepancies between reported assets. on the one hand. and
reported parental savings for the child's college education, on the other. Assuming
that parent's systematically excluded the latter in reporting the former, an assump-
lion for which there is empirical support,? a Ｂｭ｡ｸｩｭ｡ｬｩｳｾＢ ｾ･｡ｳｵｲ･ of net worth can
be obtained. incorporating college saVings as a distinct category of assets in the deter-
mination of net worth, as derived above. This maximalist measure of net worth is util-
ized in the empirical analyses of this study.
2. Potential f'inancial Capacity
While a number of estimates and imputations are required to obtain the AY income
measures from the underlying Y, A. and L elements, the Y, AY and NW accounting sys-
terns are intended to relfect ｾ ｳ ｡ ｣ ｣ ｵ ｲ ｡ ｴ ｾ ｬ ｹ as ｰ ｯ ｾ ｳ ｩ ｢ ｬ ･ actual income flow!;> to and
wealth stocks of the family. For many purposes, however. what might be character-
7As noted above. a comparison of reported "savings for college" and reported gross assets (in the balance
sheet segment of the parents' questionnaire) indicated that, in a substantial majority of cues, savin&s re-
ported for a child's college education were not considered II. component of the parents' aeneral assets and
net worth. This may reflect either that the plll'ents' actually transfered legal title to these funds to the child
(M action which would be encoureged by tax considerations) or that the parents' simply do not consider
these assets to be annable, i.e., segregate college savings from other assets. This "segregationist" hy-
pothesis is reflected in the derivation of net worth (If' = NW5) in Table 2.2, in which reported savings for col-
lege is treated as a differentiable asset (AIO) and component of net worth (NW5). .
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ized as "potential" financial capacity will be of equal or greater interest. Most briefiy
stated. the important difference between families may be not in actual financial
resources but rather in the financial resources potentially available to the family.
Discrepancies between actual and potential financial capacity will simply refiect
voluntary desicions on the part of the family not to fully exploit financial opportuni-
ties. decisions which can be argued to be within the legitimate purview of the family
alone and hence of no public policy significance. Moreover, the measures of actual
financial capacity may be imperfect, requiring adjusll. ｟ ｾ ｴ for unreported and/or
unrealized components of income. Both issues are dealt with under the rubric of
potential. financial ca.pa.city.
2.1. Potential Capital Income Conditional on Actual Wealth
Altbough the comprehensive measure of capital income (AYK) has been designed to be
exhausive. this measure may nonetheless be seriously incoIIJplete. in that it excludes
"unrealized" capital income (Le., unrealized capital gains). Moreover, this measure
may well be subject to substantial underreporting of realized capital income fiows. To
adjust for tbese sources of error, it is possible to substitute an imputation of capital
income, conditional on the level of net wort.h. for actually derived capital income in
any case in which the former exceeds the latter. For this purpose, imputed capital
income is defined as the product of the low-risk interest rate (Rl) and reported wealth
(W). The result (the maximum of derived capital income, AYK. and imputed capital
income, Rl . W) can be designated as "potential capital income conditional on actual
wealt.h," PAWAYK. Combining the adjusted measure of labor income (AYL). transfer
income (YT) and potential capital income conditional on actual wealth (PAWAYK). a
"potential-actual-wealth-conditional" measure of income, PAWAY, is obtained.
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2.2. Potential Labor Income
While the adjusted measure of labor income (AYL) represents a comprehensive meas-
ure of labor income actually received. it has the disadvantage from an economic point
of view of failing to take into account nonpecuniary labor income (differential leisure
and nonpecuniary aspects of specific employments). As a result. when benefits of pub-
lic programs are apportioned on the basis of income defined according to the AY
accounting system. more or less serious discrimination against those who more fully
exploit their pecuniary earnings capacity is implied. resulting in potentially serious
horizontal inequities. To achieve greater neutrality with reference to the
pecuniary/nonpecuniary composition of labor income (including the value of
differential leisure associated with nonparticipation in the labor force). an estimate of
"potential pecuniary labor income" can be derived. and in any case in which reported
labor income falls short of this estimate of potential labor income. the latter can be
substituted for the former.
The difficulty associated with the derivation of "potential pecuniary labor
income" is that earnings vary over individuals for a large number of observed and
unobserved reasons. To capture the observed sources of variation. earnings (wage-
salary) functions (stratified by sex) have been estimated. utilizing as observations per-
sons for whom (a) wages and salaries exceeded $1.000 and (b) selfemployment net
labor income (AY measure) was less than 20 percent of total net labor income (AY
measure). In the estimated equation. the natural logarithm of reported wages and
salaries was expressed as a linear function of (a) age (in decades). (b) age (in decades)
squared. (c) a series of dummy variables for full- and part-time employment (before
the child was in elementary school. when the child was in elementary and in high
school), (d) a series of dummy variables for educational attainment. and (e) a series of
dummy variables for race/ethnicity. i.e..
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AYI.
where AYI.
fJ•.i
A.
L5•.;
ED. .•
n..T
8.
= adjusted labor income of the parent (of sex s) ..
= estimated coetncient.
= year of age.
= labor force status dummy (j= 1....•nLS).
= education dummy (e=l•...•nED).
= race dummy (r= 1•...•nR). and
= error.
Thus. estimating separate earnings functions for males and females. predictions of
earnings conditional on sex. age. educational attainment. race and prior work history
of the parent can be obtained. The coetncients of the estimated earnings functions
are presented in Table 2.5. In the case of the age variable. if age was missing for any
individual. age was set equal to that of the spouse (if available) or to the modal age for
the individual's sex. Missing educational attainments are the "excluded" category.
represenled by the constant term of the equation. In the case of labor-foI"ce-
participation status. persons who did not report working either full- or part-time are
included in the intercept. Le .• the intercept includes both those who did not work and
those for whom the information was missing. Similarly. in the case of race both
whiles and persons for whom race was missing are captured by the intercept.
The estimated earnings functions conform q,uite closely to those generally avail-
able in the literature. Thus. earnings first rise (at a decreasing rate) and then decline
with age. While this is true for both males and females. the rate of initial increase is
substantially greater for men than for women. For both males and females earnings
rise significantly with increases in educational attainment from less than high school
graduation (EDI = 1) to high school graduation (ED2 = 1). However. the etIects of edu-
cation beyond high school but less than college graduation (ED3 = 1 through ED7 = 1)
are quite mixed. Completion of a baccalaureate degree (ED6 = 1) is highly beneficial
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Table 2.5
Estimated Male and Female Earnings Functions
Male Female
Explanatory Variables
Age 0.066 0.023
(0.011) (0.020)
2(0. 1 Age)
-0.069 -0.029
(0.012) (0.022)
ED1 -0.394 -0.343
(< HS grad) (0.117) (0.154)
ED2 -0.199 -0.187
(HS grad) (0.117) (0.152)
ED3 -0.204 -0.128
(< 1 yr. voc-tech) (0.124) (0.160)
ED4 -0.162 -0.036
(1-2 yrs. voc-tech) (0.121) (0.156)
ED5 -0.096 0.056
(2 yrs. voc-tech) (0.123) (0.166)
ED6 -0.030 0.026
(< 2 yrs. college) (0.119) (0.155)
ED7 0.004 0.014
(2-3 yrs. college) (0.122) (0.160)
ED8 0.200 0.064(4-5 yrs. college) (O.ii9) (0.157)
ED9 0.149 0.276
(master's degree) (0.121) (0.164)
ED10 0.380 0.600
(doctoral degree) (0.126) (0.265)
(Table 2.5 continues)
but substantially more so for males than females. Interestingly, by comparison to a
baccalaureate degree. a master's degree (ED9 = 1) actually results in lower earnings
for males but in a substantial positive increment for females. And while a higher gra-
duate or professional degree (EDlO =1) is profitable for males, it is significantly more
beneficial for females. With the exception of the period prior to the child's entry into
Dresch, St.owe ok Waldenberl 2.18
Table 2.5, continued
27.5.84
Explanatory Variables
WRILFT.JiS
WRJLPT.JiS
WRILFTJ:L
WRJLPTJL
WRILFT.J3F
WRJLPT.J3F
RACE1
(Native Am.)
RACE2
(Asian. Pac. Is.)
RACE3
(Hispanic)
RACE4
Ｈｾｬ｡ｃ＿ｩ｣Ｉ
Constant
Standard error
Male
0.366
(0.067)
-0.301
(0.084)
-0.012
(0.076)
-0.310
(0.093)
0.159
(0.063)
0.196
(0.084)
-0.14-0
(0.063)
-0.226
(0.064)
-0.247
(0.031)
-0.236
Ｈ Ｐ Ｎ ｏ ｾ Ｓ Ｉ
7.901
(0.296)
0.285
0.499
Female
0.211
(0.051)
-0.367
(0.053)
0.152
(0.041)
0.061
(0.037)
0.111
(0.035)
0.110
(0.040)
-0.061
(0.081)
0.127
(0.104)
-0.176
(0.046)
-0.146
(0.037)
B.626
(0.472)
0.218
0.687
Note: Dependent variable is lhe natural loga-
rithm of wages and salaries.
Standard error of estimated coefficient in
parentheses.
Age is expressed in decades.
All variables other than age and age-
squared are dichotomous (0.1).
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elementary school. working full-time in the past. by comparison to working part-time.
implies higher current earnings, and this is the case for both males and females. The
lack of any significant difference for work prior to the child's elementary schooling
may well retIecl the fact that many parents working only part-time in this period may
well have been attending school, with the part-time work variable capturing some part
of the returns to schooling. By comparison to whites and persons whose race was
missing, males of other races experience significantly lower earnings. The
ditIerentials are substantially smaller, and more variable, for females.
2.2.1. Potential Current Labor Income
In the first variant of potential pecuniary labor income, denoted "potential current
labor income" (PCAYl.. ). variables related to past labor force participation (full- and
part-time work before and during elementary school) are permitted to take on actu-
ally observed values. Working full-time waen the child was in high school is specified.
as a proxy for working full-time in 1979, the year for which 'income is reported (when
tile child was either a sophomore or senior in high school). The logarithmic earnings
function is then evaluated for each parent s of family i (denoted s,i), resulting in the
expected value of the natural logarithm of earnings. J.L..i == ::C••i'fJ•. Given the assump-
tion (implicit in the estimation of an ordinary least squares earnings function) that
tile distribution around the expected value of the natural logarithm of expected earn-
ings is normal, then the antilogarithm of JL..i [== ･ｾＧＨ｝ is the median of the distribution
of expected earnings.
Unobserved characteristics of the individual, Le., characteristics not captured (or
not adequately captured) by the vector ::C••i' are responsible for the variance of the log
of earnings around its expected value. Because (a) it would be indefensible to assume
,
that the individual had no characteristics adversely a1Iecting earnings in making an
imputation of potential labor income and (b) persons not in the labor force or ex:hibit-
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ing low earnings can be expected to have what are. on average, net negative charac-
teristics (with reference to the determinants of earnings).8 it is simply inappropriate
to impute to an individual exhibiting low or zero earnings the ｭ ･ ､ ｩ ｾ ｛ ･ ｾ Ｎ ｩ ｝ or the
mean ｛ ･ ｾ Ｎ ｩ + ua:. where af is the standard error of the estimated regreSSion] of
expected earnings. Instead., the lower quartile of the expected earnings distribution
｛ ･ ｾ Ｎ ｩ ｾ Ｎ Ｘ Ｗ Ｂ Ｎ ｝ is determined. and the greater of this value (the lower quartile of
expected net labor income) and actual net labor income (AYL.) is used as the measure
of PCAYL.. potential current labor income.9 For the household the resultant measure
of potential current labor income is denoted PCAYL (= ｾ PCAyz..). Combining this
•
measure of potential current labor income (PCAYL) with the potential-actual-wealth-
conditional estimate of capital income (PAWAYK) and transfer income (YT). an esti-
mate of "potential-current-wealth-conditional" total income (PCAWAY) is obtained.
2.2.2. PotenUal Lifecycle Labor Income
As noled. the measure of potential current labor income accepts whatever work his-
tory is reported. Thus. individuals who chose not to work when the child was in ele-
mentary school are not penalized for this less-than-modal ｰ ｡ ｴ ｴ ｾ ｲ ｮ of prior labor force
participation. However. it can be argued that this results in an understatement of
potential labor income of nonworkers. or alternatively. relatively overstates the labor
incomes of those who did chose to work in the past. resulting in unfairly favorable
treatment of the former relative to the latter (who are penalized because t.hey have.
and generally are expected to have. higher labor income now precisely because of
their higher past pattern of labor force participation. while others are compensated
B.r.m. is simply an instance of selection bias. The ezpectation of low earnincs will lead to Il BT-rtematic reduc-
tion in labor force participation under any conventionalllllSWIlptions.
9.rbe ejection of the lower quartile of predicted ellTl1in&s lIS the measure of potential earnin&s is, obviously,
arbitrary. r.n the empirical analysis the sensitivity of the results to this election will be assessed by com-
ｾ ｰ ｡ ｲ ｩ Ｘ Ｐ ｮ to tne altern.atiTei of electinB the median and the lower decile.
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for the failure to work in the past). For this reason. a' second estimate of potential
labor income. denoted "potential lifecycle labor income" (PLCAYL.). is derived. In
this case. the evaluation of the estimated earnings function of males stipulates fuU-
time work in both past perios (before and during elementary school), while for females
nonparticipation in the labor force is assumed for the period prior to elementary
scbool. followed by full-time work after elementary school entry. For both males and
females the stipulated lifecycle patterns of work represent the modal patterns. In
other words, the vector x.,\ is altered to retieclthe modal pattern of labor force parti-
cipation. regardless of the pattern actually exhibited by the individual. The earnings
function is then evaluated, and the adjustment to obtain the first (lower) quartile is
made, as indicated above. 10 The result is a lower-bound estimate of potential lifecycle
labor income which. if greater than actual net labor income, is used as the estimate of
PLCAYL.. Potential lifecycle income for the household is then PLCAYL (= 2: PLCAYL.) .
•
The rellultant measure of total income is PLCAWAY (z: PLCAYL + PAWAYK + YT),
"potential lifecycle income conditional on actual wealth."
2.3. Potential Yealth and Associated Capital Income
A serious source of horizontal inequity is incorporated in ｰ ｕ ｾ ｬ ｩ ｣ programs which
apportion benefits according to wealth: Of two otherwise identical individuals or fami-
lies (identical in lifetime income and initial wealth), the one which elects to defer con-
sumption to more advanced ages (saving more heavily at younger ages to permit sub-
sequent dissaving) or which receives a higher proportion of its income at younger
ages (requiring higher levels of savings in order to achieve a common consumption
pattern over the lifecycle) is penalized due to its higher observed level of wealth.
Thus. a tax on actually observed wealth (W) results in discrimination in favor of non-
l°Again, the sensitivity of the results to the arbitrary election of the lower quartile will be assessed by com-
parison to the medill.Il llJld lower decile.
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savers and against savers.
As in the case of earnings. differences in wealth can be viewed as a function of
both observed and unobserved individual (family) characteristics. On the one hand.
wealth will depend upon the lifecycle profile of earnings. On the other, it will depend
upon (a) preferences for present versus future consumption and (b) exigencies (e.g..
medical) which virtually force low rates of savings on individuals (families) under cer-
tain circumstances.
Unfortunately. in the present context only current income and wealth (however
defined) are observable. The first step in the derivation of the potential wealth meas-
ure is to exploit what little information is available to estimate how, in fact, a family
arrived at the present level of income and the present level of wealth. We assume,
first, that all past returns to wealth have been reinvested, and second. that all
transfer and miscellaneous income is (and has been in the past) consumed. Under
these assumptions, the current Levei of wealth is equal to the ditrerence between (a)
the present value of all past labor income and (b) the present value of all past con-
sumption out of labor income. To simplify the analysis, we further assume that, prior
to age 25, all labor income is consumed (wealth is zero). Le., that the term "past," as
Just employed, consists of the period between age 25 and the current age.
If the lifecycle profile of earnings is known, and if the generic characteristics of
the lifecycle profile of consumption are known. then knowledge of (a) current labor
income and (b) current wealth, together, permits the derivation of the actuallifecycle
paths of income, consumption/savings and wealth. To identify the lifecycle path of
labor income, income from age 25 to the current age (denoted a) is assumed to have
grown at the rate of mean earnings growth between the ages of 25 and 45 revealed by
cross-sectional earnings data in 1979, conditional on educational attainment. Given
this assumed rate of real earnings growth, it is assumed that consumption out of labor
income has grown, between the ages of 25 and a, at a real annual rate equal to 0.75
Dresch. St.owe & Waldenberi 2.23 27.5.84
times the stipulated rate of real earnings growth. It is then possible to determine the
value of consumption at age 25 and, by implication, the age 25 savings rate.
Specifically. denoting labor income at age a by La,.
where
Then,
g
ｌＲｾ = I,. ｛ ｬ Ｋ ｧ ｝ Ｍ Ｈ Ｑ ｉ Ｍ Ｒ ｾ Ｉ
is the assumed (educational-attainment-conditional)
real rate of earnings growth.
or
II II
WII =ｌＲｾ ｾ ｻＱＫｧＩｩＭＲｾｻＱＫｲＩｬｉＭｩ + ｃＲｾ ｾ {1+h)i-2:5{1+r)II"";(=2:5 (.2:5
II
ｌ ｾ ｾ {1+g)i-2:5{1+r)II-i - WII
("2:5ｃＲｾ =-....;....;;;.;;.----------t {1+h)i-2:5{l+r)lI-i
Ｈ ｾ
where WII
C2:l
h = 0.75·g
r = 0.03
is observed wealth at age a,
is implied consumption at age 25.
is the rate of growth of consumption out of labor in-
come. and
is the real interest rate (= Rl minus the inflation
rate = 0.03 by assumption. Le., rate of inflation
stipulated is 0.09).
The age-25 savings rate. rS2:5' is
Once the age-25 savings rate is determined. the entire temporal proflle of con-
sumption, savings and wealth can be derived. conditional only on age-a (and, by impli-
cation, age-25) labor income. Thus. to obtain a proxy for potential wealth, the
observed distribution of the age-25 savings rate can be employed. If the only factor
influencing the age-25 savings rate were the family's preferences for future versus
present consumption (rate of time preference). then discrimination in favor of those
ditTerentially preferring present over future consumption could be avoided by imput-
ing the mean or median age-25 savings rate and hence obtaining a corresponding
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(mean or median) measure of potential wealth at age a. This would effectively involve
asking the question: What.would be the family's wealth at age a if it had saved over its
lifecycle at rates representative of the population at large?
In fact. as noted above. savings rates vary for a number of observed and unob-
served reasons. First. the savings rate may well be a function of the level of income
ilself. i.e.. lhose wilh higher incomes (over lhe lifecycle) may save al higher rales
than lhose with lower incomes (molivaled by lhe desire to leave bequesls. elc.).
Second, even conditional on income. savings rates may be lower for some families
because of specific adverse financial circumslances (or financial exigencies). To con-
trol for lhese two sources of variation in savings rates. the age 25 savings rate, 1"S2:l'
can be expressed as a function of proxied age-25 labor income. L2fj, and its square.
This estimaled equation is reported in Table 2.6. Then. conditional on the imputed age
25 labor income of any family. lhe lower quarlile of the labor-income-conditional esti-
mate of tbe age-25 sav'j.nas rate ｩ ｾ determined. Le.,
rslltl.t, =Clo + al L 2tl + Cl2Ll:J - 0.674a.
where a is tbe standard error of tbe estimated equation. The lower quartile of the
age 25 savings rate thus recognizes. al leasl in parl. the possibility of adverse cir-
cumstances which may lead to lower than conventional rales of savings. 11
Given the lower-quartile savings rate. polentialweallh (PWII •tv ) is obtained as indi-
cated above. Assuming lhe educational-attainment-specitlc rate of earnings growth.
from implied age-25 labor income and the lower-quartile age-25 savings rate (itself a
funclion of lhe implied level of age-25 labor income) it is possible to derive the lime
palhs (between age 25 and age 11) of earnings and consumption. The difference
between the present values of earnings and consumption is lhen an estimate of
"lower-quarlile polentialweallh, II i.e ..
11As in the case of the imputation of lower-quartile labar income. the sensitivity of the election of the lower
quartile will be alllessed in the empirical analysis by comparillOD to the results when the median and lower
decile are elected.
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Table 2.6
Estimated Age-25 Savings Rate Equation
rS2:1
AYL2:1 +0.348·10-:1(0.408'10-8)
AYL1:l -0.605'10-10
(0.967'10-11)
Constant -0.032
(0.004)
R2 0.021
Standard Error 0.085
Note: Std. error of est. coef. in parentheses.
G G
PW•. ltl =L2,:> 1: (1+g)'-2':>(1+r)·-i + L2:1(1....,.S2':>.I') 1: (1+h)'-2:1(1+r)G-i
Ｈ ］ ｾ (=2':>
2.3.1. PotentiJll Currellt ｾ ･ ｡ ｬ ｴ ｨ
Two "lower quartile potential wealth" measures are derived. The first. denoted
"potential current wealth" (PCW). is obtained using actual current labor income (AYL)
(if positive) as the L,. measure. 12 In any case in which actual current wealth (W) is
greater than potential current wealth (PCW). PCW is set equal to W. i.e.; PCW is equal to
the greater of actual and potential current wealth. Corresponding to this measure of
potential current wealth is a measure of "capital income from potential current
wealth" (PCWAYK = R1 . PCW). which replaces AYK as the measure of capital income.
The corresponding measure of total income is PcWAY (= AYL + PCWAYK + IT).
2.3.2. Potential Lifecycle Wealth
The second measure of potential wealth. denoted "potential lifecycle wealth" (PLCW).
12If actual current labor income (AYL) is zero or negative, then potential current wealth is also assumed to
be zero.
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is derived using potential lifecycle labor income (PLCAYL) as the measure of La. As
before. in any case in which actual current wealth (W) is greater than potential lifecy-
cle wealth (PLCW). PLCW is set eqaul to W. Le.. PLCW is equal to the greater of actual
and potential lifecycle wealth. Corresponding to this measure of potential lifecycle
wealth is a measure of "capital income from potential lifecycle wealth"
(PLCWAYK = Rl . PLCW), which replaces AYK as the measure of capital income. Obvi-
ously. this is internally consistent only which potential lifecycle labor income
(PLCAYL) replaces actual net labor income in the derivation of total income. Thus,
the corresponding measure of total income is
PLCPWAY (= PLCAYL + PLCPWAYK + YT).
3. Other lIeasures of Parental Financial Capacity
The measures of actual and potential financial capacity which have been developed in
the preceeding sections of this chapter can be interpreted as viewing parental support
for a child's schooling as a tax, levied at specified rates on parental income and
wealth, however defined. In Chapter 6. moreover. in which the major existing program.
of "need-based" grants to students (Pell or Basic Educational Opportunity Grants) is
examined. this interpretation is made explicit. Whether explicit or implicit, this tax:
interpretation essentially involves the issue of the appropriate definition of income
and wealth for purposes of specifying the tax: base. For a variety of reasons. this cast-
ing of the issue can be questioned and can even be argued to be inappropriate.
Perhaps most importantly. postsecondary education represents an investment in
the child. Requiring the active participation of the child (a person who. at the level of
higher education. is almost invariably age 17 or older), generating a stream of returns
to which the child will, in the first instance. hold title (and from which the child will,
in most cases, derive the full benefit). the investment can most appropriately be
viewed as one made by the child. not the parents. Under these circumstances it is
reasonable to ask (a) wnether the parents apd tne child.. ind.ividually or collectively,
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do view parental support of postsecondary education as a legitimate "tax" on the
parents, and (b) whether society should view such parental support in this light and, if
necessary, attempt to impose this perception (and corresponding action) on the
parents and child.
At the most general level, a tax may be a legitimate basis on which to finance the
provision of truly collective goods, e.g., national defense, and general income redistri-
bution, but it is highly questionable on efficiency grounds as a basis for the financing
of investments, whether in plant and equipment, physical structures such as build-
ings, bridges, highways and ports, or human capital of the type represented by post-
secondary or higher education. Most simply stated. if investments are financed via
taxes, as opposed to the capital market, then there can be no assurance that invest-
ments which are in fact undertaken have higher value (generate higher rates of
return) than investments which are not undertaken. 13
Secondly, even if it were considered appropriate to finance postsecondary educa-
lion via a tax on parents, in the absence of legal mandates and sanctions for parental
support the tax is entirely voluntary. Thus, just because society believes that a par-
ticular assessment against parental income and wealth should be made in determin-
ing the level of supplementary governmental for the child's schooling, there is no
assurance that this parental assessment will actually be forthcoming in support of the
child's schooling. If the issue of equity in governmental support for postsecondary
schooling is viewed with reference to the population of actual and potential students,
as ultimately it must (since students embody the ultimate output, human capital),
then a student who fails to receive the socially sanctioned parental assessment but
receives a lower or nonexistent governmental benefit because of the stipulated (but
nonmandated) parental assessment is indeed treated unfairly vis-a.-vis other students
13.rhis issue is addressed in Stephen P. Dresch. "Save the Infrastructure - By Auctioning It Off," Opinion and
Commentary, Tha C7ln.stian &ienc. Monitor (December 9, 1982).
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whose socially sanctioned parental assessments are lower, who receive higher govern-
mental benefits as a result, but who also actually receive the sanctioned parental
assessment (or even greater amounts) from the parents.
Finally, there is the issue of the practical import of differences in assessed paren-
tal financial capacity. If, in fact, children of parents with lower assessed financial
capacity, ceteris paribus (all else equal), make investments in postsecondary educa-
tion which are comparable in magnitude to those of persons whose parents have
higher assessed financial capacity, or if differences in parental financial capacity
affect only the cost (as opposed to quantity or quality) of schooling, then differences
in financial capacity, at least as measured. will have no or little allocative
significance, and "compensatory" governmental interventions will serve only to redis-
tribute income to parents with low ftnancial capacity or to children of these parents.
With data on a single cohort of actual/potential students, it will be difficult (in fact,
impossiQle) to isolate tpe effects of dUIerences irt assessed financial capacity per se
from the etrecls of compensatory governmental interventions on schooling invest-
ments, since a measure of parental financial capacity is the primary determinant of
the level of governmental support. However, it is important at least to consider the
relationship of actual schooling investments' to parental financial capacity, govern-
mental support and other factors.
For the foregoing reasons, a number of financial measures not directly concerned
with parental financial capacity as a tax: base are also examined in this study. These
relate to the potential for intrafamily debt financing (as opposed to financial capacity
for tax purposes) and to levels of postsecondary expenditure and sources of funds.
3.1. 'Loanable Yunds': Parents as Capital. Suppliers to the Child
If postsecondary education is conceived as an investment by the child in his human
capital, undertaken in the expectation that the returns to that investment (pecuniary
and nonpecuniary) will equal or exceed the cost of funds, then the financing of that
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investment can be viewed as legitimately within the purview of the capital market.
However. for a variety of reasons, related to the mobility of human capital. to the pos-
si bility of substituting nonpecuniary for pecuniary returns, but especially to the Con-
stitulional and statutory status of human capital as an asset which cannot be attached
by the lender in the event of default by the investing borrower, the overt private capi-
tal market may be virtually precluded as a source of financing for postsecondary edu-
cation. Nonetheless, indirect access to the capital market may well be available to
tile student through the intermedialioq ｾ Ｚ the family, at least to the extent of the
.
family's saleable or mortgageable wealth.
Total wealth, as defined above and represented by W, provides an upper bound on
the amount of credit which the parents. solely on the basis of realized wealth (not
including the value of the parents' human capital), can ext,end to the child., as a loan,
for purposes of human capital investment. However, total wealth contains a possibly
significant ilHquiq. componept. For portfolio reasons ｾ ｰ Ｎ ･ ｰ ｡ ｲ ･ ｮ Ｎ ｾ ｳ rnay prefer pot tq
liquidate illiquid assets (A9), and in any event the liquidation of these assets at prices
approximating their true market values may well not be instantaneously possible.
Thus, a more appropriate measure of potential parental capital supply is provided by
the sum of net liquid assets and the mortgageable component of illiquid assets less
associated liabilities.
Assuming, conservatively, that illiquid assets can be mortgaged at a minimum of
three-quarters of their reported values, an appropriate measure of "available wealth"
(AW) is provided by
AW = W - [0.25' A9]
where A9 is gross illiquid assets. This amount can be viewed as potentially available to
the child, as a loan from the parents, for purposes of financing the child's investment
in human capital.
In fact, the capital potentially available to the student exceeds the available
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wealth of the family by the amount which the family would elect to save out of
nonweallh income over the period of the human capital investment activity. If, for
example. the child is considering an investment in four years of collegiate schooling,
then the total capital that the family can provide over the four-year schooling period,
expressed as a present value at the commencement of schooling, is the family's avail-
able wealth plus the present value of savings out of nonwealth income over the four
year period. If the rate of growth of the family's savings out of nonwealth income is
approximately equal to the discount rate, then the total amount which can be pro-
vided by the family over the course of the investment period. again expressed as a
present value at the beginning of that period. is equal to available wealth plus four
times the current level of savings out of nonwealth income. 14
Unfortunately, we do not directly observe t.he current rat.e of savings (nonwealth
income less consumption). However. the analysis of Section 2.3 of this chapter can be
employed to derive an e3timate of the current rate of savings, ｣ ｏ ｉ ｬ ､ ｩ ｴ ｾ ｯ ｮ ｡ ｬ 9Il (a)
current. labor income (AYL) and (b) current wealth (W). In that section a lifecycle
profile of labor income was determined. assuming an educational-attainment-
conditional rate of labor income growth. In addition. it was assumed that the lifecycle
protlle of consumption out of labor income exhibited a rate of growth three-quarters
that of the rate of growth of labor income. Thus, it was possible to find that profile of
consumption just consistent with current income and wealth.
In the previous formulation, the analysis just described was utilized to find the
level of age-25 consumption and the corresponding rate of savings out of labor income
14rhe 3lress in the above on "savings out of nonwealth income" deseTVes at least brief note. Wealth at the
commencement of the lIChooli.D8 period will itself generate a stream of income. However, if it is assumed
that this stream of capital income is reinYested and that the discount rate is equal to the rate of return to
wealth, then the present Yalue of wealth, includi.D8 subsequent returns, at the conclusion of the school.in&
period. discounted to the commencement of the schooling period, will be identical to wealth actually ob-
Ie"ed at the commencement of the schooling period. In short, recognizing total wealth as potentially avail-
able to the student simultaneously recognizes that returns to wealth are aYailable. Thus, for consistency, it
is necessary to recognize only the present value of current savi.D8s out of nonwealth income, i.e., nonwealth
income less current consumption ezpenditures. To add to wealth the present value of total (inc1udi.D& capi-
tal) income less.consumption would be to double count the returns to initial wealth.
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at age 25. However, that analysis can easily be extended to obtain explicity an esti-
mate of consumption and savings at the current age. Specifically, if the derived level
of age 25 consumption for a family was C2:5' and the growth rate of consumption was h
(= O.75g. where g is the educational-attainment-conditional rate of real earnings
growth), then the implied level of consumption at the current age, a, is
CII = C2C (l+h)·-2:5
and the associated level of savings is
8g =La - C. (=AYL-C.)
Assuming that the rate of savings is approximately equal to the discount rate, "loan-
able funds" (LF), the amount which the parents have (or will have) available to supply
to the child (as a loan) for the support of four years of schooling, are given by
LF =AW + (4-8.) =W - (O.25·A9) + (4'8.)
Because other financial measures will represent annualized amounts (income, as:;ess-
ments on income and wealth), it is necessary for comparative purposes to present the
measure of loanable funds on an annualized basis, denoted "annualized loanable
funds" (ALF). Assuming a four-year schooling period. annualized loanable funds are,
then.
ALi' =[AW + (4.8.)(4
Annualized loanable funds thus-derived represent the amount which the parents in
principle are capable of supply to the student as a loan in each of four years of school-
ing, conditional on the child's repayment of the loan at an interest rate at least equal
to the rate which the parents could realize on their portfolio were it otherwise
invested. adjusted for the possibly greater risk involved in lending to the child as an
alternative to other possible investments of these resources.
It might be argued that it is inappropriate to recognize this amount as potentially
available to the child since the parents might not, in fact, agree to provide these
resources tp the student. 15 However, a refusal of the parents to advance to the student
1501 course, the same objeCtion can be made to' the determiriation 'of an "expected parent.' contribution"
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up to the full amount of loanable funds as repayable credits would reflect their per-
ception either (a) that the student was unlikely actually to realize a return sufficient
to permit repayment of the loan, or (b) that the student would refuse to fulfill what is
likely to be a legally unenforceable repayment obligation. However. if either of these
conditions is in fact fulfilled, then it can be argued that the child should not make the
investment or have access to debt financing for purposes of the investment. The capi-
tal market rightly assesses the financial prospects of alternative investments and res-
tricts the supply of funds to those investments which are expected to generate a rate
of return at least equal to the current market interest rate. Moreover, the capital
market quite legitimately refuses to provide credit to would-be borrowers who are
expected to purposefully evade contracted obligations. since such evasion totally
undermines the allocative efficiency of the capital market.
If the parents refuse to extend credit to the child, up to the amount of loanable
funds as 4efined above•.then it can be argued that. witp. minor exceptions. 110 ot.1:ler
capital supplier should consider an extension of credit to the child for purposes of
human capital investment. Presumably, the parents are in a better position to assess
both the potential financial returns to the child's schooling (taking into account abil-
ity. motivations, etc.) and the good-faith commitment of the child. as a borrower, to
meet his obligation to repay the loan. Thus. unless incompetence (in the assessment
of the child's financial prospects or of his integrity as a borrower) or purposeful vil-
lany can be demonstrated to underlie the parents' refusal to extend up to the amount
of loanable funds to the child. then such a refusal should be considered by other possi-
ble lendors (including governmental or governmentally- sponsored lendors) as a
justification for denying the child access to other (extrafamily) credit.
under conventional needs analyses. since this contribution may. similarly, not actually be o:l!ered to the stu-
dent, 88 discussed previously.
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3.2. Actual Parental Support or Postsecondary Schooling and Related Variables
While financial capacity (however defined) might be considered to be relevant to ·the
issue of what the parents ought to provide as financial support for the child's school-
ing, any particular measure of financial capacity may be only slightly related (or even
unrelated) to amounts which parents in fact provide. Thus. it is reasonable to con-
sider actual parental support of students. a question which can be addressed. obvi-
ously. only in the case of actual (as opposed to potential) students and. in the case of
HS&B, owy for parents of 1960 seniors. not sophomores (since only the base- year-
student and parent tiles are available to this study). For the academic year 1960-61,
actual parental support for the child's schooling. denoted "actual parental contribu-
tion" (APC), is directly reported by the parents.
While the parents' estimate of APC is available (SUbject to reporting error). the
interpretation of this amount is open to some question. First, it cannot be concluded,
necessarily. that a child whose APC is lower than another's is in fact receiving lesser
financial benefit from parents. Thus. prior or subsequent gifts and inheritances. e.g.,
parental agreement to repay educational loans incurred by the student. may fully
offset differences in APCs. Second, if, as suggested above, parental support, in at least
some cases. is considered a loan. then the availability of loans to the child for educa-
tional purposes at interest rates lower than the rate of return the parents can realize
on their porfolio will lead to a substitution of these Donfamily loans for parental loans.
which will appear as a reduction in the APC. Third, variations in APCs may simply
refiect differences in optimal levels of educational investment on the part of children.
in levels of schooling-period consumption financed via transfers or loans from the
parents and/or in the availability of support from other sources. With reference to
each of these three sources of variation in observed parental support, the existence
and differential availability of highly subsidized. governmentally-sponsored, educa-
tional loans would be ･ ｸ ｰ ･ ｣ ｴ ･ ｾ to significantly reduce the apparent level of parental
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In light of the foregoing. it will be important to examine the variation in APC in
relationship to variations in (a) schooling costs, (b) loans from nonparental sources
and (c) other sources of financial support for schooling. Thus, the following variables
are derived:
o postsecondary expenses (PSEXP), consisting of the sum of
• living expenses (IJVEXP), and
• schooling expenses (SCHEXP)
o total loans from nonfamily sources (1'1)
o total grants (TG), consisting of
• grants from Federal sources (FG)
• grants from nonFederal sources (OG)
o contributions to the child from other relatives (including spouse) (RCC)
o support from the child's own earnings (TE), consisting of
• summer earnings (SUME), and
• school-year earnings (SCHE)
o support from the child's own savings (CSAV)
Together, these variables will make it possible to examine covariations in all of the
principle sources of financial support and the relationship of these to variations in the
types and costs of schooling investments actually undertaken.
4. (Nerne.... of the Financial Measures
The various measures of income and wealth which have been derived in this chapter
are summarized in Table 2.7. Table 2.8 then summarizes the loanable funds. parental
contribution and postsecondary finance variables which have been developed. These
variables provide the focus for the financial analyses of this study.
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Table 2.7
Measures of Income and Weallh
Variable Derivalion
Labor Income
YL Conventional Yl3 + Yl4
AYL Comprehensive AYlB + AYl9
PCAYL Pol. currenl PCAYlB + PCAYl9
PLCAYL Pol. lifecycle PLCAYlB + PLCAYl9
Wealth
W Aclual NW5
PCW Pol. currenl maz[ W. J (AYL)]
PLCW Pol. lifecycle ma:z:[ W. J (PLCAYL)]
Capital Income
YK Conventional Yl6
AYK Comprehensive AY23
PAWAYK Pol. acl.-wllh.-cond. Rl·W
PCWAYK Pol. cur.-pol.wllh.-cond. Rl·PCW
PLCWAYK Pol. lifecyc.-pol.-wllh.-cond. Rl·PLCW
Transfer & Other Income
IT = AYT All accountings YIB + Yll
Total Income
Y Convenlional YL + YK + YT
. ..
AY Comprehensive AYL + AYK + AYT
PAWAY Pol.-cap.-income AYL + PAWAYK + AYT
PCAWAY Pol.-currenl PCAYL + PAWAYK + AYT
PLCAWAY Pol.-lifecycle PLCAYL + PAWAYK + AYT
PCWAY Pol.-cur.-wllh. AYL + PCWAYK + AYT
PLCPWAY Pot.-lifecyc.-pol.-wllh. PLCAYL + PLCWAYK + AYT
Dresch, Stowe & W'llldenberg 2.36 27.5.84
Table 2.8
Loanable Funds, Parental Contribution
and Postsecondary Financial Variables
Variable Derivation
Loanable Funds
AW Available wealth W - O.25·A9
S Cur. annual savings [= I (AYL, W)]
LF Tot. loanable funds AW + 4'S
ALF Annualized loan. funds LF/4
.Actual Parental Contrib.
APC One measure
PoBtBecondary Expenses
LlVEXP Living expenses
SCHEXP Schooling expenses
PSEXP Total postsec. expenses LJVEXP + SCHEXP
Total Loans (Nonfamily)
TL OnQ ｭｾｾｉｂｬｲＡｬ .,. . ....
Grants
FG Federal grants
OG Other grants
TG Total grants FG + OG
Other Relatives' Cont.
RCC One measure (incl. spouse)
Child's Selfsupport.
SUME Summer earnings
SCHE School-year earnings
TE Total earnings SUME + SCHE
CSAV Support from savings
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The remainder of this study is devoted to analyses of and utilizing the various meas-
ures of financial capacity derived in the application of the alternative accounting sys-
tems developed in the preceeding chapter. In this chapter the focus is on the margi-
nal distributions of the financial capacity measures and their components. concludinb
with examinations of the distributions of net postsecondary schooling' costs as per-
ceived by the family and by the student and of the degree to which annualized loan-
able funds are (or would be) exhausted by these schooling costs.
At the outset it should be noted that, in this and subsequent chapters, the ana-
lyses are restricted to a subsample of the entire HS&B parent sample, derived by elim-
inating extreme observations of income and wealth. This "censuring" of the sample
was dictated by two considerations: (1) Income and wealth "outliers" appear in man)'
cases to be spurious. i.e .• to result from mis- and/or incomplete reporting of impor-
tant elements of family finances. and (2) even observations with legitimately high
income and wealth are of little or no significance with reference to public higher ･ ､ ｾ Ｍ
cation and related policies. Thus, the sample analyzed in the remainder of this report
includes only observations for which (1) net labor income was determined to be (a)
less than $100,000 per year and (b) greater than $-25,000 per year.! and (2) wealth was
determined to be (a) less than $500.000 and (b) greater than $-50.000.2
1Because net labor income could be negative only in this case of the selfemployed. and then only if imputed
returns to capital invested in the business or farm (imputed interest on business/farm assets net of imputed
interest on businellS/farm liabilities) ezceeded reported (presumably net) selfemployment income, the
second condition related to labor income serves only to eliminate a small number of the selfemployed. ｾ
most cases these observations probably reflect the failure of the HSetB questionnaire to accurately captu=oe
the total 5nancialliituation of the selfemployed.
2.rhe last condition represents what we cansider to be a "reasonable" limitation on Ilegative net warth. 1f'biJe
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Broadly speaking. these exclusions from the sample have only minor conse-
quences for the empirical analyses utilizing nonparametric statistics describing the
distributions of the financial variables. e.g .• percentiles.S However. interpretation
requires recognition of the restrictions on the tails of the distributions. In the case of
parametric statistics. e.g .. means. standard deviations and coefficients of variation.
the elimination of extreme "outliers" in some cases has major consequences (espe-
cially with reference to variance-related measures in which, because these measures
utilize the square of the distance of an observation from .... e mean, extreme outliers
carry very heavy weight). Nonetheless. recognizing the. restrictions on the sample
range, these measures provide more useful information concerning ditrerences
between the various financial variables than would be the case if-the extreme observa-
tions were retained.
Because several classes of high schools (notably those with high concentrations
of low income and minority stugenls ｾ ､ also private schools) were illtentjollally over-
sampled in the stralifted HS&B sample design, with further systematic sampling in
selecting the ultimate sample for the parent survey, in the derivation of the marginal
distributions of the various financial variables observations were weighted to
represent the actual population of parents of high school sophomores and seniors
(subject to the exclusions indicated above). However. the estimates of conditional
statistics, e.g., correlation coefficients and least-squares regressions, appropriately
utilize unweighted observations.
legitimate cases of even more negative net worth may occasionally be observed, in general enreme negative
Yalues (if not totally spurious) probably reflect the failure to tully capture important components of lUI3ets.
3m distiIliuishing between "parametric" and "nonparametric" statistics, parametric is used here to refer to
statistics which. in conjunction with others. can be employed to describe the entire distribution, as an entire
dilJtribution can be deecribed by its moments, e.g., the normal distribution (fully characterized by the tIrst
and second moments. i.e., by the mean and variance). Thus, more technically stated, parametric statistics
are (or derive from) the moments of the distribution. while this is not true of nonparametric statistics, ｾ Ｎ ｧ Ｎ Ｌ
percentiles and interquartile rllD8es.
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1. Distributions of the Alternative lIeasures and Components of Income and Wealth
1.1. Labor Incoane
Statistics describing the distributions of the various measures of labor income derived
in the preceeding chapter are presented in Table 3.1. Consider. first. the "conven-
tional" labor income measure. YL. Not surprisingly. in light of the ages of parents of
high-school-age children. relatively few parents (approximately five percent) report
zero labor income. Reftecting the positive skewness of the distribution. the mean.
$24.641, exceeds the median. $22.500. although the difference is modest. primarily
because of the exclusion of high income/wealth families (those with total income, Y.
greater than $100.000 and/or total wealth. W. greater than $500.000. as discussed
above). The interquartile range (the thrid quartile minus the first quartile) is $19.500.
equal to 86.7 percent of the median. providing a general measure of the dispersion of
the distribution.
Adjusted labor income. AYL. ditfers from the conventional measure only in that it
deducts from YL the imputed value of net capital income included in the conventional
measure of labor income of the selfemployed. This deduction reduces the estimate of
mean labor income by about $1.250. to $23.366. but has no effect on the median. while
the interquartile range declines to $18.150. 60.7 percent of the median. The
differences between the distributions are greatest in the upper and lower tails. indi-
cating the bimodal distribution of the selfemployed.. Thus. the shift from the YL to the
AYL measure reduces tpe 99ttl ｰ ･ ｲ ｣ ･ ｮ ｴ ｩ ｬ ｾ fr9IIl $B5.000 to S77.f)OQ and. the first percep-
tile from $0 to $-3.125.
By comparison to adjusted labor income. AYL. potential current labor income
differs only for (a) those families in which selfemployment labor income is low or
negative and (b) those families in which one or both parents either do not work or
report extremely low labor income (less than the lower-quartile estimate for full-time
wage and salary workers. conditional on sex. race. educational attainment. age and
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Table 3.1
Distributions of the Alternative Labor Income Measures
YL AYL PCAYL PLCAYL
Mean $24,641 $23.388 $28,051 $28.392
Std. dev. 17,184 16,883 15,872 15,704
Coef. of var. Ｖ Ｙ Ｎ Ｗ ｾ Ｗ Ｒ Ｎ Ｒ ｾ 55.9"; 55.3";
Percentiles
1st $0 $-3,125 14,045 $4,548
5th 300 0 6,113 6,250
10th 4,000 4,000 8,750 8,750
25th 12,500 12,500 17.500 17,848
50th 22,500 22,500 26,250 26,289
75th 32,000 30,650 35,600 36,324
90th 46,500 44,500 48,534 48,852
95th 60,000 55,750 59,737 59,983
99th 85,000 77,500 80,000 81,008
Q3 - Ql $19,500 $18,150 $18,100 $18,476
,,; of med. Ｘ Ｖ Ｎ Ｗ ｾ 80.7"; 69.0"; 70.3";
Note: Distributions are derived utilizing weighted observations.
Number of observations =5,474.
prior work experience). Thus, PCAYL is significantly greater than AYL for the lowest
range of the distribution, with the first percentile rising from $-3,125 to $4,045, the
tlfth percentile from $0 to $6.113, the tenth percentile from $4,000 to $8,750, and the
25th percentile from $12,500 to $17,500. However, because of the prevalence of non-
working wives in the higher end of the distribution, the upper tail would also shift
upward significantly. with the third quartile (75th percentile) rising from $30,650 to
$35,600, the 90th percentile from $44.500 to $48.534, and the 95th percentile from
$55,750 to $59,737. The mean and median, respectively. rise from $23,388 to $28,051
and from $22,500 to $26,250. Reftecting the greater relative compression of potential
versus adjusted labor income. the interquartile range relative to the median declines
from 80.7 percent to 69 percent.
The di1ferences between "potential lifecycle,i and"potential current" labor
income, differing only in that the former stipulates the modal lifecycle pattern of
employment ("penalizing" those whose prior labor force J?8Tticipation was less than
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modal). are modest. with the mean and median each rising by less than $500 (PLCAYL
versus PCAYL) and with similarly trivial effects on other characteristics of the distri-
bution.
While the various labor income measures obviously ditJer. it is not selfevident
Utat the differences are of any significance with reference to the characterization of
differences between families. Thus. if one measure were simply a linear transforma-
tion of another. e.g .. if potential current labor income were simply a multiple of
adjusted labor income for all families (or. more plausibly. in light of its derivation. if
Ute potential measure ditJered from the actual only by a constant). then the two alter-
natives would contain the same information. i.e.• variations in adjusted labor income
would fully correspond to variations in potential labor income. Although this issue is
addressed in greater detail subsequently. when differences between the alternative
measures for families with various characteristics are expliciUy examined. a prelim-
inary indication of the fupdamental tUffereI1ces ｾ ･ ｴ Ｎ ｷ ･ ･ ｮ lp.e ｭ ･ ｡ ｳ ｵ ｲ ･ ｾ ｪ ｾ given Py
their correlations. which are presented in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2
Correlations between the Alternative Labor Income Measures
YL AYL PCAYL PLCAYL
YL 1.000 0.955 0.947 0.943
AYL 1.000 0.945 0.941
PCAYL 1.000 0.999
PLCAYL 1.000
Note: Correlations are derived utilizing unweighted observations.
Number of observations =5.474.
The various measures are indeed highly correlated. with correlation coefficients
in excess of 0.94 in all cases. implying that the variance in anyone measure can
account for at least 88 percent of the variance in any other. However. because the
"unexplained" component of variance (up to 12 percent) is systematically related to
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various family characteristics. the differences between them will be found to be of
substantive significance nonetheless. The virtual identity of the alternative potential
measures (current versus lifecycle) is indicated by a correlation coefficient which is
almost identically unity: however, the use of the lifecycle earnings measure in the
derivation of potentiallifecycle wealth requires that it be retained in any event.
1.2. ....alth
Basic statistics describinp the various alternative measures of wealth are presented in
Table 3.3. As can be observed. actual wealth (W. "maximalist" net worth) exhibits a
much more positively skewed distribution than any of the measures of labor income,
with a mean of $55.537 versus a median of $36.377. The extreme dispersion of wealth
is also indicated by the interquartile range of $63.675. equal to 175 percent of the
median. It will be observed that negative wealth (net worth) is estimated for slightly
more than ten percent of the families. and even the 25th percentile family is observed
to have wealth of less than $10.000. Recall that wealth explicitly includes equity in
owner-occupied housing and that home owners constitute about 60 percent of the
sample.
The estimate of potential current wealth. PCW. is obtained by imposing lower·
quartile ·savings behavior. conditional on the estimate of actual current labor income
(AYL) and the assumed mean growth of earnings over the lifecycle. The estimate of
pew is then equal to the greater of actual wealth or that which would be implied by
"lower-quartile" savipg$ behavior. Superficially, it might be thought that this imposi-
tion would have the greatest impact on the lower tail of the wealth distribution. While
it is true that significant upward shifts are observed below the 10th percentile and
that the lower quartile rises from $9.625 to $14.637. the absolute impact is at least as
great in the upper range of the distribution. with the third quartile rising from
$73.300 to $78.480 and the 90th percentile from $127.653 to $134.000. The mean and
rne·dian. rellpectively. would rise trom $55.537 to $59.949 and. from $36.377 to $40.702.
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Table 3.3
Distributions of Alternative Measures of Wealth
W PCW PLCW
Mean $55,537 $59,949 $61,572
Std. dev. 72,OBI 71,736 71,B55
Coef. var. 129.B% 119.7% 116.7%
Percentiles
1st $-14.950 $-3.453 $-3.650
5th -3.429 -417 -600
10th -600 200 500
25th 9.625 14,837 16,142
50th 36,377 40,702 43,200
75th 73,300 7B,480 79,919
90th 127.653 134,000 136.069
95th 18B.268 191,739 194,694
99th 383.730 3B3,730 3B9.566
Q3· Ql $63.675 $63,643 $63,777
%of med. 175.0% 156.4% 147.6%
Note: Distributions are derived utilizing weighted observations.
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Thus, the interquartile range would be virtually unaftected, although, relative to the
now higher median. the range would decline from 175 percent to 156 percent.
The third wealth measure, potential lifecycle wealth (PLCW). is derived in a
manner identical to that of potential current wealth. with the exception that potential
lifecycle labor income is employed instead of actual adjusted labor income as the
measure of current labor income. Thus. potential lifecycle wealth effectively
represents that level of wealth which would be emibited by a family if (a) it had exhi-
bited modal lifecycle labor force participation. (b) it had received at least lower-
quartile earnings (conditional on all relevant characteristics). and (c) it had engaged
in at least lower-quartile savings behavior (conditional on the level of earnings).
By comparison to potential current wealth. potential lifecycle wealth would shift
the entire upper three-quarters of the distribution upward, by between $1,500 and
$3,000, while the impact would be substantially less in the lower quartile of the distri-
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bution. Again. the interquartile range would be only marginally atlected. altbough.
relative to tbe median. it would fall from 156 percent to 148 percent.
The substantive ditlerences between these alternative wealth measures are indi-
cated by theit correlations, which are presented in Table 3.4. The correlations
between the actual wealth measure. on the one hand. and the potential measures. on
the other. are slightly higber than those between the actual and potential income
measures. 0.96 to 0.97 versus 0.94, although tbe variance of actual wealth still
accounts for only about 93 percent of the variance 'of either measure of potential
wealth. Potential current and potential lifecycle wealth. surprisingly are extremely
highly correlated (r =0.99+). notwithstanding the fact that the former is derived util-
izing actual adjusted labor income (AYL) while the derivation of the latter uses poten-
tial lifecycle labor income (PLCAYL).
Table 3.4
CQrrelation:! 13etlfeen ａ ｬ ｴ ･ ｲ ｮ Ａ Ａ ｴ ｾ ｶ ･ Measures of Wealth
W PCW PLCW
W 1.000 0.974 0.964
PCW 1.000 0.997
PLeW 1.000 ,
Note: Correlations are derived utilizing unweigbted observations."
Number of observations =5.474.
Correlations between the alternative wealth measures and the various measures
of labor income are presented in Table 3.5. The correlation between actual wealth and
conventional labor income (r,.n). 0.42. is substantially higher than that between
actual wealth and adjusted labor income (r, ..O'L). 0.24. which is not surprising in that
the capital-income component of selfemployment income is removed from the
adjusted measure of labor income. Somewhat unexpectedly. the correlations between
wealth and labor income. however defined. are not exceptionally great. even in the
case of the potential wealth measures which themselves are based upon measures of
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labor income (imputing a lifecyCle pattern of earnings and stipulating a lower-quartile
pattern of lifecycle savings). Thus. depending primarily on the measure of labor
income and secondarily on the measure of wealth, variations in labor income can
"account" for only between five and 25 percent of variations in wealth. Stated some-
what more technically, labor income and wealth constitute relatively orthogonal com-
ponents of parental financial capacity.
Table 3.5
Correlations Between Wealth and Labor Income Measures
YL AYL PCAYL PLCAYL
W 0.421 0.239 0.350 0.353
PCW 0.481 0.305 0.415 0.418
PLCW 0.481 0.307 0.423 0.426
Note: Correlations are derived utilizing unweighted observations.
Number of observations = 5,474.
Underscore {-> denotes correlation between elements
of same accounting system. .
1.3. Capital Income
Having derived the various alternative wealth measures, it is appropriate to turn to
the capital income ftows to which they would give rise. The distributions of these are
presented in Table 3.6. The most notable fact concerning actually reported capital
income (YK) is its generally extremely low level. Thus, almost half of the sample
reports zero capital income. and the third quartile level is only $600. Because the
interquartile range contains no relevant information in this context, the coemcient of
variantion, 303 percent (equal to the ratio of the standard deviation, $3,253, to the
mean, $1,073), provides some indication of the degree of dispersion of the capital
income distribu tion.
Reported capital income is incomplete in three important dimensions. First, it
ignores implicit capital income on equity in owner-occupied housing, while the latter
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Table 3.6
Distributions of Alternative Capital Income Measures
YK AYK PAWAYK PCWAYK PLCWAYK
Mean $1.073 $6.065 $6,664 $7.194 $7,389
Std. dev. 3,253 8.256 8.650 8.608 8.623
Coef. var. 303.11.: 136.11.: 129.81.: 119.71.: 116.71.:
Percentiles
1st $0 $0 $-1.794 $-414 $-438
5th 0 0 -411 -50 -72
10th 0 0 -72 24 60
25th 0 644 1.155 1.780 1,937
50th 50 3.991 4.365 4.884 5.184
75th 600 7.682 8,796 9,418 9,590
90th 2,300 13,677 15.318 16,080 16,328
95th 5,500 20.824 22,592 23.009 23.363
99th 17.550 43.192 46.048 46,048 46,748
Q3 - Ql $600 $7,038 $7,641 $7,637 $7,653
1.: of med. 1.200.01.: 176.31.: 175.11.: 156.41.: 147.61.:
Note: Distributions are derived utilizing weighted observations.
Number of ｯ ｴ ＾ ｾ ･ ｲ ｶ ｡ ｾ ｾ ｑ ｮ ｾ ｾ ｾ Ｌ Ｔ 74.
. . - ' .
constitutes the most significant asset of most families. Second, it is a gross measures
from which interest obligations on liabilities is not deducted. rendering it sensitive to
the asset/liability composition of the portfolio. Le., a family which incurred debt to
acquire an income-producing asset wouldappear to have enjoyed an increase in capital
income equal to the gross return to the asset purchased. while only the difference
between the gross return and interest expense would constitute a true increase in
income. Finally, third, reported capital income fails to recognize the capital income
component of reported 8elfemployment income. resulting in an overstatement of
labor income and a corresponding understatement of capital income. These
deficiencies are corrected in the measure of adjusted capital income (AYK). which
ditIers from conventional, reported capital income (YK) by (a) adding implicit income
on the value of owner-occupied housing. (b) deducting interest expense. and (c) incor-
porating that part of selfemployment income attributable to capital invested in the
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business or farm.
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Because of these modifications. adjusted capital income is substantially higher
for most families. Thus. the mean rises from $1,073 to $6,065, the median from $50 to
$3,991. Notably, the increases are substantially greater in the upper portion of the
distribution, with the third quartile rising from $600 to $7.682, the 90th percentile
from $2,300 to $13,677, the 95th percentile from $5.500 to $20,624, and the 99th per-
centile from $17,550 to $43,192. In contrast. the lower quartile would rise only from
$0 to $644, and almost 20 percent of the sample would continue to exhibit zero capital
income, a group consisting almost entirely of non-home-owners. Because of the sub-
stantial impact on the middle range of the distribution, the coeffi.cient of variation
would be only 136 percent (in contrast to 303 percent in the case of YK), while the
interquartile range of $7,036 would equal 176 percent of the median.
Even the adjusted capital income measure. AYK. is incomplete. in that it excludes
unrealized capital gains and may also be subject to substantial underreporting. The
estimate of "potential actual-wealth-conditional" capital income. PAWAYK. overcomes
lhese difficulties by applying a common rate of return to actual wealth. W, using the
assumed low-risk interest rate, R1 (= 12 percent) as the common rate of return. By
comparison to AYK, this adjustment increases the mean and median by about 10 per-
cent, from $6,065 to $6,664 and from $3,991 to $4,365, respectively. The lower quartile
would rise by about $500. to $1,155, while the third quartile would rise by about $1,100,
to $B.796, the 90th percentile by almost $1,700, to $15,316. Because of the more sub-
Istantial impacts on the upper range of the distribution. the interquartile range would
Irise from $7.036 to $7,641.
In contrast to the preceeding measures. which derive from actually reported
realth, the tinal two capital income measures are linked (via the stipulated low-risk
interest rate. R1. as in the case of PAWAYK) to the current and lifecycle potential
lealth measures. Potential current wealth (peW), derived by assumin a minimum 0
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lower-quartile savings behavior conditional on actual labor income (AYL). results in
PCWAYK. By comparison to PAWAYK. this measure of potential capital income would
shift the entire distribution upward substantially, with the exception only of the
extreme upper tail (above the 95th percentile). Thus, the fifth percentile would rise
from $-411 to $-50. the lower quartile from $1,155 to $1,780, the median from $4.365 to
$4.884, the third quartile from $8,796 to $9,418. and the 90th percentile from $15,316
to $16.060. Relative to the median, the dispersion of the distribution would contract,
with the ratio of the interquartile range to the median declining from 175 percent to
156 percent.
Potential lifecycle wealth (PLCW) differs from potential current wealth (PCW) in
that it is based upon an estimate of the potential lifecycle profile of labor income
(PLCAYL, stipulating the modal pattern of lifecycle labor force participation and
imputing Lower-quartile earnings. conditional on age. sex, race and educational attain-
ment) ratper than on actual adjusted labor income (AYL). M a result, reJative to e,api-
t.al income from potential current wealth (PCWAYK), capital income from potential
lifecycle wealth (PLCWAYX) is somewhat, but not substantially. higher, with the mean
and median, respectively, rising from $7,194 to $7,369 and from $4.684 to $5.184.
Impacts below the lower quartile wouid be substantially less than those at and above
the lower quartile, over which range the effects would be virtually constant at all lev-
els.
Correlations between the various capital income measures are presented in Table
3.7. The incompleteness of the reported capital income measure, YK. is indicated by
its low correlation (r = 0.5) with adjusted capital income, AYK. Thus. less than one-
quarter of the variance in the comprehensive (adjusted) measure is captured by the
reported (unadjusted) measure. Correlations between the reported and potential
measures of capital income are even lower, between 0.27 and 0.26. In contrast, the
!
corre,lations between lbe adjusted measure, on the one hand. and the potential meas·
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ures. on the other, all exceed 0.6, while the intercorrelations between the various
potential measures all exceed 0.96, and, in the case of the potential-wealth-based
measures, the correlation exceeds 0.99.
Table 3.7
Correlations Between Alternative Capital Income Measures
YK AYK PAWAYK PCWAYK PLCWAYK
YK 1.000 0.500 0.261 0.277 n.276
AYK 1.000 0.645 0.622 ,J.614
PAWAYK 1.000 0.974 0.964-
PCWAYK 1.000 0.997
PLCWAYK 1.000
Note: Correlations are derived utilizing unweighted observations.
Number of observations = 5,474.
Correlations between the various capital income measures, on the one hand, and
the alternative measures of (a) labor income and (b) wealth, on the other, are
presented in Table 3.B. The most notable observation from this table is that the corre-
lations between the adjusted capital income measure (AYK) and the various labor
income measures are all substantially higher than those between the conventional
capital income and the various labor income measures. Moreover, a similar observa-
tion applies with reference to the potential versus adjust capital income measures.
Thus, the progressive adjustments to capital income serve to increase the strength of
the relationship between labor and capital income.
The inadequacy of the conventional measure of capital income is clearly revealed
by its very low correlation with actual wealth (rr.J1{ =0.26). The corresponding corre-
lation in the case of adjusted capital income is vastly higher (rr.AYK = 0.64). Because
they apply a standard rate of return to a specified measure of wealth, the correlations
between the various potential capital income measures and the corresponding wealth
measures are, not surprisingly, 1.0.
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Table 3.8
Correlations Between Alternative Capital Income Measures and
Alternative Measures of (a) Labor Income and (b) Wealth
YK AYK PAWAYK PCWAYK PLCWAYK
YL 0.116 0.350 0.421 0.481 0.481
AYL 0.094 0.141 0.239 0.305 0.307
PCAYL 0.111 0.258 0.350 0.415 0.423
PLCAYL 0.112 0.261 0.353 0.418 0.426
W 0.281 0.845 1.000 0.974 0.964
PCW 0.277 0.822 0.974 1.000 0.997
PLew 0.276 0.814 0.964 0.997 1.000
Note: Correlations are derived utilizing ｵ ｮ ｷ ･ ｩ ｧ ｨ ｴ ｾ ､ observations.
Number of observations =5,474.
Underscore (__) denotes correlation between elements of
same accounting system.
1.4. Transfer Income
Fewer than 40 percent of parents of high school students report receipt of any
transfer income (IT =AYT), public or private. However, as indicated by Table 3.9, 10
percent report receipt of $6,250 or more, five percent $12,500 or more, and one per-
cent $30,000 or more. As would be expected, the correlations between transfer
income and the various measures of labor income, as reported in Table 3.10, are all
significantly negative, although their magnitudes (-0.08 to -0.094) are not as great as
one would casually expect. Interestingly, correlations between transfer income and
the measures of wealth and of capital income are positive, although of trivial magni-
tude.
1.5. Total InCOID!
Appropriately combining the various preceeding components of income, the alterna-
tive total income measures are obtained, the distributions of which are described in
Table 3.11. Focussing first on total money income as conventionally defined (Y), the
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Table 3.9
Distribution of Transfer Income
YT= AYT
Mean $2.298
Std. dev. 6,070
Coef. var. 264.170
Percentiles
1st to 50th $0
75th 2,000
90th 6,250
95th 12,500
99th 30,000
Note: Distributions are derived utilizing weighted observations.
Number of observations = 5,474.
Table 3.10
Correlations Between Transfer Income and Other Income-Wealth Measures
YT YT YT
YL -0.085 W 0.039 YK 0.021
AYL -0.094 PCW 0.047 AYK 0.031
PCAYL -0.081 PLCW 0.051 PAWAYK 0.039
PLCAYL -0.080 PCWAYK 0.047
PLCWAYK 0.051
Note: Correlations are derived utilizing unweighted observations.
ｾ ｵ ｉ ｉ ｬ Ａ ｬ ｾ ｲ ()f ｧ｢ｾｾｲｶｩｩｾｩｾｾｾ = ｾＬＴ 74-.
positive skewness of the distribution is indicated by the fact that the mean, $28,013.
significantly exceeds the median, $24,500. One-quarter of high school sophomores and
seniors come from families with incomes less than $14,850, another one-quarter from
families with money incomes greater than $36,050. Thus, the interquartile range is
$21.200, 86.5 percent of the median, providing a general measure of the dispersion of
the distribution of money income.
The overall accuracy of the HS&B parent survey data is indicated by the con-
sistency between these estimates of mean and median money income (Y) and compar-
able mean and median money-income estimates for 1979 from the from the Current
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Population Survey.· For purposes of this comparison, the CPS estimates for families
headed by .a person between the ages of 45 and 54 are utilized, since this age range
corresponds most closely to ages of HS&B parents (although the median HS&B parent
age is in the lower end of the 45 to 54 CPS range). The HS&B mean, $28,013. is
remarkably close to the CPS mean of $28,155. and the HS&B and CPS medians are
comparably close ($24,500 versus $25.345. respectively). For neither pair of measures
(mean or median) are the HS&B and CPS estimates statistically di.tJerent at any con-
ventional level of significance. Focusing on the lower tail of the distribution, with
1979 poverty levels of $5,763 for three person families and of $7,386 for four person
families, the proportion of HS&B families below the poverty level, between five and 10
percent, is reasonably close to the CPS estimate of 9.1 percent of all families and of
7.3 percent of persons between the ages of 45 and 54. While more precise comparisons
between the HS&B and CPS money-income distributions would be possible (using
unpublished data from the CPS Annual Demographic File), even these rather ｣ ｲ ｵ ｾ ･
assessments are sutncient to indicate the general representativeness of the HS&B
sample and data.
The movement from the conventional reported-money-income measure (Y) to the
adjusted measure of income results in a substantial upward shift of the distribution,
with the mean and median, respectively, rising from $28.013 to $31,751 and from
$24,500 to $28.426. Significantly. however. the absolute di.tJerences would be greatest
in the upper tail of the distribution. Thus, the lower decile would rise by $750, the
lower quartile by $2.650. the median by almost $4.000, the upper quartile by $5,350.
and the 90th percentile by more than $6,500. The dispersion of the adjusted measure
would be more than ten percent greater than that of the unadjusted measure in abso-
lute terms, but would decline marginally relative to the median (from 86.5 percent to
·U.s. Bureau of ｴｨｾ CensWl. Series P-60. No. 13? "Yoney Income of Households. Families, and Persons in the
United States: Ｑ Ｙ Ｗ ｾ Ｂ (Washington. D.C.; Government PrintiJJ& Oftice. 1980).
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Table 3.11
Distributions of Alternative Total Income Measures
Y AY PAWAY PCAWAY PLCAWAY PCWAY PLCPWAY
Mean $28,013 $31.751 $32.350 $37.014 $37.355 $32.860 $38.079
Sld.. dev. 18.424 20.224 21.081 20.897 20.947 21,463 21.369
Coer. var.. 65.6'; 63.7'; 65.2'; 56.5'; 56.1'; 65.3% 56.1';
,IPercentiles
$350 $650 $624 $5.233 $5.446 $701 $5.4621st
5th 4.000 5.500 5.165 9.014 9.024 5.223 9.128
10th 6,000 6.750 6.72C 13.706 14,170 6.766 14,368
25th 14.850 17,500 17.406 22.760 23.013 17.656 23.472
50th 24.500 28,426 28.687 33.342 33.615 29.162 34.265
75th 36.050 41.400 42.484 46.772 47,227 42.963 48.076
90th 52.550 59.116 60.753 65.005 65.245 61.752 66.364
95th 64.600 70.699 74.262 78.452 78.894 75.911 60.242
99th 69.000 97.354 99.612 104.780 105.242 101,410 106.913
Q3 - Q1 $21.200 $23.900 $25.078 $24.012 $24.214 $25.306 $24.607
,; of med. Ｖ Ｖ Ｎ Ｕ ｾ Ｘ Ｔ Ｎ Ｑ ｾ Ｘ Ｗ Ｎ Ｔ ｾ 72.0% 72.0'; 66.6% 71.8%
Note: Distributions are derived utilizing weighted observations.
Number of ｯ ｾ ｳ ･ ｲ ｶ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ = ｓＮｾＷＴＮ
84.1 percent).
Replacing adjusted capital income (AYK) by potential capital income conditional
on actual wealth (PAWAYK) in the derivation of total income. Le.• comparing the
PAWAY and AY total income measures. the mean would increase by about $600. to
$32,350. the median by only about $250. to $28.687. While the consequences would be
minor in the lower range of the distribution (actually reducing the estimate of total
income at and beloW' the lower quartile. where interest obligations on liabilities fre-
quently exceed interest income on assets). the absolute impact would rise with
income in the upper range. with the third quartile rising by almost $1.100 (to
$42.484), the 90th percentile by about $1.650 (to $60.753). and the 95th percentile by
almost $3.400 (to $74.262). Thus. the net effect of unnalized and/or unreported capi-
tal income is absolutely greater in the upper tail of the distribution. as would be
expected.
Dresch, Stowe & Wllldenoerg 3.18 27.5.84
Turing to potential current income (PCWAY), which dit!ers from potential actual
wealth income (PAWAY) by utilizing the greater of actual and potential current labor
income (AYL or PCAYL). the entire distribution shifts upward by about $5.000 by com-
parison to PAWAY. with the mean and med!-an rising. respectively. from $32.350 to
$37.014 and from $26,687 to $33.342. Thus. the absolute level of unexploited earnings
capacity is et!ectively invariant with respect to the estimated level of income.
Because the median would rise signitlcantly, while the interquartile range would
decline by about $1,000. the ratio of the interquartile range to the median 'Would
decline from 87.4 percent (PAWAY) to 72 percent (PCAWAY).
While PCAWAY adjust to a (lower-quartile) norm of current labor force participa-
tion. PLCAWAY adjusts to a norm of lifecycle labor force participation (stipulating non-
participation on the part of the mother prior to the child's entry into school and fuil-
time participation thereafter). However. given the only very slight differences
between potential current and potential lifecycle labor income (PCAYL and PLCAYL).
the distributions of PCAWAY and PLCAWAY are virtually identical. with the mean rising
only from $37.014 to $37,355. and with similarly minor etrects over t.he entire distribu-
tion.
Conjoining actual adjusted labor income (AYL) with a norm of lower quartile sav-
ings behavior ｲ ･ ｳ ｾ ｬ ｴ ｳ in poteI;1tial current income. PCWAY. By comparison to potential
actual wealth income (PAWAY. PCWAY is only marginally greater. with the mean and
median each rising by about $500. However. the etrect is even smaller at. and below
the 25th percentile. while the 90th percentile increases by about $1.000 and the 95th
percentile by more than $1.500. Thus, imposition of a norm for savings behavior has a
greater absolute impact in the upper ranges of the distribution.
The tinal measure of total income. PLCPWAY, combines both a norm for lifecycle
labor force participation (as reflected in potential lifecycle labor income, PLCAYL) and
a norm for savings behavior (linking lower quartile savings with potential lifecycle
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labor income to obtain potential lifecycle wealth. PLCW. andassociated capital income.
PLCWAYK). By comparison to the most comprehensive measure of potential current
income conditional on actual wealth and actual labor income (PAWAY). the mean and
median shift upward significantly. the former from $32,350 to $36,079. the latter from
$26,687 to $34,285. The absolute impact. about $5.000. would be approximately con-
stant over the entire distribution.
Correlations between the various alternative measures of total income, actual
and potential. are presented in Table 3.12. Interestingly, the correlation between
reported and adjusted current income (Y and AY). 0.98. is substantially higher than
the correlations between the conventional and adjusted measures of their primary
components, labor income (0.95) and capital income (0.5): this redects the transfer of
the capital-income component of selfemployment earnings from labor to capital
income and the inclusion of net imputed income on owner-occupied housing in the
adjusted measures. The predQrninance of labor income in total income is also
redected in these correlations. Across the various pairs of measures the lowest corre-
lations. approximately 0.9. are observed between (a) gross current money income as
conventionally defined. Y, and (b) the measures incorporating potential labor income,
PCAWAY, PLCAWAY and PLCPWAY. Conversely. these latter three measures utilizing
potential labor income (current or lifecycle. with or without potential wealth in the
case of the latter) are the only income variables which are essentially identical in
intonnation content (exhibiting correlations greater than 0.99). Over all pairs, the
degree of "explanatory power" of one measure with reference, to another ranges from
approximately 0.8 to virtually.!.
Table 3.13 presents correlations between the various income measures and the
measures of (a) wealth. (b) labor income, (c) capital income and (d) transfer income.
The inclusion of net imputed income on owner-occupied housing (the primary com-
ponent of wealth) raises the correlation between wealth and income from 0.46 (Y) to
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Table 3.12
Correlations Between Alternative Total Income Measures
Y AY PAWAY PCAWAY PLCAWAY PCWAY
Y 1.000 0.978 0.955 0.916 0.913 0.958
AY 1.000 0.976 0.941 0.939 0.974
PAWAY 1.000 0.965 0.963 0.996
PCAWAY 1.000 0.999 0.960
PLCAWAY 1.000 0.958
PCWAY 1.000
PLCPWAY
Note: Correlations are derived utilizing unweighted observations.
Number of observations =5.474.
i
I
I
PLCPWAY II
0.916
0.936 I
0.958
0.994 i
0.995 I
0.962
1.000
0.55 (AY). Imputing income to wealth in any case in which reported income fell below
the norm (suggesting unrealized and/or unreported capital income) raises the corre-
lation between wealth and income (PAWAY) to 0.6. Imposing the lower-quartile norm
for labor income again raises the wealth-income (PCAWAY and PLCAWAY) correlation.
to 0.68. The highest correlation. 0.72. results when a norm is set tor both savings
behavior (and hence wealth) and labor earnings (comparing PLCW and PLCPWAY). A
norm only tor savings behavior- results in a correlation (between PCW and PCWAY) of
0.64. somewhat less than that observed when a norm only for labor earnings is
imposed.
Correlations between total and labor income. especially within the same account-
ing system. as substantially higher. as 'WOuld be expected (since labor income is the
primary component of total income). However, this correlation is greatest (0.93) in
the case of the conventional (Y) accounting system. in which the capital component of
selfemployment income is included in labor income and in which no imputation of net
income to owner-occupied. housing is included in capital (and total) income. In all
other cases the correlations between total income and the associated measure of
labor income are about 0.88 (with the variance of labor i.ncome accounting for less
than 80 percent of the variance of total income).
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Table 3.13
Correlations Between Alternative Total Income Measures and
Alternative Measures of (a) Wealth and (b) Components of Income
Y AY PAWAY PCAWAY PLCAWAY PCWAY PLCPWAY
0.653
0715
0.580
06440722
0.682
0721
0.681
06 8
0.603
98
0.457 0.550W
CWP 0.516 0.5 .4 . .
I
IPLCW 0.517 0.597 0.647 0.724 0.725 0.646 0.724
YL 0.931 0.916 0.912 0.862 0.858 0.916 0.863
AYL 0.882 0.868 0.873 0.784 0.781 0.880 0.790
PCAYL 0.881 0.872 0.877 0.875 0.873 0.883 0.882
PLCAYL 0.878 0.870 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.881 0.884
YK 0.297 0.284 0.193 0.203 0.204 0.188 0.198
AYK 0.429 0.527 0.461 0.546 0.547 0.442 0.523
PAWAYK 0.457 0.550 0.603 0.681 0.682 0.580 0.653
PCWAYK 0.516 0.598 0.648 0.721 0.722 0.844- 0.715
PLCWAYK 0.517 0.597 0.647 0.724 0.725 0.846 0.724
YT 0.237 0.218 0.213 0.231 0.230 0.211 0.230
Note: Correlations are derived utilizing unweighted observations.
Number of observations =5.474.
Underscore (-> denotes correlation between elements of same
accounting system.
Correlations between total income and the associated capital income measures
are substantially lower. In the case of the conventional accounting system (without
imputed income on owner-occupied housing and with selfemployment capital income
incorrectly included in labor income) the lowest correlation between total and capital
income is observed., 0.3. Correctly treating the capital component of selfemployment
income and including net imputed income on owner occupied housing. the correlation
(between AY and AYK) rises to 0.53. Imposing a norm on capital ｾ ｮ ｣ ｯ ｭ ･ Ｎ given
observed wealth. the correlation (between PAWAY and PAWAYK) rises further to 0.6. In
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this and all remaining cases the correlations between total income and associated
measures of capital income are necessarily identical to those between total income
and wealth.
Finally. and somewhat surprisingly, the correlations between transfer income and
total income are invariably positive (about 0.22). This undoubtedly results from the
fact that gifts and transfers from private sources are included in total transfers.
2. Distributions of Parental 'Loanable Funds' and Its Components
While closely related to parental income and wealth, from which they are derived. the
measures of loanable funds and its components are intended to capture a quite dis-
tinct dimension of financial capacity. Essentially, income and wealth are of interest
primarily as bases for overt or covert "taxes" on parents for purposes of financing the
schooling of children. In contrast, the concept of loanable funds focuses solely on the
capacity of the parents to act as lenders to a child investor in human capital. Thus,
the question is not one of the parents' "capacity" out of income and wealth to "subsi-
dize" the child's schooling, but rather one of the capacity of the parents simply to
"finance" the child's investment, given the parents' existing portfolio of assets and
liabilities, their current rate of net savings out of nonwealth income, and the expecta-
tion of eventual repayment (inclusive of interest at the parents' opportunity cost of
funds, i.e., at the rate of return earned by the parents' portfolio).
As derived in the preceeding chapter, loanable funds (LF) consist of (a) the
Parents' "available wealth" (AW) at the commencement of the investment (schooling)
period, defined as total wealth (W) less the "nonmortgageable component" of illiquid
assets (25 percent of total illiquid assets, A9), plus (b) the present value of savings out
of nonwealth income (annual rate S) over the investment period. The annual rate of
savings is determined on the basis of currently observed adjusted labor income (AYL)
and wealth (W), deriving those paths of consumption and savings which are just con-
sistent with observed labor income and wealth 'at the current age, under the
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assumptions that (a) labor income and consumption have grown at average
educational-attainment-specitic rates since age 25 (with the growth rate or consump-
tion stipulated to be 0.75 times the growth rate of adjusted labor income). (b) wealth
at age 25 was zero. (c) all returns to wealth since age 25 have been reinvested, and (d)
aU transfer income since age 25 has been consumed. In any case in which adjusted
current labor income is observed to be negative, current savings are set equal to zero.
Having obtained the current annual rate of savings (in the "t1rst" year of the assumed
four-year investment period). savings over the investment period are assumed to
increase at the rate of interest (discount rate), implying that the present value of all
savings over the investment period is equal to the length of the period (in years)
times the current annual rate of savings. Assuming a four-year investment period,
"annualized loanable funds" (ALF) is. then, 0.25·AW ｾ S.
The distributions of available wealth (AW), savings (S) and annualized loanable
funds CALF) are <lescribed in Table 3.14. As can be ob,erved by comparing Tables ｾ Ｎ Ｓ
and 3.14, available wealth is substantially less than total wealth (W), primarily because
of the importance of owner-occupied housing (an illiqUid asset assumed to be only 75
percent mortgageable) in the lattp.r. Thus, lower-quartile available wealth of $2.302
contrasts with lower-quartile wealth of $9,625, and the discrepancy becomes abso-
lutely greater in the higher ranges of the distribution, with the median (W versus AW)
declining from $36,377 to $22.841. the third quartile from $73.300 to $53,534. the 90th
percentile from $127,653 to $95.500. and the 95th percentile from, $188.268 to
$141,084. Mean available wealth of $38,582 is only about 70 percent of mean total
wealth. $55,537. The greater dispersion of available wealth, by comparison to total
wealth. is indicated by the increase in the ratio of the interquartile range to the
median, which rises from 175.0 percent (W) to 224.3 percent (AW).
As would be expected in light of the ages of parents of high school and college age
children, the estimates of current annual savings are quite substantial. with a median
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Table 3.14
Distributions of Loanable Funds and Its Components
AW S LF ALF -
Mean $38,582 $3,649 $53,179 $13,295
Std dev. 56,598 3,478 62,065 15,516
Coef. var. 146.7% 95.3% 116.7% 116.77-
Percentiles
1st $-23,801 $0 $-12.175 $-3,044
5th -8.000 0 -1.151 -288
lOth -3,050 250 765 191
25th 2.302 1.169 11.692 2,923 I50th 22.841 2,757 37,286 9,322 i75th 53,534 5,098 72,358 18,090 ,
90th 95,500 8,218 120,116 30,029 I
95th Ｑ Ｔ Ｑ Ｌ Ｐ Ｘ ｾ 10,522 170,132 42,533 I99th 287,075 15,866 313,809 78,452 i
Q3- Ql $51,232 $3,929 $60,666- 15,166 I
% of med 224.3% 142.5% 162.77- 162.7% I
Note: Distributions are derived utilizing weigh ted obser-vations. !
Number of obser-vations =5,474.
of $2,757, a third quartile of $5,09B and a 90th percentile of $8,218. However, the
skewness of the distribution is indicated by the comparison of the mean to the
median, $3,649 versus $2,757, respectively, and by the low values of the 10th percen-
tile, $250, and of the lower quartile, $1,169. The implied dispersion of the distribution
is indicated by the ratio of the inter-quartile range to the median, 142.5 percent. which
is, however, substantially smaller than the comparable measure for available wealth,
224.3 percent.
The distribution of total loanable funds (LFj indicates that three-quarters of all
parents could finance a child's investment in human capital (present value over four
years) of at least $11,692 without requiring recourse to external sources of funds,5
while the median parent could full finance an investmeat of $37,286, and one-quarter
5port!olio preferences of'parents miiht imply recoune to enemal capital markets. However, this would
simply indicate that the returDII achievable by the parents on their non-child assets exceed the interest
cOllts on liabilities. -
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of parents could fully finance at least $72.358. Again. however. a significant propor-
tion of families would be capable of financing little or no human capital investment.
with the tenth-percentile family having total loanable funds of only $765. The disper-
sion of this measure of lending capacity is indicated by the interquartile range rela-
tive to the median. 162.7 percent.
The distribution of annualized loanable· funds (ALF) is implied by the distribution
of total loanable funds (LF). from which it is directly derived (dividing the latter by an
assumed four-year schooling period). Thus. a ｬｯｷ･ｲｾｱｵ｡ｲｴｩｬ･ family could fully
selmnance an annual schooling investment (over four years, with costs stated in con-
stant 1979-80 prices) of at least $2,923, with a median family capable of investment
financing at an annual rate of $9,322, an upper quartile family at an annual rate of
$18.090. and the 90th percentile .family at an annual rate of $30.029. Interpretively,
one-half of all families could fully finance four years of schooling at a relatively expen-
sive private institution, and one-quarter could fully finance the most expensive
private schooling. However. the tenth percentile family could self-finance virtually no
schooling. with annualized loanable funds of only $19l.
As will be discussed subsequently. the foregoing evidence suggests that almost
three-quarters of all families could fully self-finance schooling at the median cost
(inclusive of tuition. fees, and room and board) actually reported by the HS&B seniors
actually attending college in 1980-81, $3.250. Conver8ely, only one-quarter would
require non-parent-wealth-collateralized access to capital markets or other sources of
funds in order to finance four years of collegiate schooling. Indicative of the degree to
which parental lending capacity is not being exploited. the median parents' actual
contribution to support of the child's postsecondary schooling is less than 10 percent
of those parents' annualized loanable funds.
Correlations between parental loanable funds and its components are presented
in Table 3.15. The predominant intluence of available wealth (AW) on' total/annualized
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loanable funds (LF/ ALF) is indicated by the fact that the correlation between this com-
ponent and the total is 0.98. In contrast, the correlation between current annual sav-
ings (S) and total/annualized loanable funds (LF/ ALF) is only 0.51.
Table 3.15
Correlations Between Loanable Funds and Its Components
AW S LF(ALF}
AW 1.000 0.304 0.976
S 1.000 0.506
LF(ALF} 1.000
Note: rLF.AU =1.0
Correlations are derived utilizing unweighted observations.
Number of observations =5,474.
The relationships between loanable funds and its components, on the one hand,
and the various measures of income and wealth, on the other, are indicated by the
correlations presented in Table 3.16. Not surprisingly, the highest correlation, 0.97, is
observed between actual wealth (W) and available wealth (AW): if the relationship
between illiquid assets and wealth were invariant across families (i.e., if illiquid assets
were a constant proportion of wealth), this correlation would be 1. Again retiecting
the predominant intiuence of wealth on loanable funds, a correlation of 0.95 is
observed between wealth (W) and total/annualized loanable funds (LF/ALF).
Wore interesting are the correlations of the loanable funds measures with the
various measures of income. In contrast to a correlation of 0.56 between conventional
money income (Y) and total/annualized loanable funds, this correlation rises to 0.65
when the comprehensive measure of current income (AY) is employed and to 0.76 with
the recognition of potential lifecycle labor income (PLCAWAY). Because the correla-
tions between current annual savings and the various income measures are relatively
invariant (ranging from 0.75 to 0.83), this increase in the income/total-Ioanable-funds
correlations is' almost entirely due to the higher correlations between the
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Table 3.16
Correlations Between Loanable Funds Components and
Alternative Measures of (a) Total Income and (b) Wealth
AW S LF(ALF)
Y 0.421 0.790 0.563
AY 0.520 0.793 0.654
PAWAY 0.580 0.808 0.711
PCAWAY 0.647 0.757 0.761
PLCAWAY 0.649 0.755 0.762
PCWAY 0.556 0.834 0.696
PLCPWAY 0.620 0.788 0.743
W 0.973 0.315 0.953
PCW 0.944- 0.426 0.953
PLCW 0.935 0.440 0.948
Note: Correlations are derived utilizing unweighted observations.
Number of observations =5,474.
adjusted/pot.ential income measures and available wealth. Thus. the correlation
between income and available wealth rises from 0.42 (Y), to 0.52 (AY) and further to
0.65 (P1CAWAY). While the higher correlation in the case of the adjusted income
measure (AY) reftects its recognition of net imputed income to owner-occupied hous-
ing. the fact that the highest correlation is observed when potential LifecycLe labor
income is recognized (in PLCAWAY) suggests that the degree of exploitation of earn-
ings capacity is negatively associated with the level of wealth.
3. Distributions of Actual Postsecondary Ezpenditure and Sources of Fands
In this section actual (parentally-reported) postsecondary expenditures and sources of
funds are examined for that subset of the HS&:B sample of 1980 high school seniors
reported by the parents to be in college in the Fall of 1960. It should be stressed tbat
these are parental reports of schooling finances for the current. year. made after tbe
commencement of the school year, and thus should be reasonably accurate. That this
is the case is indicated by the close correspondence between estimates of mean and
median postsecondary expenditures, on the one hand, and of total mean and median
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sources or runds to ftnance this schooling. on the other. with differences between
these of less than SlOO.
For reasons of internal logic. the analysis focuses successively on (a) actual post-
secondary expenditure, (b) "external" sources of support for schooling. and (c) paren-
tal and student contributions to the financing of schooling. The following section then
conjoins these to obtain estimates of net schooling costs as perceived by the family
Ilnd by the student. Finally. in the last section of this chapter these net cost esti-
mates are combined with the preceeding estimates of ',parental loanable funds to
assess directly the issue of the degree to which parents could in fact act as capital
suppliers to the child for purposes of human capital investment, given the actual net
investment costs incurred.
3.1. Postsecondary Ezpendltures
The distributions of (a) living expenditure$ (excluding schooling costs p".,. se), (b)
schooling expenditures (consisting of tuition and fees). and (c) total postsecondary
expenditures (the sum of schooling and living expenditures) are described in Table
3.17. Because living expenditures (lJVEXP) refer only to out-of-pocket expenses. Le..
in general do not include the costs to the family of housing and feeding a commuting
student. 30 percent of students are reported to incur no living expenses. Living
expenses are $1.500 for the median student. $2.500 for the upper-quartile student and
$3,500 for the 90th percentile student.
With reference to schooling expenditures (SCHEXP). only 1.5 percent of students
report zero costs. However, more than 10 percent report schooling costs of only $250.
and the lower-quartile is only $750. the median $1.500. The upper quartile, con-
versely, is $3.000. and the 90th percentile is $5.000. ｍ ｾ ｡ ｮ schooling expenditures of
$1.944 slightly exceed mean living expenditures of $1.704.
Combining living and schooling expenditures. total postsecondary expenditures
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Table 3,17
Distributions of Postsecondary Expenditures
Mean
Std. dev.
Coef. var.
Percentiles
1st
5th
10th
25th
50th
75th
90th
95th
99th
Q3 - Ql
7. of med.
Note:
LIVEXP SCHEXP PSEXP
$1.704 $1.944 $3.648
1,612 1,546 2.613
94.67. 79.5% 71.67.
$0 $0 $250
0 250 250
0 250 750
0 750 1.500
1.500 1.500 3.250
2.500 3.000 5.500
3.500 5.000 7.500
4.500 5.000 9.500
6.000 7.000 11.000
$2.500 $2.250 $4-.000'
166.7% 150.07. 123.17.
Distributions are derived utilizing weighted observations.
Number of observations = ＱＮＵｾＴＮ
(PSEXP) have a mean and median of $3.648 and $3.250. respectively. In excess of five
percent report postsecondary expenditures or $250 or less. and the tenth percentile is
only $750. However, total expenditures rise rapidly. with a lower quartile of $1,500, an
upper quartile of 15.500. a 90th percentile of $7.500 and a 95th percent.ile of S8.500.
The interquartile range relative to the median is 123.1 percent. substantial but
signiticanUy lower than that of either living or schooling expenses in isolation. 166.7
percent and 150 percent. respectively.
Perhaps surprisingly, the correlation between living expenses and schooling
expenses, reported in Table 3.18. is rather low. 0.35. Interestingly. however. each is
approximately equally correlated with total postsecondary expenditures (- 0.82).
Correlations of these expenditure variables with the income. wealth and loanable
funds measures are reported in Table 3.19. ｃ ｯ ｲ ｲ ･ ｾ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ of the expenditure variables
and the income variables are approximately constant across income variables. How-
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Table 3.18 I
Correlations Between Postsecondary Expenditure and Its Components I
LIVEXP
SCHEXP
PSEXP
LIVEXP
1.000
SCEEXP
0.349
1.000
PSEXP
0.829
0.813
1.000
Note: Correlations are derived utilizing unweighted observations.
Number of observations =1,554.
ever. the correlation of income and schooling expenditure (SCHEXP). - 0.11, is more
than twice as great as that between income and living expenditure (LIVEXP) , .... 0.04.
The correlation between income and total postsecondary expenditure (PSEXP) is virtu-
ally invariant at about 0.09.
Table 3.19
Correlations Between Postsecondary Expenditures and Alternative Measures of
(a) Total Income. (b) Wealth and (c) Loanable Funds
LIVEXP SCHEXP PSEXP
y 0.046 0.110 0.094
AY 0.039 0.101 0.085
PAWAY 0.039 0.108 0.088
PCAWAY 0.037 0.115 0.091
PLCAWAY 0.036 0.115 0.092
PCWAY 0.043 0.112 0.093
PLCPWAY 0.041 0.122 0.098
I
I
I
I
I
w
PCW
PLCW
AW
S
LF(ALF)
0.022
0.036
0.036
0.025
0.056
0.037
0.054
0.072
0.079
0.061
0.122
0.065
0.046
0.065
0.070
0.052
0.109
0.074
I
I
I
I
Note: Correlations are derived utilizing unweighted observations.
Number of observations = 1.554.
A ｭｯｲｾ interesting pattern is observed in the correlations between the postsecon-
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dary expendilure measures and t.he alternative measures of wealt.h. Again. the corre-
lations are more lhan twice as great for schooling expenditures as for living expendi-
tures. However, in this case the correlations with the potential wealth measures,
especially potential lifecycle wealth (imposing norms for both labor force participa-
tion and savings) are substantially higher (roughly 1.5 times higher) than those for
actual wealth. In effect, higher levels of current. expenditure over the lifecycle, imply·
ing lower wealth, are associated with correspondingly higher current expenditure for
schooling. The highest correlations are observed between schooling expenditure and
(a) current savings (S), 0.12, and (b) total/annualized loanable funds (LF/ALF), 0.09.
The latter is primarily a redection of the former, which itself redects the relationship
between the imputed rate of savings and both income and wealth.
3.2. 'Enemal· nnancial SUpport for Schooling
Distributions of enernal financial support for postsecondary schooling are presented
in Table 3.20 , distinguishing (a) total loans (TL. virtually all of which are Federally
sponsored. directly or indirectly), (b) Federal grants (FG), (c) other grants (OG), and
(d) total grants (TG = FG + OG). Only about one-fourth of students are reported to
utilize external (nonfamily) borrowing as a source of financial support, although mean
borrowing, conditional on borrowing at all, is about Sl,BOO, and between five and 10
percent" of students report borrowing in excess of $2,000, with more than five percent
borrowing over $2,600.8
Grants are a much more significant source of support for postsecondary school-
ing than are loans, with about 20 percent of students reporting grants from both
6rhe t.reatmezrt of studezrt borrowml from external sources as "external" ｾ ｣ Ｂ ｊ ｬ ｉ might well be ques-
tioned. on gToUDds that this borrowing represents a."'1 obligation of the student, commiting him to fu:ure
repayments. and hence should be considered a source of "selfsu;:port." To the degree to which stude::lt loans
e.re unsubsidized this is indeed correct. However, u demonstrated in Stephen P. Dresch...Fina...·lcie.l and
Behavioral ｬ Ｚ ｾ ｰ ｬ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ of Federal Student Loan Programs and Proposals," published in H. Tuckman and E.
Whalen, eda., 5Ull.rilti8s to Higher E=clltio7L: 17w luu•• (New York: Preager Publishers, 1980). exisililg
Federally-sponsored student loans incorporate a subst.e.ntial "pure-grant" component, constituting 4pproxi-
m6tely 50 percent of the amount of the ostensible loan. Clearly, a more refiJled analysis would decompose
lOaDS into implicit grant and true loen components and treat the latter u one component of selfsupport.
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Table 3.20 i
Distributions of External Sources of Support for Schooling II
I
!
TL FG OG TG II
$442 $400 $420 $820 !Mean
Std. dev. 886 809 737 1,222
Coef. var. 200.6% 202.3% 175.2% 149.1%
Percentiles
1st to 25th $0 $0 $0 $0
50th 0 0 0 150
75th 15C 450 600 1.350
90th 1.60C· 1.600 1.350 2.600
95th 2,600 2,600 2.050 3.4-00
99th 2,750 3.500 3,050 5.200
Q3· Ql $150 $450 $SOO $1,350
% of med. NA NA NA 900.0%
Note: Distributions are derived utilizing weighted observations.
Number ot observations = 1.553.
NA indicates not applicable.
Federal and other soqrces. 10 percent reporting only Federal grants and 20 percent
reporting only grants from nonFederal sources. For more than 25 percent of students
Federal grants totaled $450 or more. and for more than 10 percent these grants were
at least $1,600. In the case of nonFederal grants. the award exceeded $500 for more
than 25 percent ot students and was equal to $1,350 or more for in excess of 10 per-
cent ot students. As noled. more than fifty percent of all students received grants
from some source or sources. and at least 25 percent of students received grants of at
least $1,350, with in excess of 10 percent receiving at least $2,600.
Correlations between these various external sources ot financial support for post-
secondary schooling are reported in Table 3.21. While the correlations between loans.
on the one hand. and grants. on the other. are relatively low, it is interesting that the
loan/Federal-grant correlation is negative (-0.04) while the loan/nonFederal-grant
correlation is positive (0.07). Federal and nonFederal grants are more highly corre:-
lated (0.23). and the two grant components are approximately equally correlated (-
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0.78) with tolal grants.
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Table 3.21
Correlations Between Elements of External Support
TL
FG
OG
TG
TL
1.000
FG
-0.037
1.000
OG
0.069
0.234
1.000
TG
0.019
0.794
0.776
1.000
I
I
I
i
Note: Correlations are derived utilizing unweighted observations. I
Number of observations = 1,553. I
Correlations between the external support variables and the various measures of
i.ncome. wealth. loanable funds and postsecondary expenditure are reported in Table
3.22. Regardless of the income measure employed.. loans are positively correlated
with income (- 0.16), wbile the income/grant correlations are negative (Federal
grants"" -0.22. nonFederal grants - -0.2. total grants - -0.26). and the same is true of
the wealth/grant correlations (Federal grants - -0.15. nonFederal grants - -0.18. total
grants .... -0.21). Also a'S in the case of income. the wealth/loan correlations are posi-
live but small. although higher in the case of the potential wealth measures.
Probably retlecting the positive relationship between savings. income and wealth.
loans are positively correlated with current savings. while grants and savings are
negatively correlated.. and the same is generally true of available wealth and
total/annualized loanable funds. Loans are particularly highly correlated with school-
ing and total postsecondary expenditure (0.36). While Federal grants are approxi-
mately equally correlated with living and schooling expenditures (.... 0.15), nonFederal
and total grants are more high correlated with schooling expenditure (- 0.3).
3.3. Family and Student Contributions to Postsecondary Ji'iDance
Family and student contributions to the financing of postsecondary schooling can be
decomposed into (a) parental support (APe: Actual Parental Contribution). (b) support
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Table 3.22
Correlations Between External Sources of Support and Alternative Measures of
(a) Total Income, (b) Wealth, (c) Loanable Funds and (d) Postsecondary Expenditure
TL FG OG TG
Y 0.172 -0.213 ｾ Ｎ Ｑ Ｗ Ｐ -0.244
AY 0.156 -0.226 ｾ Ｎ Ｑ Ｖ Ｗ -0.264
PAWAY 0.154 -0.226 ｾ Ｎ Ｒ Ｐ Ｐ -0.272
PCAWAY 0.153 -0.232 ｾ Ｎ Ｒ Ｑ Ｐ -0.262
PLCAWAY 0.153 -0.233 ｾ Ｎ Ｒ Ｑ Ｑ -0.263
PCWAY 0.162 -0.216 ｾ Ｎ Ｑ Ｙ Ｕ -0.263
PLCPWAY 0.161 -0.222 -0.205 -0.272
rtf 0.044 -0.156 ｾ Ｎ Ｑ Ｘ Ｑ -0.215
PCW 0.073 -0.149 ｾ Ｎ Ｑ Ｘ Ｕ -0.212
PLCW 0.076 -0.146 -o.lB1 -0.209
AW 0.034- -0.140 ｾ Ｎ Ｑ Ｗ Ｗ -0.201
S 0.163 -0.216 ｾ Ｎ Ｑ Ｕ Ｓ -0.236
LF(ALF) 0.071 -0.179 ｾ Ｎ Ｑ Ｙ Ｖ -0.240
LIVEXP 0.236 0.142 0.157 0.190
SCHEXP 0.366 0.150 0.306 0.269
PSEXP 0.365 0.177 0.261 0.290
Note: Correlations are derived utilizing unweighted observations.
Number of observations = 1,553.
to the child from other relatives (RCC), (c) student earnings (TE), distinguishing
between summer (SUYE) and school-year (SCRE) earnings, and (d) drawings against
the accumulated savings of the child (CSAV). The distributions of these elements of
student ｾ ､ family selfsupport are ｰ ｯ ｲ ｴ ｲ ｡ ｲ ･ ｾ in Table 3.23.
More than 15 percent of parents report making no financial contribution toward
the child's postsecondary schooling expenditures, and the lower quartile of APC is only
$150. The median parent reports a contribution of $900, and at the upper quartile and
above the parents' contribution equals or exceeds the maximum amount reportable
on the parents' HS&B questionnaire ($2,600).
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Table 3.23
Distributions of Student and Family Support for Schooling
APC RCC SUME SCHE TE CSAV
Mean $1,157 $93 $414 $502 $916 $194
Std. dev. 984 414 512 715 972 452
Coef. var. Ｘ ｾ Ｎ Ｐ Ｗ Ｍ 445.27- 126.57. 142.57- 106.17. 232.8%
Percentiles
1st to 10th $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25th 150 0 0 0 150 0
50th 900 0 150 150 600 0
75th 2,600· 0 450 900 1,350 150
90th 2,600· 150 900 1,600 2,500 450
95th 2,600· 450 1,600 2,600· 2,750 900
I99th 2,600· 2,600· 2,600· 2,600· 4,200 2,600·
Q3 - Ql $2,450 $0 $450 $900 $1,200 $150
7. of med.. 272.2% NA 300.0% 600.0% 200.0% NA
Note: Distributions are derived utilizing weighted observations.
Number of observations =1,553.
Asterisk (.) denotes point estimate of highest category.
NA ＴｾｾｾｴｾＳ PQt ｉ ｬ ｰ ｰ ｬ ｩ ｰ ｾ ｰ ｬ ･ Ｎ
As can be observed. contributions from other relatives are zero or of trivial mag-
nitude for the vast majority of students, with only 20 percent reporting receipt of any
support from this source. Half of those reporting a positive amount receive only about
$150, and fewer t.han a quarter receive $450 or more. This is, in short, a quantitatively
very unimportant source of finance for the postsecondary schooling of the vast major-
ity of students.
Technically, a student's selfsupport for schooling includes earnings. withdrawal of
accumulated savings, and borrowing. either within or outside the family. However.
because the "loan" component of parental and other support for schooling cannot be
directly observed. it is more useful here to focus on nonloan selfsupport, although the
substantive reality of loans (to lhe extent of the "true-loan" equivalent of subsidized
loans) as a cost ultimately borne by the ｳ ｴ ｵ ｾ ･ ｮ ｴ should be kept in mind..
The remarkable observation with ｲ ･ ｦ ｾ ｲ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ to the nonloan component of student
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selfsupport is the extremely small amounts reported. Thus, zero summer earnings
are reported for 35 percent of students, and more than 40 percent report zero earn-
ings during the school year. For 20 percent zero earnings are reported for the entire
year. With reference to summer earnings, half of all students report S150 or less, 75
percent S450 or less, and 90 percent S900 or less. Thus, only 10 percent of students
relie on summer earnings to any substantial extent as a source of financial support
for postsecondary schooling. In the case of school-year earnings, 25 percent report
amounts of S900 or above, and between five and 10 percent report S2,600 or more. For
total (summer and school-year) earnings, half report S600 or less, 75 percent SI.350
or less, and 95 percent S2,500 or less.
If student earnings provide only modest support for postsecondary schooling,
accumulated student savings are a virtually trivial source of ftnance. Thus, more than
60 percent of students are reported to cover no postsecondary expenses from past sav-
ings, 90 percent report $450 or less, and even tpe Ｙ Ｕ ｾ ｰ percentile is only $900.
As reported in Table 3.24, the correlations between these various components and
.tudent and family support for schooling are generally extremely small in absolute
value. Only in the case of the earnings and child's savings variables do these correla-
tions exceed 0.2. Not surprisingly. the correlations between support from the child's
savings and summer/total earnings is 0.26, probably redecting a signidcant positive
correlation between earnings over time. The greater importance of school-year as
opposed to summer earnings in the tot.al is redected in the relative correlations, 0.B5
versus 0.7.
Table 3.25 presents correlations between the student/family support variables
and the various measures of income, wealth, loanable funds, postsecondary expendi-
ture and external support. As would be expected, the correlations between income
(however defined) ｾ ､ actual parental contributions (APe) are reasonably high, ... 0.32.
Positive correlations are also observed between income and the child-earnings (espe-
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Table 3.24
Correlations Between Sources of Student and Family Support for Schooling
APC RCC SUME SCHE TE CSAV
APC 1.000 0.032 0.048 -0.019 -0.043 0.059
RCC 1.000 0.083 0.029 0.066 0.020
SUME 1.000 0.211 0.696 0.262
SCHE 1.000 0.849 0.160
TE 1.000 0.260
CSAV 1.000
Note: Correlations are derived utilizing unweighted observations.
Number of observations = 1,553.
cially summer and total) and child-savings variables, .... 0.09. Parental contributions
and support from the child's savings are also positive correlated with wealth (.... 0.23
and ..... 0.14, respectively) and with total/annualized loanable funds (0.27 and 0.14,
respectively).
With reference to postsecondary expenditures, the parental contribution correla-
tions are reasonably high (0.34 in the case of total expenditure). While summer earn-
iogs are positively correlated with expenditure, school-year earnings exhibit negative
correlations (especially with schooling expenditure, -0.09). Support from the child's
savings is positively correlated (0.11) with schooling expenditure.
Turning to the relationships between student/family and external sources of sup-
port. total loans are positively correlated with the parents' contribution (0.15), sum-
mer earnings (0.08) and support from the child's savings (0.11). In contrast, grants
are negatively correlated with the parental contribution (-0.14 in the case of Federal
grants, -0.07 nonFederal, and -0.14 total). No significant relationships are observed
between the child-earnings/savings variables and external support.
4. Net Postsecondary Schooling Costs
The foregoing data concerning postsecondary schooling costs and sources of funds can
be combined to provide evidence on the net costs associated with a year of postsecon-
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Table 3.25
Correlations Between Student/Family Support for Schooling and
Other Financial Variables
APC RCC SUME SCHE TE CSAV
Y 0.311 0.077 0.094 0.056 0.092 0.099
AY 0.320 0.070 0.089 0.049 0.084 0.099
PAWAY 0.329 0.065 0.084 0.033 0.070 0.089
PCAWAY 0.334 0.061 0.084 0.027 0.065 0.103
PLCAWAY 0.334 0.060 0.084 0.026 0.065 0.102
PCWAY 0.329 0.066 0.082 0.030 0.067 0.086
PLCPWAY 0.334 0.062 0.081 0.023 0.061 0.098
'tV 0.214 0.040 0.059 -0.004 0.029 0.142
PCW 0.237 0.047 . 0.060 -0.007 0.027 0.140
PLCW 0.240 0.049 0.059 -0.010 0.024 0.139
AW 0.214 0.041 0.042 -0.026 0.004 0.144
S 0.318 0.040 0.078 0.004 0.045 0.027
LF{ALF) 0.271 0.047 0.057 -0.023 0.014 0.137
LIVEXP 0.271 0.047 0.109 -0.019 0.045 0.037
SCHEXP 0.291 0.063 0.106 -0.087 -0.007 0.114
PSEXP 0.342 0.067 0.131 -0.063 0.024 0.091
TL 0.148 0.042 0.084 -0.051 0.008 0.112
J'G -0.139 -0.024- -0.003 -0.008 -0.007 -0.022
OG -0.071 0.015 0.015 -0.035 -0.017 0.020
TG -0.135 -0.006 0.007 -0.027 -0.016 -0.001
Note: Correlations are derived utilizing unweighted observations.
Number of observations = 1.553.
dary scbooling. First. bowever. it is necessary to address the issue of the "true" cost
of schooling to the individual and family.
It is conventional in higher education circles to define college cots as the sum of
tuition and fees (here. SCHEXP). on the one hand" and living expenses (LIVEXP). on the
other. and this convention bas been followed in the derivation of "total postsecondary
I
expenditures" (PSEXP). However. while living expenses must obviously be paid" these
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are, in general, costs which would be incurred whether an individual were in school or
not. Moreover, because room and board costs of most public and of many private col-
leges are highly subsidized,7 living expenses as a student are not uncommonly less
than the expenses which an individual would incur were he not to be a student.S Thus,
living expenses cannot be considered a "cost" of schooling in any meaningful or legiti-
mate economic sense. 9 Nonetheless. as a gesture to convention we first develop what
we characterize as a series of "nominal net cost" estimates. utilizing total postsecon-
dary expenditure as the measure of the gross cost. This is followed by an ._...alysis of
economically defensible measures of "true net cost," in which schooling expenditures
alone (excluding living expenses) are recognized as real costs to the student of his
schooling.
Three alternative nominal net cost measures are derived. The first can be con-
sidered a measure of the nominal net cost to the family, including parents, the stu-
ｑ Ｎ ｾ ｮ ｴ and other relatives. apd is obtained py qeductiQg total srants from total post-
secondary expenditure, resulting in a measure denoted NNFC (= PSEXP - TG). This
measure will incorporate a possibly substantial upward bias in that it fails to deduct
from gross costs the subsidy element of highly subsidized student loans, estimated. as
noted above, to equal approximately 50 percent of a nominal loan.
7It might be objected that :NCh "aUJtilliary enterprises" u dormitories and food services e.re required to be
aelfsupport.inl even in public colleges and UDiversities. However, by compe.riaon to other providers of hoU8-
ing and of food semces, these enterprises e.re hi&hl1 subsidized nonetheleSll. Thus, these facilities. at both
public and private institutions. e.re ftnanced thrOUCh lovernmentally-guaranteed borrowin&. interest an
which is e%empt from state and Federal income tues, their sales e.re exempt from sales tues, their net in-
come is exempt from state and Federal income taxes, and many of the inputs (including administrative over-
head) are incorporated in directly subsidized budgets.
8.rms is especialJy the cue when ancillary subsidies to students (by comparison to nonstudents) e.re con-
sidered. Thus, health care services provided by colleges and universities e.re commonly highly subsidized.
studenta (but not nonstudents) continue to be eligible for health insurance throU4lh the ･ ｭ ｰ ｬ ｯ ｹ ･ ｾ ｰ ｲ ｯ ｶ ｩ ､ ･ ､
plllDS of their pe.rents, both the student and the pe.rent e.re permitted to claim the student u a dependent
for purposes of Federal and state income taxes, a student's implicit earnings (invested in human capital) are
not subject to income tuation, cad 7UIUS.um.
90f course. while livin& expenses cannot be considered a true cost of schooling. it is necesll81"Y to recognize
foregODe earniDgll as a legitimate schooling cost. Ironically, in light of the conventional treatment of living
expenses. the true economic cCllrt of schoollD, i!I in fact higher than appee.rs on the basis of the conventional
calculation.
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Deducting parents' and relatives' contributions from nominal net family cost, the
second nominal net cost variable represents a rough measure of the cost to the stu-
dent, denoted NNSC (= PSEXP - TG - APC - RCC). It incorporates a downward bias in
that some part of the deducted parents· and relatives' support may in fact be repay-
able loans rather than gifts. However. it also incorporates the upward bias present in
the estimate of net cost to the family. Le.• the subsidy element of loans.
Finally, the third measure. nominal net residual cost, NNRC (= PSEXP - TG - APC -
RCC - TL - TE - CSAV) is offered as a basis for assessing the internal consistency and
reliability of the underlying data. since in principle this residual should be zero or
negative as all sources of funds have ostensibly been captured.
The distributions of these alternative measures of nominal net cost are presented
in Table 3.26. For the median family nominal net cost (NNFC). e qual to gross cost
(including living expenses) less external grants. is $2.555. However. for more than five
percent of families this cost is negative. and for more than one-fourth nominal net
cost is $750 or less. On the other hand, 25 percent of families confront nominal net
costs of $4.250 or more. and for 10 percent this measure of family cost is over $6.000.
Nominal net cost to the student (NNSC). equal to nominal net cost to the family
less parental and other relatives' contributions. i.e.• treating these as nonrepayable
gifts to the student. is substantially lower. with a median net student cost of $1.350.
For more than 25 percent of students nominal net cost is negative. while 25 percent
confront net costs of about $3.000 or more. and 10 percent face costs greater than
$4.500. The latter two figures. however. are probably significantly upward biased as a
result of the truncation of individual sources of support (especially parental contribu-
tions) at $2.600. In any event. it is clear that a significant fraction (more than one-
fourth) of students incur zero or only trivial net costs on account of schooling. even
when living expenses are considered a component of schooling cost.
Nominal net residual costs (NNRC). equal to nominal net cost to the ｳ ｴ ｵ ｾ ･ ｮ ｴ less
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Table 3.26
Nominal and True Net Costs: Family. Student and Residual
NNFC NNSC NNRC TNFC TNSC TNRC
Mean $2.828 $1.578 $26 $1.124 $-126 $-1.677
Std. dev. 2,564 2,334 2.462 1.719 1,656 2.014
Coef. var. 90.6% 147.9% 9,312.1% 152.9% NA NA
Percentiles
1st $-2.000 $-3.250 ,,"6.795 $-2.850 $-4.450 $-8,400
5th -350 -1,850 -3,900 -1,300 -2.700 -5,200
10th 250 -650 -2,750 -645 -2,000 -4,150
25th 750 -50 -1.250 250 -1,100 -2,750
50th 2.555 1,350 -100 750 -150 -1.450
75th 4,250 2,950 1.350 1.650 600 -350
90th 6.050 4,600 2.850 3,000 2,100 400
95th 7,500 5.900 4,000 5,000 2,500 1,200
99th 10,500 8,000 6.500 6,550 4.400 3.000
Q3 - Ql $3,500 $3.000 $2.600 $1,400 $1,700 $2.400
"of med. 137.0% 222.2% NA 186.7% NA NA
Note: Distributions are derived utilizing weighted observations.
Number Qt ｯｰｳ･ｲｶ｡ｴｩｯｑｾ =1,554.
NA denotes not applicable...
loans from external sources and support from the student's own earnings and savings,
is negative for more than one-half of all students. Interpretively. after paying all
costs. including living expenses, 50 percent of students enjoy a financial surplus.
available for savings or for "extraordinary" consumption. While net residual costs are
estimated to exceed $1,350 for 25 percent of students and to exceed $2,650 for 10 per-
cent. these positive differences between nominal costs and revenues are probably
accounted for by the truncation of individual sources of funds at $2,600, although
there are undoubtedly some students for whom anticipated revenues-in the Fall of the
school year are indeed less than anticipated expenses, with the residual to be met by
whatever means possible (e.g., additional grants, parental contributions and borrow-
ing) when the need arises.
As has been discussed. no economic meaning can be attached to the nominal net
cost measures which have Just been presented Thus, three parallel "true-net-
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schooling-cost" measures are developed, using schooling expenses alone (SCHEXP),
exclusive of living expenses, as the measure of true schooling cost. The first of these
measures is true net cost to the family (TNFC =SCHEXP - TG), the second is true net
cost to the student {TNSC =SCHEXP - TG - APC - RCC}, and the third is true net resi-
dual cost {TNRC =SCHEXP - TG - APC - RCC - TL - TE - CSAV}. These measures will
incorporate the respective biases discussed with reference to the corresponding meas-
ures of nominal net cost. In this case, true net residual cost (TNRC) will indicate the
residual amount (negative) available to the student to cover any living expenses not
met directly by the parents.
The distributions of the alternative measures of true net cost are also portrayed
in Table 3.26. In contrast to nominal net family cost (NNFC), true net family cost
(TNF'C) is trivial or negative for one-quarter of all families and is $750 or less for more
than one-half of all families. On the other hand. 25 percent of families confront true
net ｃ ｏ ｓ ｾ Ｒ ｊ of $1,650 or more, and for mDre t,pap lO percent Df '",mUies ｾ Ｔ ｾ ｳ ml,liasure Df
cost exceeds $3,000.
True net cost to the student (TNSC), equal to true net cost to the family less
parental and other relatives' support, is negative for more than 50 percent of students
and is $600 or less for 75 percent of students. For 10 ｾ ｲ ｣ ･ ｮ ｴ this net student cost is
$2,100 or greater,_. but most of these cases are probably the spurious result of the
truncation of individual sources of funds in the underlying data.
True net residual cost (TNRC). equal to schooling expenses less all sources of sup-
port, including external loans and student earnings and savings, provides an indica-
tion of amounts available (negative) for consumption and savings. The median of $-
1.450 indicates that one-half of all students have at least this amount available to
meet living expenses, to engage in extraordinary consumption or to save. For 10 per-
cent of students the available amount is greater than $4,000, and it is $2,750 or
I
greater for 25 percent of students. Moreover, notwithst!U1ding limitations of data
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(truncation), the residual net cost is negative for more than three-quarters of stu-
dents, and the 90th percentile is only $400.
Correlations between the six net cost measures (nominal versus true. family
versus student versus residual) are presented in Table 3.27. While the nominal family
and student net costs are highly correlated (0.91). a substantially lower correlation
(O.B) is observed between the true family and student net costs. Correlations between
corresponding true/nominal pairs of the various net cost measures (family, student,
residual). in the range of 0.75. suggest thul. only slightly more than half of the vari-
ance in true net cost is associated with variations in nominal net cost, and vice ｶ ･ ｲ ｳ ｾ Ｎ
Table 3.27
Correlations Between Nominal and True Net Cost Measures
NNFC NNSC NNRC TNFC TNSC TNRC
NNFC 1.000 0.911 0.716 0.779 0.540 0.249
NNSC 1.000 0.B13 0.690 0.715 0.406
NNRC 1.000 0.527 0.584 0.745
TNFC 1.000 0.798 0.488
TNSC 1.000 0.694
TNRC 1.000
Note': Correlations are derived utilizing unweighted observations.
Numper of observations = 1,554.
Correlations between the alternative net cost variables and the various measures
of income. wealth. loanable funds. postsecondary expenditure. external- and
stUdent/family-support variables are presented in Table 3.28. As would be expected.
nominal net family cost is positively correlated with income (regardless of the income
variable employed). although the magnitude of the correlation (- 0.22) is relatively
small, with variations in income accounting for less than five percent of the variance
in cost. Even lower correlations (- 0.1) are observed between nominal net student
cost and income, while nominal net residual costs are entirely uncorrelated with
income. Interestingly, the correlations between true net family cost and income (-
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0.3) are about 50 percent higher than the correlations between nominal net family
cost and income. However. this is entirely offset by variations in parental contribu-
lions, resulting in correlations between true net student cost and income which are
about the same as those observed between nominal net student cost and income.
True net residual cost is marginally negatively correlated with income. In general.
the correlations between wealth. on the one hand. and nominal/true net
family/stUdent cost are somewhat lower than those between wealth and the cost vari-
abIes. Apart from current savings (detennined by income and wealth). the same is
true of the relationship between loanable funds and costs.
While nominal net costs are highly correlated 'With total postsecondary expendi-
ture, this is much less true of true net costs. with the correlations declining from 0.89
t.o 0.55 in the case of family costs. from 0.82 to 0.35 in the case of student. costs. and
from 0.64 to 0.1 in the case of residual costs. Retlecting the "residual" role of exter-
nal (nonfamily) loans. the cQrrelations between nominal ｮ ｾ ｴ fmnHy/student ｣ ｯ ｾ ｴ ｳ and
loans are significantly positive (0.37 and 0.33. respectively), while a very low (-0.05)
correlation is observed between "nominal net residual cost.s and loans. As would be
expected. grants (especially Federal grants) are highly negatively correlated with net
costs. particularly in the case of true net costs. although in absolute value the corre-
lations are higher with family cost than with student costs (suggesting t.hat variations
in grants are offset. to some degree. for the student by opposing variations in parental
contributions). Finally. parental contributions are quite highly correlated with nomi-
nal and true net family cost but are virtually uncorrelated with nominal net student
cost. True net student cost is quite negatively correlated with parental contributions.
5. Loanable Funds and the Capacity of Parents to Und.enrri.te Postsecondary Educa-
lion
The final issue addressed in this chapter concerns the relationship between annual-
ized lPiUlable fundll of ｰ ｡ ｲ ･ ｮ ｴ ｾ and ibe llctual schooling costs of their children. .AJ
, I :. '. . "',
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Table 3.26
Correlations Between Nominal/True Net Cost Measures and
Other Financial Variables
NNFC NNSC NNRC TNFC TNSC TNRC
Y 0.213 0.091 -0.026 0.276 0.064 -0.070
AY 0.213 0.069 -0.020 0.265 0.066 -D. 056
PAWAY 0.220 0.094 -0.007 0.297 0.096 -0.040
PCAWAY 0.226 0.101 -0.001 0.310 0.107 -0.031
PLCAWAY 0.229 0.102 0.001 0.312 0.110 -0.029
PCWAY 0.221 0.095 -0.007 0.294 0.093 -0.044
PLCPWAY 0.231 0.104 0.002 0.310 0.107 -0.032
W 0.150 0.069 0.014 0.206 0.076 -0.001
Pew 0.166 0.078 0.013 0.220 0.075 -0.013
PLCW 0.171 0.060 0.016 0.224- 0.078 -0.011
AW 0.149 0.068 0.028 0.202 0.072 0.011
S 0.224 0.107 0.024 0.284 0.095 -0.019
LF(ALF) 0.190 0.068 0.029 0.252 0.068 0.006
LIVEXP 0.762 0.714 0.576 0.187 0.021 -0.113
SCHEXP 0.699 0.634 0.463 0.722 0.557 0.278
PSEXP 0.890 0.822 0.635 0.547 0.345 0.096
TL 0.366 0.333 -0.052 0.327 0.240 -0.257
FG -0.196 -0.153 -0.127 -0.435 -0.360 -0.271
OC -0.081 -0.062 -0.080 -0.276 -0.246 -0.226
TG -0.178 -0.138 -0.133 -0.454 -0.367 -0.317
APC 0.416 0.036 -0.010 0.368 -0.219 -0.234
RCC 0.072 -0.104 -0.144- 0.063 -0.195 -0.213
SUME 0.131 0.109 -0.244- 0.093 0.047 -0.387
SCHE -0.052 -0.024 -0.366 -0.061 -0.015 -0.431
TE 0.1;)32 Q.Q4? -Q.4Q1 ｑﾷｒＹｾ 0.014 -0.5213
CSAV 0.094 0.075 -0.247 0.1.07 0.070 -0.332
Note: Correlations are derived utilizing unweighted observations.
Number of observations = 1,553.
discussed previously, it is necessary to distinguish between the conventionally recog-
nized concept of schooling cost. combining schooling expenses and living costs (PSEXP
= SCHEXP + LIVEXP), and true schooling costs. restricted to tuition, fees and other
similar expenses (SCHEXP). Since the Hving expenses of the child were presumably
met as part of the family's consumption budget prior to the child's entry into college.
the only net additional cost necessarily imposed on the family is the more narrowly
defined schooling expenditure, underlying the true net cost measures already
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developed. We consider, tlrst. the absolute excess of loanable funds over postecondary
costs alternatively defined, and then demonstrate the robustness of the conclusions
by assessing the relative unused tlnancing capacities of parents.
5.1. Absolute Residual Annualized Loanable Funds
Consider, first, the relationship of annualized loanable funds to conventional or nomi-
nal schooling costs (PSEXP). Two questions can be raised: F....rst. if the students
received no external grant support, to what degree could parents finance gross post-
secondary schooling costs out of annualized loanable funds? This question can be
answered by 'examining what will be characterized as "nominal residual annualized
loanable funds gross," NRALFG (= ALF - PSEXP), which will measure the "unused"
underwriting capacity of the parents (considering the advance from the parent to the
child to be a repayable loan). The second question recognizes the existence of exter-
nal grant suppor and asks. to what extent are the parents' annualized loanable funds
sufficient to finance the net-of-external-grant costs of schooling? This question is
addressed by examining what will be characterized as "nominal residual annualized
loanable funds net," NRALFN (= ALF - NNFC) , measuring the "unused" underwriting
capacity of parents given the existing system of external grants.
The distributions of the gross and net estimates of nominal residual annualized
loanable funds are presented in Table 3.29. As can be observed. even if it were neces-
sary for parents to advance to their children the full amount of gross postsecondary
costs (includine livipg expenses), the median family would pave ｲ ｾ ｾ ｨ ｩ ｵ ｡ ｬ Ｎ upuse¢,
loanable funds of more than $a,ooo per year (in each of the four years of the schooling
period), and the upper quartile family would have unused capacity of almost $19,000.
Even at the lower quartile unused capacity of more than $1.300 per year is observed.
Only between the lower quartile and the lower decile would annualized loanable funds
be fully exhausted. with the lower-decile family's ALF "overdrawn" by almost $3,000,
ilP4 at the tutb percentile the family's financing capacity would pe overdrawn py
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almost $5,000.
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Table 3.29
Distributions of Residual Annualized Loanable Funds
NRALFG NRALFN TRALFG TRALFN
Mean $12.677 $13,497 $14,381 $15,201
Std. dev. 16,982 16,678 16,940 16,660
Coef. var. 134.0" 123.6" 117.8" 109.6"
Percentiles
1st, $-9,151 $-7,043 $-5,456 $-3,462
5th -4,921 -3,170 -2,509 -1,001
10th -2,680 -1,300 -750 377
25th 1.353 2,444- 3,028 4,400
50th 8,341 9,259 10,029 10,833
75th 18,745 19,256 20,492 20,799
90th 31,109 31,375 32,942 33,265
95th 46,031 46.597 48,531 48,814
99th 78,268 78,268 82,393 82,523
Q3 - Ql $17,392 $16,812 $17,410 $16,399
% of med. 208.5% 181.6% 173.6% 151.4%
Note: Distributions are derived utilizing weigbted observations.
Number of observations = 1,554.
Recognizing the existing distribution of grants, Le., assessing the excess of annu-
alized loanable funds over nominal cosls net or external grant assistance, as reflected
in NRALFN. the median family's unused ftnancing capacity is estimated to rise by
almost $1,000, to $9.259, and the lower quartile rises from $1,353 to $2,444. The
"overdraft" on the lower-decile family's underwriting capacity declines from 12,680 to
$1,300. Thus, with the existing system of grant support. substantially fewer than 25
percent of families would face ftnancial demands greater than annualized loanable
funds. even if the entire cost of postsecondary schooling (inclusive of living expenses)
net of grant aid were to be met by advances from the parents to the child. Perhaps
even more importantly. this would continue to be true for the vast majority of families
even if grant aid were eliminated and postsecondary schooling costs were increased
substantially.
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Because t.hey utilize total schooling costs, including living expenses, while these
living expenses were met by the parents as part of current consumption prior to t.he
child's college entry, the foregoing estimates of nominal residual annualized loanable
funds have litUe economic meaning or significance. More appropriate measures are
provided by "true" residual annualized loanable funds, recognizing only direct school-
ing expenses as a gross cost. Again, two variants of this true loanable funds residual
can be derived. First, if there were no external grants, the parents' "unused"
underwriting capacity would be indicated by the difference between annualized loan-
able funds and schooling expenses, giving ..true residual annualized loanable funds
gross," TRALFG (= ALF - SCHEXP). Second, recognizing the existence of grants, one
can examine t.he unused underwriting capacity of the parents were they to finance the
child's net schooling costs, giving ..true residual annualized loanable funds net,"
TRALFN (= ALF - Th'FC).
The di$tributions of tpe true resi4ual annuaU2:ed loap.able fupds measure:ji, gross
and net. are also presented in Table 3.29. The true gross unutilized underwriting
capacity of the parents (considering only scbooling costs and ignoring grants) is
estimated for the median parent to be $10,029, i.e., even if grants were eliminated, the
median family would be able to fully finance over $10,000 per year more thtJ.n the
actual cost of its child's schooling. At the 75th percentile this unused capacity
exceeds $20,000, and even the lower-quartile family is found to have unutilized capa-
city of $3,082. Only in t.he vicinity of the lower decile is the family's financial capacity
estimated to become exhausted by true gross schooling costs, with the lower-decile
family confronting an overdraft of $750.
Recognizing the existing pattern of grant aid, even the lower decile family enjo}15
a surplus of annualized loanable funds over true net family cost, of $377. And while
the fifth-percentile family would overdraw is available funds, a deficit of only $1,001 is
estimated (and recall that this assumes no ｣ ｯ ｮ ｴ ｾ ｩ ｢ ｵ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ by the child to meeting the
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costs of schooling. as through school-year or summer work}.
The correlations between the various residual annualized loanable funds meas-
ures indicate that they contain essentially the same information. apart from the
specific metrics (absolute magnitudes) involved. This indicates. effectively. that the
results are being driven by annualized loanable funds, and that the schooling cost
measures simply serve to determine the magnitude of the residual.
Table 3.30
Correlations Between Residual Annualized Loanable Funds Measures
NRALFG NRALFN TRALFG TRALFN
NRALFG 1.000 0.998 0.995 0.991
NRALFN 1.000 0.994 0.995
TRALFG 1.000 0.997
TRALFN 1.000
Note: Correlations are derived utilizing unweighted observations.
Number of observations =1.554.
. - . ..' . - . . -
Not surprisingly, residual annualized loanable funds are highly positively corre-
lated with income (however defined). as indicated by Table 3.31. Because wealth is the
primary determinant of loanable funds. while loanable funds are the primary deter-
minant of ruidual annualized loanable funds. the correlations between the residual
loanable funds measures, on the one hand. and wealth and loanable funds. on the
other, are extremely high. While nominal residual annualized loanable funds are
slightly negatively correlated with schooling costs, true residual annualized loanable
funds are effectively uncorrelated with postsecondary expenditures. Although loans
bear no significant relationship to residual loanable funds, grants (and especially non-
Federal grants) exhibit significant negative correlations, indicating that grants do
compensate to some degree for the absence of parental underwriting capacity. Of the
family/student contributions to the financing of postsecondary education, only paren-
tal contributions and contributions from the child's savings are at all significantly
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correlated, positively, with residual annualized loanable funds. Of the various net cost
measures, only true net family cost is signidcantly. again positively. correlated with
residual loanable funds, suggesting that true net family costs may be determined in
part with consideration of consequences for used parental underwriting capacity.
5.2. RelatiYe Residual Annualized Loanable Funds
Of all families of students. annualized loanable funds are zero or negative for 5.7 per-
cent. For these families. loanable funds provide no basis on which to underwrite
children's sehooling. However. "for the other 94.3 percent the preceeding conclusions
can be made even more graphic by assessing relative residual annualized loanable
funds. Le., the unutilized residual as a proportion of total annualized loanable funds
(with the utilized proportion equal to one minus the unutilized proportion). The dis-
tributions of the various residual annualized loanable funds measures relative to total
annualized loanable funds (the parents' total underwriting capacity) are presented in
Table 3.32.
A perusal of Table 3.32 will indicate that.. even if our derivation of annualized
loanable funds results in a substantially indated estimate of parents' underwriting
capacities, relatively few parents would even approach full utilization of that capacity.
. .
even if costs are detlned to include living expenses and if grants were eliminated.
Thus, even the highest estimate of costs results in median unutilized capacity of in
excess of 75 percent of annualized loanable funds. i.e., costs 'WOuld have to be four
times Ireater than we have estimated or "true" annull1ized loanable funW$ ｾｯｵｬ､ pav!;!
to be one-fourth as great as our estimate before gross costs (including living expenses
and ignoring grants) 'WOuld equal total annualized loanable funds. Considering only
schooling expenses (Le., excluding living expenses. as costs which would have to be
borne in any event and which were previously covered by the family) and taking into
account grants, the median family is found to have unused underwriting capacity
equal to almost 94: percept of its annualized loanable funds.
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Table 3.31
Correlations Between Residual Annualized Loanable Funds Measures
and Other Financial Variables
NRALFG NRALFN TRALFG TRALFN
Y 0.541 0.533 0.548 0.539
AY 0.634 0.626 0.640 0.632
PAWAY 0.697 0.690 0.704 0.696
PCAWAY 0.750 0.743 0.757 0.749
PLCAWAY 0.750 0.743 0.757 0.749
PCWAY 0.676 0.670 0.684 0.676
PLCPWAY 0.725 0.716 0.732 0.725
W 0.948 0.950 0.954 0.955
PCW 0.945 0.946 0.952 0.953
PLCW 0.938 0.940 0.945 0.946
AW 0.964 0.967 0.970 0.972
S 0.463 0.454 0.471 0.461
LF(ALF) 0.988 0.988 0.996 0.995
LJVEXP -0.092 -0.080 0.004 0.019
SCHEXP -0.042 -0.021 -0.008 0.013
PSEXP -0.082 -0.062 -0.002 0.019
TL 0.014 0.015 0.037 0.039
FG -0.207 -0.152 -0.194 -0."139
OG -0.241 -0.189 -0.227 -0.174
TG -0.285 -0.217 -0.268 -0.199
APC 0.217 0.212 0.245 0.239
RCC 0.036 0.036 0.041 0.041
SUME 0.037 0.038 0.048 0.049
SCHE -0.013 -0.015 -0.015 -0.017
TE 0.010 0.010 0.015 0.014
CSAV 0.123 0.125 0.127 0.129
NNFC 0.051 0.039 0.125 0.114
NNSC -0.040 -0.051 0.029 0.019
NNRC -0.070 -0.081 -0.014 -0.024
!NFC 0.167 0.137 0.186 0.156
TNSC 0.035 0.007 0.037 0.009
TNRC -0.009 -0.033 -0.020 -0.044
Note: Correlations are derived utilizing unweighted observations.
Number of observations = 1.554.
There would.. of course. be families for which costs. however measured. would
exceed annualized loanable funds. However. even in the "worst case" (ignoring grants
and including living expenses as a cost), this is true of only between 10 and 25 percent
l
of all families. with the 25th percentile family having unused capacity equal to almost
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Table 3.32
Distributions of Relative Residual Annualized Loanable Funds
RNRALFG RNRALFN RTRALFG RTRALFN
Yean -0.312 0.610 0.253 1.175
Std dev. 6.261 4.412 5.061 5.740
Coef. var. NA 723.4% 1,997.5% 483.4%
Percentiles
1st -20.957 -9.303 -13.353 -2.475
5th -2.529 -1.115 -0.737 0.186
10th -0.661 0.009 0.130 0.634
25th 0.435 0.565 0.703 0.639
50th 0.756 0.823 0.678 0.937
75th 0.906 0.943 0.950 0.967
90th 0.965 0.993 0.976 1.069
95th 0.965 1.056 0.969 1.227
99th 0.997 3.243 1.000 6.569
Q3 - Ql 0.471 0.356 0.246 0.146
% of med. 62.3% 43.5% 26.0% 15.6%
Note: Distributions are derived utilizing weighted observations.
N'-JmQer Qf ｯｰｳ･ｲｶｯＮｴｩｯｰｾ ｾ ｾＬ .. ｾ ｾ Ｎ
44 percent of annualized loanable funds, while the lower decile family would face an
overdraft equal to 66 percent of it capacity. When true costs (exclusive of living
expenses) and the presence of grants are recognized, fewer than five percent of all
families would find annualized loanable funds fully exhausted by net schooling costs.
and the fifth percentile family would have unutilized capacity equal to almost 19 per-
cent of annualized loanable funds.
This picture is only marginally altered when the one seriously restrictive, impli-
cit qUalification in the derivation of annualized loanable funds is recognized In that
derivation, it is assumed that the parent. at anyone time, has outstanding advances
for the financing of schooling to only one child If, in fact, child spacing is such that
each child is able to fully requite his financial obligations to the parents before the
next child reaches the stage of postsecondary attendance, then this implicit assump-
tion is justified. However, in many families the ages of children will be sufficiently
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close that the parents may be required to underwrite the schooling of several children
simuttaneously, or. at least. to underwrite the schooling of one child prior to the full
amortization of the debts to the parents of older children.
If it were possible to borrow against future earnings (without other collateral),
which is more feasible for "established" parents than for their "unestablished" chil-
dren, then our derivation of annualized loanable funds would have seriously underes-
timated actual parental underwriting capacity, and the possibility of outstanding
loans to multiple children would not require significant qualifications to the foregoing
conclusions. However, even in the absence of such "perfect" capital markets. multi-
ple children require only minor qualifications to our conclusions. Consider the distri-
bution of relative true residual annualized loanable funds gross (recognizing only
schooling costs, not living expenses, but assuming an absence of grants), as portrayed
in Table 3.32 Even after fully meeting one child's gross schooling expenses, the
median parent ｷ ｑ ｾ ｬ ､ have left 87.8 percent of pis underwriting capacity; viewed
differently, only if this parent were simultaneously underwriting the schooling of octu-
plets (or. less restrictively. of eight siblings) would his financing capacity be fully
exhausted. For the 75th percentile family, only the full underwriting of 20 children
simultaneously would exhaust annualized loanable funds, and even at the 25th percen-
tile level the parents could simultaneously underwrite the schooling of triplets
without exhausting their underwriting capacity. Of course, the tent.h percentile fam-
ily would be capable of underwriting the schooling of only one child at a time; how-
ever, it would have some residual capacity which, combined with the repayment of
advances made to older children, would permit the at-least-partial underwriting of
younger children. And, in any even, the conclusion remains that, except significantly
below the lower quartile. parental resources are sufficient to pennit the financing of
schooling, without ｲ ･ ｾ ｡ ｲ ､ to the number and spacing of children. Below the lower
quartile there is indeed a significant limitation on the ftnancial capacities of parents.
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but this is the case whether or not one introduces the qualifications associated with
numbers of children and the timing of their births.
In summary. loanable funds of the parents would be more than adequate to per-
mit the underwriting of total schooling costs for substantially more than 75 percentd
of all students. even if grants were eliminated. In light of the fact that more than one
half of all students are reported to receive grants. it is clear that for many recipients
these grants (not to mention highly subsidized loans) are not required in order to per-
mit the student to meet the financial demands of schoolin!.i. although the grants may
indeed motivate school attendance (by reducing its costs. or raising its net benefits.
relative to the alternatives).
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Chapter 4
DIFFERENTIAL DISTRmUTIONAL IMPIJCATIONS
OF THE ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS
27.5.&1
As discussed in Chapter 2, in which the alternative accounting systems were developed
conceptually, the ｩ ｭ ｰ ｯ ｲ ｾ ｡ ｮ ｴ implications of different accounting systems relate not to
differences in the level of assessed (in this case parental) financial capacity. but
rather to systematic differences in the cfistribution of assessed financial capacities.
Differences in the distribution of the relevant population over assessed financial capa-
city. Le.. marginal distributions, have been examined in Chapter 3. Here, attention
focuses on differentials in the central tendancies of conditional distributions. Le.• on
dillerences in mean tmancial ｣ ｡ ｰ ｡ ｣ ｾ ｴ ｾ ･ ｾ 9f ｾ Ｔ ･ ｮ ｾ ｩ ｦ ｴ ｡ ｰ ｬ ･ ｾ ｵ ｰ ｧ ｲ ｡ ｵ ｰ ｳ of the ｰ ｡ ｰ ｵ ｬ ｡ ｴ ｾ ｡ ｮ Ｎ
Thus. this analysis will indicate which groups of the population would gain/lose rela-
tive to other groups as the result of the replacement of one measure of financial capa-
city by another.
Differentials in six socioeconomic/demographic dImensions are examined (in
each case independently):
(1) ComprebelUliYe (AY) Income Quartile&- Because this is the most complete meas-
ure of actual financial capacity, ditl'erentials across comprehensive income quar-
tiles will indicate the incidence implications of each of the accounting systems in
the dimension most commonly employed in the analysis of distributional issues.
(2) Race/J:Umicity- Differential implications of alternative actual/potential public
policies for various racial and ethnic groups, especia).ly those conceived to have
suffered past/present discrimination, bas represented a continuing focus of polit-
ical aJ}d social conce rD.
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(3) Yamily ｓ ｴ ｲ ｵ ｣ ｴ ｾ Especially in ligbt of changes in "traditional" patterns of
behavior. and especially the secular rise in the proportion of children in female-
headed households. implications of social welfare programs in this dimension are
of obvious interest and importance.
(4) Parental EducaUon- Because observed. realized income (even comprehensive
current income, AY) can be argued not to adequately retlect permanent (nontran-
sitory) economic welfare over the lifecycle. parental education (human capital)
can be viewed as providing a possibly superior indication of true tlnancial capa-
city. at least on average.
(5) Parental Employment Status- As discussed previously. differences in the treat-
ment of exploited and unexploited tlnancial capacities by conventional means-
tested entitlement programs may have serious consequences for horizontal
equity and for behavior (the degree of exploitation of earnings capacity).
Ditreren tial ｴ ｲ ｾ ｡ ｴ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ ｳ of working and nonworking parents are of part.ioular
signitlcance from the vantage point of both equity and etflciency.
(6) Home Ownership Status- The apparent discrimination of conventional measures of
tlnancial capacity in favor of home owners. by comparison to renters. will have
potentially significant equity implications. directly as it atIects renters relative to
owners and indirectly as it atIects those groups the access of which to this form of
wealth holding has been constrained by discrimination in housing and related
financial markets. Moreover. this discrimination reinforces what may be a highly
inetflcient set of incentives in favor of particular forms of wealth holding, with
adverse consequences for the economy at large.
Other dimensions of distributional analysis obviously could be identified. However,
with reference to the issues associated with parental capacity to tlnance ｰ ｯ ｾ ｴ ｳ ･ ｣ ｯ ｮ ﾭ
dary education. and in light of the information available from the High School and
Beyond survey ble. these represent the most relevant and significant.
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1. The Analytical Technique Employed in the Distributional Analysis
The analytical technique utilized to assess these differential incidence implications of
the alternative accounting systems can be very simply and briefly described. Assume
that in some given dimension (e.g .• family structure as reflected in presence/absence
of parents) the population can be decomposed into n distinct classes (e.g.. two-parent
families. families with mother present and father absent. families with father present
and mother absent). For each family i (in a sample of m families) a vector of variables
.\1 =[ZlJ' ... ｾ ｊ Ｇ '" %raJ] can be· formed. any element i of which will equal unity if
Ilnd only if the family is in the ith category in the socioeconomic/demographic dimen-
sion under analysis: all other elements of this vector are equal to zero. One of the
classes. arbitrarilly denoted the first, is specified as the reference class. Given the
sample of observations (families). an ordinary-Least-squares (015) equation of the fol-
lowing general form can be estimated for each measure Y' (q =1..... Q) of tinancial
capacjty:l
where Y1 is the qth measure of financial capacity for the jth family.
fJt is an estimated coefficient. and
ef is a random error term with zero mean.
The mean value of the qth measure of dnancial capacity of families in the ith
Ｘ Ｐ ｣ ｩ ｯ ･ ｣ ｯ ｮ ｯ ｭ ｩ ｣ Ｏ ､ ･ ｭ ｯ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｰ ｨ ｩ ｣ category is then
11 = fJ, + fJl if i ｾ 1.
= fl1 if i =1.
l Yhile the focUI here il on meuu.rel of financial capacity, the Illme technique will be employed to aamine
cfijferential probabilities of receipt of grants and di1Jerentialgrant awards, conditional on receipt of a positive
aWllTd. In other words, the analytical techniques described here are of general applicability to th' analysis of
intergroup di1rerencel.
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More usefully, 'for present purposes, is the fact that the comparison of fJ!1 and fJi"l, for
financial capacity measures q2 and q I will indicate ｾ ｨ ･ gain (if positive) or loss (if
t ' ) G"I"1nega lve. 1. '
for lhe mean family in the ilh category rela.tive to the m.ea.n/or the reference ca.tegory
resulting from a replacement of the first by lhe second measure of financial capacity.
These estimates of relative gain/loss (or the coefficients entering into their determi-
nation) provide the focus for the following distributional analysis.
2. DUrerentiallmplicatioDJI of the AlternatiYe Income and Wealth lIeasures
2.1. DUrerentiaIB Across CompreheDBift Income (AY) Quartiles
Estimated regression equations for the seven alternative total income measures, with
dummy (0, 1) explanatory variables ､ ･ ｮ ｯ ｴ ｩ ｮ ｾ quartiles of the distribution of the
comprehensive measure of income (AY), are reported in Table 4.1. Corresponding
regressions for the three alternative measures of wealth are provided by Table 4.2.
The first (lowest) quartile of the AY income distribution is represented by the inter-
cept of each ｾ ｱ ｵ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｎ That the ｲ ｮ ｯ ｶ ｾ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ from the conventional current-money-
income measure to the comprehensive income measure would be highly beneficial for
lower income families is clearly revealed.: By comparison to the lowest quartile, the
second quartile's mean income ditferential would rise by about $1,600, the third
quartile's mean by about $3,600. and the fourth quartile's mean by about $5.600.
Thus, the substitution of comprehensive (AY) for conventional (Y) income in a means-
tested program would, ceteris·pa.ribv.s (Le., holding total program benefits constant)
redistribute benefits to families with lower income. A similar but less dramatic pat-
tern would be revealed by the substitution of the ｾ ｯ ｴ ｡ ｬ income measure ｩ ｮ ｣ ｯ ｲ ｰ ｯ ｲ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｧ
potential capital income conditional on actual wealth (PAWAY); this measure ｷ ｯ ｵ ｾ ､
result ib one of the greatest relative distributions to iower income groups.
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Table 4.1
Differential Incidence Equations:
Income as a Function of Comprehensive Income Quartiles
Quartile Y AY PAWAY PCAWAY PLCAWAY PCWAY PLCPWAY
ntercept 9.101 10.195 10,26B 16,502 16.B52 10,499 17.249
1st) (231) (230) (262) (294) (297) (271) (307)
ｾ ｮ ､ Ｍ ｬ ｳ ｴ 11,236 12,646 13,043 11,496 11.510 13,194 11,731
(334) (333) (379) (425) (429) (391) (443)
ｾ ｲ ､ Ｍ ｬ ｳ ｴ 20,631 24.232 24.974 22.913 22.913 25.244 23.206 I(335) (334) (360) (426) (430) (392) (445)
4th-1st 43.961 49.566 50,601 47.669 47.637 51.540 4B.597
(334) (333) (360) (426) (430) (392) (444)
IJtl 0.772 0.613 0.777 0.713 0.706 0.772 0.703 I
Note: Estimates are based on unweighted observations.
Number of observations = 5.474.
Standard errors in parentheses.
ｃ ｑ ･ ｴ ｬ ｬ ｣ ｩ ｾ ｮ ｴ ｾ ｲ ･ ｰ ｾ ｳ ･ ｮ ｴ differentials between the ｩ ｮ ､ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｴ ｾ Ｔ
classes/groups and the intercept class/group.
By comparison to PA"AY. recognition of potential current labor income (Le.•
employing PCAWAY, which incorporates a norm for current exploitation of earnings
capacity) would be more beneficial to higher income groups, with the second quartile
mean differential declining by about $1.500, the third quartile differential by almost
$2,100. and the fourth (highest) quartile differential by about $2,900. The differential
implications of the income measure recognizing a norm for lifecycle exploitation of
earnings capacity (PLCAWAY) are virtually identical to those of ｾ ｨ ･ current earnings
capacity expoitation measure (PCAWAY). In contrast, imposing a norm for savings
behavior over the lifecycle, contingent on actual earnings, i.e., employing PCWAY,
would result in the differentials most favorable to lower income groups, with the
second quartile ditferential rising (relative to PAWAY) by $150. the third quartile
differential by almost $300. and the fourth quartile differential by more than $900.
While imposition of norms for both savings and earnings behavior over the lifecycle
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Table 4.2
Differential Incidence Equations:
Wealtb as a Function of Comprehensive Income Quartiles
Quartile
Intercept
(1st)
2nd-1st
3rd-lst
4th-1st
Note:
w PCW PLCW
15,561 17,462 16,666
(1,611) ( 1,565) (l,571)
19.716 20.960 21.555
(2.329) (2.262) (2.270)
47,757 50.006 50.216
(2,336) (2.269) {2.277}
93.119 100,947 101,117
(2.334) (2,267) (2,275)
0.245 0.287 0.286
Estimates are based on unweigbted observations.
Number of observations =5,474.
Standard errors in parentbeses.
ｃ ｯ Ｎ ･ ｴ ｮ ｣ ｩ ･ ｮ ｾ ｳ ｲ ｾ ｰ ｲ ･ ｳ ･ ｮ ｾ ､ ｩ ｦ ｦ ･ ｲ ･ ｮ ｴ ｾ ｡ ｬ ｳ between ｴ ｰ Ｎ ｾ in-
dicated classes/groups and tbe intercept
class/group.
(PLCPWAY) would be relatively unfavorable from tbe vantage point of low income
groups, tbey would still gain significantly by comparison to the conventional current
money income measure (Y). witb tbe second quartile di.t!erenlial (over the first) rising
by about $500, the third quartile differential by appronmately $2.600, and the fourth
quartile differential by almost $4,600.
In short. by comparison to current practice (as retlected in current money
income), eacb of the alternative accounting systems would serve to raise tbe assessed
financial capacities of higher income groups relative to those of lower income groups.
That the same is true of the potential measures of wealtb by comparison to actual
wealth. and hence that the foregoing interpretations of the income ditIerentials are
consistent with the findings for wealth, is clearly revealed by Table 4.2.
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2.2. OO!erentials Associated With Race/Ethnicity
Estimated regression equations reflecting ditIerentials in the alternative measures of
income across groups defined by ethnicity and race are reported in Table 4.3.
Corresponding regressions for the alternative wealth measures are provided by Table
4.4. Regardless of the income measure employed. all minority groups other than
Asians and Pa.cific Islanders (one group) exhibit mean incomes substantially below
that of whites (the intercept group). Thus, considering only the conventional current
money income measure, mean black income is $12,300 less than that of whites, mean
Hispanic income is $10,600 less, mean income of Native Americans is $7,600 less, and
mean income of families with unreported race/ethnicity is $7,600 less (indicating that
the unreported are disproportionately members of minority groups). 'While the Asian
and Pacific Islands group is found to enjoy a higher mean income than whites, the
ditrerential ($2.100) is not statistically significant.
That the discrimination of the oonventional current money inoome measure in
favor of homeowners and against renters represen ts a dB /a.cto discrimination against
members of minority groups is clearly revealed by the comparison of the Y and AY
coefficients. Thus, the ditIerenlial between black and white incomes rises by more
than $2.600 as a result of a shift from Y to AY, that for Native Amerieans and for
Hispanics rises by about $1,500, and that for families of unknown race/ethnicity rises
by almost $1.400. On the other hand. the income "advantage" of the Asian group over
whites would increase. but only by a statistically insignificant amount ($400).
Imposing a norm for capital income conditional on actual wealth, Le.• focusing on
the PAWAY measure, by comparison to comprehensive current income (AY) ,
ditIerentials between white and minority incomes would rise even further. e.g.. by
11,350 for blacks, by $600 for Hispanics. by $600 for Native Americans and by $1,200
for the unclassified. Again. by comparison to whites the Asian and Pacific group would
be only marginally atfected.
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Table 4.3
Differential Incidence Equations:
Income as a Function of Race/Ethnicity
Y AY PAWAY PCAWAY PLCAWAY PCWAY PLCPWAY
ntercept 30,619 34,943 35,791 40,706 41,076 36,366 41,667
ｾ ｗ ｢ ｩ ｴ ･ Ｉ (266) (312) (325) (316) (319) (333) (327)
iNative -7,616 -9,329 -9,937 -10,577 -10,569 -10,152 -10,632
ｾ ･ ｲ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｮ (1,566) (1,732) (1,603) (1,764) (1,766) (1,644) (1.610)
ｾ ｩ ｡ ｮ Ｌ 2,132 2,510 2,436 2,221 2,269 3,766 3,725
Pac.Is. (1.667) (2,060) (2,144) (2,096) (2,101) (2,194) (2,153)
IBlack -12,324 -15,156 -16,505 -17,977 -16,195 -16,506 -16,292
(720) (786) (816) (800) (601) (637) (621)
lHispanic -10,772 -12,311 -13,105 -13,654 -13,663 -13,336 -14,229
(606) (682) (916) (696) (699) (939) (922)
!Wissing -7,610 -6,964 -10,156 -9,333 -9,144 -10,421 -9,391
(1,713) (1.870) (1.947) (1,905) ( 1,907) (1,991) (1,954)
ｾ 0.074 0.086 0.095 0.112 0.113 0.093 0.111
!Note: Estimates are based on unweighted observations.
Number of observations = 5,474.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Coemcients represent differentials between the indicated
classes/groups and the intercept class/group.
Perhaps most signitlcantly, imposing norms for parental labor force participation
and earnings, comparing PCAWAY to PAWAY, would result in a further widening of the
gap between whites and lower-income minorities. Thus, the black ditrerential would
increase by an additional $1,500 (to $18,000), that for Hispanics by more than $700 (to
$13,900) and that for Native Americans by more than $600 (to $10,600). This finding
constitutes clear evidence that relatively disadvantaged minorities more fully exploit
their earnings capacities than do whites (or Asians and Pacitlc Islanders), contrary to
many popular mythologies. That this is true over the lifecycle as well as currently is
indicated by the fact that the ditferentials are marginally increased again (for blacks
and Hispanics) when nonns for lifecycle labor force participation and earnings are
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Table 4.4
Differential Incidence Equations:
Wealth as a Function of Race/Ethnicity
W Pew PLew
Intercept 65.201 69.990 71.797
(White) (1,105) (1.103) (1, 104)
Native -25.281 -27.072 -27,479
American (6.124) (6.110) (6.117)
Asian, 7,437 18.516 19.574
Pac.ls. (7.284) (7.267) (7.275)
Black -47.573 -47.595 -48.381
(2,778) (2.772) (2.775)
Hispanic -31.090 -33.033 -33.970
(3.118) (3.110) (3,114)
Missing -27.707 -29.893 -29.767
(6.612) (6.596) (6.604)
ｾ 0.063 0.06B 0.070
Note: Estimates are based on unweighted observations.
Number of observations = 5.474.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Coefficients represent ditIerentials between the in-
dicated classes/groups and the intercept
class/group.
imposed.
That relatively disadvantaged minorities engage in savings behavior comparable
to that of whites (again contrary to popular belief, as expressed by Banfield's refer-
ence to the "myopia of the poor")! is indicated by the fact that the ditIerential
between disadvantaged minorities and whites is not narrowed (and in fact widens mar-
ginally) when norms for lifecycle savings behavior (conditional on actual earnings) are
imposed. This finding is corroborated by the observation that ditIerentials between
minority and white wealth remain constant or rise when the potential wealth
ｾ ､ ｷ ｬ ｬ ｊ Ｇ ､ C. BlID1leld, 'lh8 [In,MCI&I8nlV at" (Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1970).
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measures replace the actual wealth measure. This is somewhat surprising, in light of
the argument, mentioned previously. that discrimination in housing and related finan-
cial markets significantly reduces opportunities for profitable investment confronting
minorities and hence constitutes a disincentive to save. Whatever disincentives are
confronted clearly do not appear to reduce minority wealth. conditional on earnings.
And. since a norm for wealth conditional on actual earnings does not narrow the
minority-white income gap. simultaneous imposition of norms for lifecycle earnings
and savings has results virtually identical to imposition of a norm for lifecycle earn-
ings alone. resulting in effectively the highest discrepancies between minority and
white incomes.
In summary. recognition of implicit income on owner occupied housing and impo-
sition of norms for returns to wealth. for current and lifecycle labor force participa-
tion and earnings. and for lifecycle savings would serve only to widen the observed
gaps between the income$ Qf ｷｰｩｴ･ｾ ap.d of disadvantaged minorities.
2.3. DitferentiBls Associated lfttb. Family Structure
Differentials associated with ditIerences in family structure. under the alternative
｡ ｣ ｣ ｯ ｵ ｮ ｴ ｩ ｮ ｾ systems. are indicated by tbe regression estimates reported in Table 4.5
for income and Table 4.6 for wealth. As would be expected, incomes of female-headed
households are less than one-half as great as those of households with two parents
(the reference group). regardless of the accounting system employed. Similarly,
"father"'9nly" householq,s e$bit, lower incomes. Ｆ ･ ｰ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｬ ｬ ｹ on the order Qf 20 to 25
percent less than incomes of two-parent families.
Redecting the lesser likelihood of home-ownership on the part of female-beaded
households. the income gap between mother-only and two-parent families would widen
significantly. by more than $2.000 (from $17.300 to $19.400). as a result of a shift from
the convention current money income measure (Y) to the comprehensive current
inc'ome measure (AY). while the gap between father-only and two-parent families
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Table 4.5
Differential Incidence Equations:
Income as a Function of Presence of Parents
Y AY PAWAY PCAWAY PLCAWAY PCWAY PLCPWAY
ntercept 31.014 35,157 35,852 41,308 41,700 36,496 42,588
'Both) (262) (288) (301) (286) (286) (308) (293)
Mother -17.323 -19,354 -20,087 -23,947 -24,193 -20,526 -24,871
Only (594) (652) (682) (649) (648) (697) (663)
Father -5,322 -6,151 -6,437 -9.570 -9,731 -6,386 -9,859
Only (1,482) (1,627) (1,701) (1,617) (1,617) (1,738) (1,654)
ｾ 0.135 0.139 0.137 0.201 0.204 0.137 0.206
1N0te: Estimates are based on unweighted observations.
Number of observations =5,474.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Coefficients represent dine rentials between the indicated
classes/groups and the intercept class/group.
Table 4.6
Differential Incidence Equations:
Wealth as a Function of Presence of Parents
Intercept
(Both)
Mother
Only
Father
Only
w PCW PLCW
61,948 67,318 69,353
(1,061) (1,056) (1,056)
-36,296 -39,953 -41,946
(2,402) (2,391) (2,391)
-13,831 -13,406 -14,896
Ｈ Ｕ Ｌ ｾ Ｐ Ｉ Ｈ Ｕ Ｌ ｾ Ｖ Ｓ Ｉ (5,962)
0.040 0.049 0.053
Note: Estimates are based on unweigbted observations.
Number of observations =5,474.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Coet!icienls represent differentials between the in-
dicated classes/groups and the intercept
class/group.
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would widen only marginally (from $5,300 to $6,200). Imposing a norm for returns to
weallh (conditional on actual wealth) would increase the morther-only versus lwo-
parenl gap by a further $700.
As a result of the greater likelihood that female head-of-household will be
employed (by comparison to the wife in a two-parent family), imposition of a norm for
current labor force participation and earnings would raise the female-only versus
two-parent gap by a highly-statistically-significant $3,900 (comparing PCAWAY to
PAWAY). And because the mother's labdr torce participation is not an issue in a
father-only household, the gap for this group also widens substantially. by $3,200
(from $6,400 to $9,600). For both groups the replacement of current by lifecycle
norms for labor force participation would widen the gap slightly more. In contrast,
imposition of norms for lifecycle savings behavior (conditional on actual current earn-
ings) would have almost no effect on the differentials between two-parent and other
families (comparipi PCWAY anr;i PAWA,Y). However, the greatest absolute gaps would be
observed if norms for both lifecycle earnings and savings were imposed. with female-
headed households falling below two-parent households by $25,000, male-only house-
holds by $9,900.
2.4. Difl'erentials Associated With Parental Education
Regression equations identifying the income and wealth differentials associated with
parental education under the alternative accounting systems are reported in Tables
4.7 and 4.8, ｲ ｾ ｳ ｰ ･ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ ｬ ｹ Ｎ That ｩ ｮ ｣ ｑ ｭ ｾ ｩ ｮ ｣ ｲ ･ ｾ ｳ ･ ｳ monotonically with ｩ ｰ ｣ ｲ ･ ｾ ｳ ･ ｳ in. edu-
cation, regardless of the accounting system, is clearly revealed. The greater likeli-
hood that the more highly educated will be home owners is indicated by the general
rise in the differentials with replacement of conventional current money income (Y)
by comprehensive current income (AY), with the gap between high school graduates
and nongraduates (the reference group) rising by $1,100, that for persons with some
college by $1,400, and that for college grac1uates by $3,200.
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Table 4.7
Differential Incidence Equations:
Income as a Function of Parental Education
Y AY PAWAY PCAWAY PLCAWAY PCWAY PLCPWAY I
ｾｮｴ･ｲ｣･ｰｴ 19,390 21,853 21,669 26,383 26,722 21,854 26,977
<12Yrs.) (462) (505) (523) (512) (513) (532) (521) I
12 Yrs. 6.146 7,212 7,635 7,324 7,287 7,533 7,138
(655) (715) (741) (726) (727) (753) (736)
13-15 9,250 10,627 11,359 10,960 10,948 11,996 11,806
Years (619) (676) (700) (686) (687) (712) (698) J
I16+ 20,725 23,891 26,083 26,832 26,916 27,201 28,401
ifears (717) (783) (811) (794) (796) (824) (808) I
WZ 0.136 0.149 0.163 0.178 0.178 0.172 0.192
lNote: Estimates are based on unweighted observations.
Number of observations =5,474.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Coeffl.cieQts repre$ent Qitl'erentiels betweep the ｾ ｮ ｾ ｣ ｡ ｴ ･ ､
ciasses/groups -and the intercept class/group.
Below the college-graduate level the imposition of norms for realized (reported)
returns to wealth (conditional on the actual level of wealth) would have little effect
(comparing PAWAY to AY); however, because a higher proportion of the returns to
wealth of college graduates is either unrealized or unreported. the gap between this
group and non-high-school-graduates would rise by a highly significant $2,200. The
imposition of norms for current labor force participation and earnings has litUe
impact at any educational level. However. imposition of norms for savings would sub-
stantially increase the differential of college graduates, by $1,100 (comparing PCWAY
to PAWAY), suggesting that college graduates save at lower rates than nongraduates,
conditional on actual earnings. This finding is borne out by the observation that the
weallh ditrerenlials of college graduates increase dramatically when the potential
wealth measures replace actual wealth. Simultaneous imposition of norms for both
savings and lifecycle labor force participation would result in the greatest gap
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Table 4.8
Differential Incidence Equations:
Wealth as a Function of Parental Education
W PCW PLCW
Intercept 32,764- 34,308 34,889
( <12Yrs.) (1,836) (1,808) (1,802)
12 Yrs. 17,881 17,025 16,636
(2,602) (2.562) (2.554)
13-15 21.489 26,792 28,637
Years (2,460) (2.422) (2,415)
16+ 59,227 68,543 71.600
Years (2,848) (2,804) (2,795)
Jtl 0.075 0.102 0.112
Note: Estimates are based on unweighted observations.
Number of observations =5,474.
Standard errors in parentheses.
ｃ ｯ ･ ｴ ｦ ｬ ｣ ｩ ･ ｮ ｴ ｾ represent ､ ｕ ｦ ｾ ｲ ･ ｮ ｴ ｾ ｡ ｬ ｳ betweep the ip-
dicated classes/groups and the intercept
class/group.
associated with college completion, $2,200 greater than the most comprehensive
measure using actual wealth and earnings.
2.5. Di1!erentialB Associated. With Parental Employment
Differentials in income and wealth associated with differences in parental employ-
ment. under the alternative accounting systems, are indicated by the regressions
reported in Tables 4.9 (income measures) and 4.10 (wealth measures). Not surpris-
ingly. families in which only the mother works emibit lower levels of income and
wealth than families in which only the father works. Conversely. incomes are higher
(relative to the father alone working) when both spouses are employed Interestingly.
however. wealth is lower in two-worker households than in households in which the
father alone works, suggesting that a working mother necessitates greater current
expenditure or that the mother works largely to permit hi,gher levels of consumption,
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i.e.. that families with a greater preference to present over future consumption are
also more likely to more fully exploit their earnings capacity.
Table 4.9
Differential Incidence Equations:
Income as a Function of Parental Employment
Y AY PAWAY PCAWAY PLCAWAY PCWAY PLCPWAY
ntercept 27.3B1 31.775 34,4BB 39,349 39,899 33.043 40,B12
<Father) (401) (443) (464) (466) (4-67) (474) (47B)
ｾ ｯ ｴ ｨ ･ ｲ -10,B22 -12,73B -13,497 -16,421 -16,757 -13,791 -17.22B
ｾ ｮ ｬ ｹ (625) (691) (723) (727) (72B) (739) (745)
!Both B,0310 7,739 7,BI0 3,B97 3,581 B,020 3,549
(522) (577) (604) (607) (60B) (617) (622)
Neither -21,209 -23,845 -24,569 -22,240 -22,226 -25,049 -23,140
(1,095) (1,209) (1.266) (1,272) (1,275) (1.293) (1,304)
[{2 0.217 0.211 0.207 O.lBO 0.179 0.207 O.lBO
Note: Estimates are based on unweighted observations.
Number of observations = 5,474.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Coefticients represent differentials between the indicated
classes/groups and tbe intercept class/group.
The discrimination of means-tested social welfare programs against those fami-
lies more fully expoiting their earnings capacity is indicated by the relative declines
in tbe difterentials associated witb a working mother (either alone Dr in conjunction
with a working father) when income is adjusted to a norm of current labor force parti-
cipation. ThUI, comparing PCAWAY to PAWAY. the differential separating father-only-
working from motber-onLy-working bouseholds increases (in absolute value) from
$13.500 to *16,400, or by S2.900. The excess to two-worker over onLy-father-working
households similarly declines from $7.BOO to S3.900, or again by $2.900.
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Table 4.10
Differential Incidence Equations:
Wealth as a Function of Parental Employment
W PCW PLCW
Intercept 64,960 69,590 72,575
(Father) (1,701) ( 1,692) ( 1,694)
Mother -32,35B -34,809 -36,2BO
Only (2,654) (2.640) (2,643)
Both -3,003 -1,251 -3,276
(2,217) (2,205) (2,207)
Neither -44,137 -4B,130 -51,751
(4,646) (4,621) (4,626)
JlZ 0.042 0.052 0.055
Note: Estimates are based on unweighted observations.
Number of observations =5,474.
Standard errors in parentheses.
CQeffl,cieIlts rt:!pr.esent ､ ｩ ｦ ｦ ･ ｲ ･ ｮ ｴ ｾ ｡ ｬ ｳ between the in.-
dicated . classes/groups and the intercept
class/group.
2.8. DUferentialB Anociated With Home Ownership
Income and wealth ditferentials associated with renter versus home-owner status are
indicated by the regressions reported in Tables 4.11 and 4.12. As would be expected,
renters exhibit [ower levels of income and wealth than owners, regardless of the
accounting system employed. However, recognition of the implicit income on owner-
occupied housing, i.e., moving from the conventional current money income concept
to the comprehensive current income concept (from Y to AY), would greatly increase
the differential, from $12,500 to $17,400 (or by $4,900, roughly the average value of
implicit net income on owner-occupied housing). This finding indicates the magnitude
of the degree of discrimination in favor of owners and against renters incorporated in
conventional needs-tested social welfare programs.
ReOecting the greater: relative returns to wealth held in the form of owner-
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Table 4.11
Differential Incidence Equations:
Income as a Function of Home Ownership
Y AY PAWAY PCAWAY PLCAWAY PCWAY PLCPWAY
ｾｮｴ･ｲ｣･ｰｴ 30,103 34,829 35,626 40,405 40,753 36,104 41,408
(Own) (269) (289) (301) (295) (.296) (309) (305)
lRent -12,469 -17,383 -18,616 -19,286 -19,323 -18,199 -18,818
(599) (644) (670) (657) (658) (689) (679)
ｾ 0.073 0.118 0.124 0.136 0.136 0.113 0.180
Note: Estimates are based on unweighted observations.
Number of observations = 5,474.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Coefficients . represent dillerentials between the indicated
classes/groups and the intercept class/group.
Table 4.12
Dillerential Incidence Equations:
Wealth as a Function of Home Ownership
lY PCW PLCW
Intercept 67,328 71,312 72,783
(Own) ( 1,004) (1,011) (1.015)
Rent -62,606 -59,128 -58,398
(2,235) (2,252) (2.261)
J?2 0.125 0.112 0.109
Note: Estimates are based on unweighted observations.
Number of observations =5,474.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Coefficients represent differentials between the in-
dicated classes/groups and the intercept
class/group.
occupied housing, and hence the somewhat greater incentive to save, the differentials
in wealth associated with ownership decline when the potential wealth measures
replace the actual wealth measure. TJ;1at is, on average renters engage in lesser sav-
ings than owners, although the differential is not statistically significant.
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2.7. Conclusion
The evidence of this chapter clearly indicates that current means-tested social wel-
fare programs. utilizing conventional measures of income and wealth (current money
income and actual wealth) discriminate, in some cases severely, against lower-income
groups, against disadvantaged minorities, against single-parent families, against the
less-highly-educated, against families which more fully exploit their earnings capacity
and against renter families. Thus, significant. gains in equity would be associated with
moves toward more comprehensive measures of income and toward adjustment. of
income and wealth for norms of labor force participation and lifecycle savings
behavior. Such changes would not only improve equity; they would also have poten-
tially significant efficiency implications, in that current programs discourage work
effort and savings.
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Chapter 5
PELL GRANTS UNDER THE ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS
In this chapter the implications of the alternative parental-financial-capacity account-
ing systems for Federal outlays and the distribution of entitlements under the Pell (or
Basic Educational Opportunity) Grant program are examined. At the outset it should
be clearly indicated that we are not suggesting that anyone of the alternative
accounting systems could be substituted operationally for the "conventional"
accounting system currently employed in determining eligibility for Federal Pel:
Grant support. Obviously, the imputations, e.g., of potential labor income, of potential
capital income, of potential wealth and even of implicit rental income on owner-
occupied housing are fraught with uncertainties. It will be virtually impossible in the
case of any individual family to determine the actual source of a systematic deviatioI:
of financial circumstances from the "norm" for the population of families of college-
age children. Thus, it might well be argued that to impose standards for receipt of
labor income and for wealth accumulation would result in more serious inequities
than are encountered under the existing measurement of financial capacity.
While it may be true that the imposition of norms in the case of any individual
family might well be inequitable, it can nonetheless be argued that, on a:uera.ge, the
adjustments to income and wealth made here do indicate the degree to which the con-
ventional accounting of financial capacity serves to discriminate in favor of particula!'
divergences of earnings and savings behavior from the norm. Whether the substitu-
tion of one of the alternative financial accounting systems for the conventional sys-
lem would result in an increase in inequity is an interesting question, albeit one
which would be ditncult to answer empirically. However, if the adjustments do capture
, . .
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the general magnitude of the degree of discrimination incorporated in current meas-
urements of financial capacity, then they will indicate the desirability of program-
malic modifications which would reduce this degree of discrimination. Because the
alternative accounting systems may themselves incorporate serious operational ine-
quities, however, the most desirable public policy response may be not to embrace the
alternative but to tind some "third" alternative which avoids the discriminatory
effects, general and idiosyncratic, which are encountered in the existing program and
which would also result under the alternatives. Stated somewhat differently, the evi-
dence of discriminatory impact itself justifies the search for superior alternatives,
even if these must diverge radically from the status quo.
1. The Structure of the Ez:istiDg Pen Grant Program
Most brietly stated, the current Pell Grant program provides federal grants to students
on terms which are designed to at least partially compensate for differential parental
financial capacity to support postsecondary schooling. Thus, the program is "need
based", with need defined with reference to (a) the costs of schooling and (b) the
assessed ftnancial capacities of parents and students. Oversimplifying somewhat,
parental financial capacities are retlected in an "expected parental contribution",
itself a function of parental income and wealth as defined by the conventional
accounting system, the expected contribution representing the result of applying
specified "tax rates" to income and wealth as conventionally measured.
Operationally, the expected parental contribution is obtained as follows: To the
previous years adjusted gross income for Federal Personal Income Tax purposes, total
nontaxable income is added, resulting in what is called "annual adjusted family
income."l Deducting the parents' Federal Personal Income Tax liability for the prior
IFor present purposes, nonta%able income is defined lUI Y17. total "public" transfer payments. Adjusted
gross income is then total gross current money income, Y19, lellll Y17. In addition to nontuable income in
the previous tu year, the Pell Grent computation ll1.ao adds one-half of the VeterllD's Educational Benefits
which the student ezpeca to receive o..er the course of the Ichoolyeer. Howe..er, since the focus here is an
par,ntal ftnancial capacity, tm. element of llDDualadjusted famil1 income is ignared.
Dresch. Stowe at Waldenberg 5.3 27.5.84
year,2 "effective family income" in the year is obtained. Effective family income is
then reduced by (1) a family size offset,3 (2) an unusual medical expense otfset,4 (3)
an employment expense offset,5 and (4) an offset for unreimbursed elementary and
secondary school tuition and fees. 6 After deduction of the various offsets, what is
referred to as "parents' discretionary income" is obtained. If positive, the "standard
parental contribution from income" is equal to 10.5 percent of discretionary income.
Parents' net assets provide the basis for the determination of the expected parental
contribution from wealth. "Available parental assets" are defined as total net assets
less an "asset reserve" of $25,000,7 and the standard contribution from assets is
2.u discWllled further below, Federal Personal Income Tax liabilities are based on a rather complicated set of
calculations. On the buill of adjusted gros. 'income, as detlDed in the previous footnote, an estimate of item-
ized deductioDJI other than interest expense is made. utilizing grouped data for ]980 publi.hed by the U.S.
Internal Revenue Service, .statUtics 01 ｾ｣［ｯｭＮＬ P8rsonal ｾ ｏ ｲ ｍ 1IIz laItums, 1980 (WashiI1iton, D.C.;
Government Printinl Omce. ]982). To this is added the estimate of interest expense, as developed in Chapter
2 of this study, to obtain total itemized deduction•. From total itemized deducticms the minimum standard
deduction i. aubtracted, the result being .t to zero it otherwise negative. This net deductible amount is
then subtracted from adjusted lP"08. income, as is the product of the number of personal ezemption. times
1],000. The resultant e-Umate of tauble income i. then utilized to obtain the total tax liability, usin8 the
to table. for married couple. ftlin& jointly or for unmarried heads of householw., as appropriate. The foregO'"
iDs procedure i. followed preci.1y when the conTentional accounting system, using current money income,
is employed. When the alternatiTe accountinB systeDUI are utilized, adjusted IroBS income is set equal to the
mm of adjWJt.ed lP"Cla income as previously detlDed plus the (positive) di.fference between total income under
the alternative measure and total income under the comprehenaive current income accounti..ng system (AY).
3rhe family size otr.t. are as follo..:
Fam. Size Oft'set Fam. Size Offset
] 13,850 6 110,250
2 5,000 7 11,350
:5 6,050 8 12,550
4 7.700 9 ｾＳＮ 'n5O
5 9,050 10 14,850
plus I] .150 for each additional family member 0ft'1' 10.
ｾ ･ ､ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｬ expeD8es in ace. of 3) percent of effectiTe family income are deductible. AlthOUih the HS&B
puent JNrTey did inquire. in the cue of parents reporting "flnancial d.i1ftculties," concerning the source of
these dimculties, includin& medical expenses .8 a poaible response, the absence of any estimate of medical
apenaes virtually forced a decision to ilnore this ezclWlion in the prellent analysiL
1n the case of two employed parenu, the employment expenae. offset i. 50 percent of the elU'IliDss of the
lower-earning spOU3e, with a muimum offset of 11,500. In the case of • single-parent family, the earnings of
the single parent subllt.itute for those of the lower-earning spouse in this computation.
8m the case of parents of high school seniors, for whom the number of younger children was reported, in any
cue in which the senior HSatB sample member had attended a private school, it was assumed that younger
lIiblin&s 8180 attended private schools and that tuition rates were identical for all children in the family, per-
mittiD& an imputation of private schoo1in& cOlt. utilizing the school-reported leTel of tuition and fees (u-
suming no tuition reimbursement). While this undoubtedly somewhat overstates the total private school e:z-
pensell of most families, in that .ome children may De in public schools, lower le-vels of schoolin& usually en-
tail lower tuition charges and some reimbu:t'8ement" may be received, the overstatement should have only
minor cOJ13equences for the analym. .
Dresch. Stowe ar: Waldenbers 5.4 2'7.5.84
specified as five percent of this amount. After reducing the contribution from assets
by the absolute value of negative discretionary income, the expected parental contri-
bution is equal to the sum of the discretionary-income and available-wealth com-
ponents.
The overall maximum award under the Pell Grant program (for the 1980-61
academic year) was $1,7508 and the maximum award for which any student was eligi-
ble was $1.750 less the expected parental contribution as just derived However, the
grant award could not exceed one-half of the total costs of schooling, and rec81pt of an
award was contingent on eligibility for an award in excess of $150, i.e., no award of less
than $150 was made.9
In this study we explicitly take into account the following elements of the Pell
grant formula:
[1] Total income- In this study we consolidate the two components of total income
identified in the Pell Grant formula. adjusted gross income and nontaxable
income. 'When the conventional accounting system is employed. total income is
defined as total current money income (Y19), consisting of adjusted gross income
(Y19 - Y17) plus nontaxable "public" transfer payments (Y17). In the case of the
alternative accounting systems, total income is as deftned in each [comprehen-
sive (AY), potential ... (P...AY)].
1Additional offsets ..,aiDst wealth are permitted for parenlll with lUIlIets devoted to a business or farm. Be-
cause of the leaer apparent reliability of the data concerning businellll and farm anetll and liabilities, the
relatively small proportian of families reporting business and farm usets. and the questionable desirability
of this more favorable treatment of business and farm anea, the mare complicated treatment of theae com-
ponents of wealth were not incorporated in the present analysis.
"'rhe legislatively scheduled m.uimum ayard for the 1980-81 academic year wu 11,800. Hcnrever, as part. of
the Carter Administration's anti-in1lationary economic program, total outJaYIJ under the Pel1 Grant program
were reduced by reducins all grant aYard. by 150. As noted beloy, the minimum award yas scheduled. to be
1200 (with any entitlement beloy this level set to zero); however, this minimum YIllI also reduced by 150, to
1150.
gror all practical purpoaes any nudent whoae expected parental contribution WIlS zero was entitled to an
award of at lellllt S750, regardless of the out-of-poclcet costs of schooling, simply because livinS npenses of
11,100 and millCellaneOWl educational expenses (booU, laboratory .upplies, etc.) of S400 are permitted for all
Irtudents, includiIli those commuti.D& to lIChool from their parents' home.
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[2] Parents' Federal Personal Income Tax Liability- This is determined on the basis
of an estimate of (actual or potential) taxable income. Deductions from an
appropriate estimate of adjusted gross income (conditional on the accounting
system) are made for personal exemptions and for itemized deductions. and
Federal personal income tax liabilities are then imputed. to
[3] Family size otfset- This adjustment is made according to the Pell Grant
specifications. as previously described..
[4] Employment expense otfset- Again. the Pell Grant specifications are strictly fol-
lowed.. When. in the case of the alternative accounting systems. an imputation of
potential labor income is made. the estimate of potential labor income is utilized
in this calculation.
[5] Elementary and secondary school tuition deduction- As indicated previously. this
is incorporated for members of the senior HS&B sample but not for sophomores
(for whom the ages and schooling statuses of siblings were not available), assum-
ing that younger siblings of a senior in a private school were also in private
schools charging comparable tuition.
[6] Parents' net assets- These are specified as total wealth (W).
Thus, the only factors entering into the parental component of the Pell Grant formula
which are ignored here are (1) the student's Veteran's Educational Benefits (which the
Pell formula includes in adjusted family income). (2) unusual medical expenses
(which. in the Pell formula, are deducted from adjusted family income), and (3) net
business farm assets (for which the Pell formula provides ｡ ､ ､ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｾ ｾ asset reserves).
In the vast majority of cases. however, the grant computations underlying this
l°As discussed in a previous footnote. the estimate of adjusted gross income in the case of any of the alter-
native accounting systems is equal to adjusted Bross iDcome under the con..entional accountins system (Y19
- Y17) plus the di1rerence (if positive) between total income under the alternative and total income under the
comprehensive accountiIJB system (AV). Thus. adjusted gross income for tu purposes is identical under the
conventional (Y) and comprehensive (AY) accountins systems, and is greater than this amount under the al-
ternative (potential) accountiD& systems only if the potential total iDcome measure (P...AY) e:z:ceeds the
comprehensive total income measure (AV).
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analysis conform extremely closely (subject to reporting error) to the actual compu-
tations which would be observed for the families in question. l1
2. Actual Pen Grant Eligibility and OuUaya
The foregoing provides an overall description of the Pell Grant program as it con-
fronted the members of the HS&B senior cohort, graduating from high school in 1980.
In this section we first examine grant eligibilities and outlays, given the financial
characteristics of families and the provisions of the program as they were operation-
ally applied We then turn to the issue of tradeotfs between various programmatic
features (e.g., income and wealth "tax rates"), conditional on ｵ ｮ ｾ ｨ ｡ ｮ ｧ ･ ､ total
outlays. In both cases the various underlying family financial variables are defined to
correspond as closely as possible to those actually employed in the Pell Grant pro-
gram. Subsequent sections of this chapter will then examine the implications of a
replacement of these financial variables (corresponding. essentially. to the conven-
tional "money-income" accounting system) by financial variables drawn from the
alternative accounting systems developed in this study.
2.1. Pell Grant Baseline: Conventional financial Accounting
As noted, the existing program etfectively employs the conventional "current money
income" accounting system in the assessment of parental. financial capacity for pur-
poses of determining eligibility for Pell Grants. Thus. application of the Pell Grant for-
mula, as described above, to the conventional accoun ting system provides a fairly pre-
eise indication of the potential distribution of benefits under the program as currently
structured and applied. 12 Table 5.1 describes the distribution of the expected paren tal
liThe Pell Grallt computations also take into account the income and assets of the student and the student's
spouse (if any) and treat ditferentieJly "dependent" and "independent" students. For present purposes it
was impossible to di1ferentiate between independent and dependent students. Moreover, because the focus
of interest in this study is PCInlntat tinancial capacity, the analysis is restricted to the parental components
of the Pel] Grant formula. Thus, in the estimate of the actual grant award. foJ' which a student is eligible. (a)
it is assumed that actual schooling cOS'ts are incurred, but (b) student earnin&s and savings are ignored.
12As will be apparent. application of the Poll ｇ ｲ ｾ ｴ formula to estimates of the 1'lnancial variables of a
repreeentati't'e sample of parents/litudents to obtain estimates of total outlllfs, entitlement.. and participa-
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contributions for the HS&B population (sophomores and seniors).
Table 5.1
Parental Contribution Distribution: Actual Pell Program
Parental Contribution Percent Distribution
Zero 11.3"
So - S750 20.2
750 - 1,500 19.6
1.500 - 2,250 13.9
2,250 - 3,000 B.9
3,000 - 3,750 6.4
3.750 - 4,500 5.4
4,500 - 5,250 3.3
5,250 - 6,000 2.4
6,000 - 6,750 1.B
6,750 - 6.9
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
Ranges exclude lower bound (column one).
Estimates based on weighted sample.
As can be observed. more than 10 percent of high school students are expected to
receive no parental contribution, the median contribution is less than Sl,500 (roughly
the out-of-pocket cost of commuting to a. four-year public college), and for fewer than
Meen percent would the expected parental contribution exceed S4,500 (a lower-bound
estimate of the gross out-of-pocket cost of attending a four-year private residential
college). Thus, the distribution of the expected parental contribution is extremely
positively skewed, with the vast majority of high school students falling in the
compressed lower portion of the distribution.
The distributions of grant award eligibilities (for those members of the senior
HS&B sample undertaking postsecondary education), maximum and actual (i.e., condi-
tiona! on actual schooling costs), are indicated in Table 5.2. As can be observed, over
60 percent of those in school are eligible for no award, and for another four percent
the maximum award is between S150 (the lower bound on actual awards) and $400.
tion rates will result in an upper bound set of estimates, simply because all potentially eligible individuals
will be assumed to participate. By comparison to actual outlays, entitlements and participation rates, these
estimates permit at least order-of-magnitude estimates of rllt.es of nonparticipation of eligible individuals.
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For those eligible for awards. the median award is $985. The mean award of $955 (con-
ditional on receipt of an award) implies total outlays (assuming that all eligible indivi-
duals applied for grants) of $600.7 million.
Table 5.2
Maximum and Actual Pell Awards. Conventional Accounting
Award Range
Percent Eligible
Maximum Actual
Zero 61.2% 61.2%
150 - 400 3.9 5.0
400 - 600 4..4 4.3
600 - BOO 4.1 5.0
BOO - 1.000 3.4 5.6
1.000 - 1.200 4.3 B.8
1.200 - 1,400 4.4 2.8
1.400 - 1.600 3.6 3.5
1.600 - 1.750 10.7 3.7
Conditional on Positive Actual Award
Distribution Actual Grant
5th percentile $271
10th 349
25th 619
50th 985
75th 1.230
90th l,58B
95th 1.750
Mean $955
Std. dey. 436
Coer. of var. 45.6%
Interquart. range $610
Percent of mean 61.9%
Total outlays $600.7 million
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
Ranges exclude lower bound.
Estimates based on weighted sample.
Because this analysis is restricted to persons graduating from high chool in 1980
and attending an institution of postsecondary education in the fall of that year, the
foregoing estimates of program participation on the part of and total outlays to
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members of the indicated population cannot be compared to estimates of actual
aggregate program participation and outlays. Roughly comparable estimates are.
however. available from the 19BO freshman survey of the Cooperative Institutional
Research Program {CIRP).13 While these surveys represent slightly ditlerent popula-
tions (HS&B the population of 19BO high school seniors attending college in the Fall of
19BO. ClRP the population of Fall 1960 Orst-time college freshmen regardlesss of the
date of high school graduation). their comparison should provide reasonable estimates
of the rate of Pell Grant nonparticipation on the part of those actually eligible for
positive grants and of the consequent reduction in program outlays.
According to the 1960 CIRP survey. 33.5 percent of tint-time freshmen received
Pell Grants in 1960-Bl. while the present study indicates that 36.6 percent of 19BO
high school graduates attending college were eligible for awards. This suggests non-
participation on the part of 13.7 percent of those actually eligibe for awards. The
mean actual award of the CIRP recipients. $969, is less than 1.5 percent greater than
the estimate here of the mean award for which the HSc!cB college attending population
was eligible. $955. Together. these estimates suggest actual outlays to the HS&:B popu-
Lation of $562.2 million. $36.5 million (12.4 percent) less than the 100 percent partici-
pation total of $600.7 million. In summary, of all 1960 high school graduates attend-
ing college. 5.3 percent were eligible for, but did not receive, Pell Grants, with the
mean value of these unreceived grants equal to approximately $B67, roughly 10 per-
cent less than the mean grant of actual recipients.
2.2. Iso-OuUay TradeotrB within the Pell Grant Program
Before turning to the implications for the Pell Grant program of a replacement of the
the conventional current-money-income accounting system by either a comprehen-
!ive or potential income accounting system. it is useful to examine the
130rhe CIRP estimateB preBented below are taken from unpublished tabulations prarided by ｾ ｨ ･ omce of Plan-
Ding. Budget and Evaluation. U.S. Department ｯ ｾ Education.
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interrelationships between the various programmatic features of the program as it
existed in 1980-81. As has been described, the important elements of the Pell Grant
formula include (l) the tax rate on discretionary family income, (2) the tax rate on
available assets (actually, wealth), (3) the employment expense ceiling, (4) the frac-
tion of earnings subject to deduction as an employment expense, (5) the level of the
family size offsets, and (6) the asset reserve which is deducted from wealth prior to
application of the wealth tax rate.
Variations in each of these dimensions might be examined in isolation, in which
case the consequence of any programmatic change would be indicated by a change in
total estimated outlays. In general, however, it can be argued that total outlays, at
least in order of magnitude, are determined prior to the determination of specific pro-
grammatic features, Le., that programmatic determinations are made so as to equate
outlays to a predetermined budgetary outlay target. In fact, this has been explicitly
the case with reference to Pell Grants, in which various apportioning devices have
been employed to conform actual outlays to budgetary targets.14 Under these cir-
cumstances it is more realistic to examine tradeotJs between programmatic features
which hold total outlays constant. And entirely apart from budgetary realism, a
meaningful analysis of the distributional implications of changes in various program-
, .
malic features depends critically on the stipulation of unchanged total outlays. Only
by holding outlays constant is it possible to determine which classes of families would
gain and which would lose as a result of a change in any dimensions of the program.
For the foregoing reasons the present analysis examines a range of programmatic
14M has been noted, this adjuM.ment of the aWllTd-detennilling formula to reduce actual outlays to a
predetermined level was utilized in 1960-81, with the reduction of mazimum, actual, and minimum aWllTds
by 150, notwithstandins an original legislateive formula which would have provided for minimum and mn-
imum awards of 1200 and 11,800, respectively. In light of the recurrent recouse to such adjustments (down-
ward), Pell Grants di1!'er signi1lcantly other e:zamples of from what are generally chllTacteri2ed as "entitle-
ment" pr08J'ams, in which not only one's eligibility far. an award but also the amount of the award llTe
effectively guaranteed. Over time, however, Pell Grant appropriations do appear to have been determined
primarily with reference to anticipated outlays, given the structure 01 the prOlram III1d specific pr08ram-
matic de,terminations.
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variations which are stipulated in each case to result in outlays identical (subject to a
margin of rounding error) 15 to those actually estimated above for the cohort of 1980
high school graduates. The following tradeoffs are identified:
[1.] tax rate on wealth versus tax rate on income;
[2] lax rate on wealth versus asset reserve;
[3] employment expense ceiling versus tax rate on income;
[4] employment expense as a fraction of earnings versus tax rate on income;
[5] general level of family size offset versus tax rate on income; and
[6] general level of family size offset versus tax rate on wealth.
Tradeoffs between each of these pairs of programmatic parameters are indicated in
Figures 5.1 through 5.6.
The tradeoff between the income and wealth tax rates. as portrayed in Figure 5.1.
is quite revealing. From a sta.tus lflLO with an income tax rate of 10.5 percent and a
wealth tax rate of five percent. it would be possible in the limit to reduce the wealth
tax rate to zero by increasing the income tax rate to 16.6 percent. However. even if
lhe wealth tax were increased dramatically. it would not be possible to reduce the
income tax rate below about 7.5 percent. subject to the requirement of unchanged
total outlays. This ditference demonstrates the substantially greater significance of
the income tax rate to the financial performance of the program. retlecting the rela-
lively low levels of wealth of parents of college students. at least by comparison to
income.
The relatively low levels of parental wealth are also reftected in the tradeoff
between the wealth tax rate and the asset reserve. as portrayed in Figure 5.2. To
15points on the iso-outlay loci where determined iteratively, ftxing the value of one parameter and searching
for the value of the other which would result in total outlays equal to those estimated for the Pell grant base-
line. Equality wu defined for these purposes as outlays within S:0.5 million. Given baseline outlays of S600.7
million. this implies a mar,pn of error (of outlays) of no more than 0.08 percent.
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increase the asset reserve from $25,000 to $40,000 would require a virtually
confiscatory 47 percent tax on those few persons who would still be found to have posi-
tive available wealth. On the other hand. the wealth tax rate could be cut by about
two-thirds, from five to 1.6 percent. if the asset reserve were reduced to zero.
That the employment expense ceiling of $1,500 is relatively innocuous is clearly
indicated in Figure 5.3, in which it. is demonstrated that a doubling of the ceiling to
$3.000 would require an increase of less than one percentage point in the tax rate on
income (from 10.5 percent to 11.3 percent). Further increasing the employment
expense ceiling to $6,000 would require increasing the tax rate only to 12.6 percent,
and an increase to $9,000 (eqUivalent to effective elimination of the ceiling), but con-
tinuing to restrict the deduction to 50 percent of the earnings of the lower-earning
spouse or single parent, could be achieved by a tax rate of only 13.1 percent. In short,
increases in the ceiling on the employment expense deduction can be purchased at
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the price of only minor increases in the tax rate on income.
of the employment expense deduction would permit a reduction in the income tax
rate only from 10.5 to 9.6 percent. Obviously. the employment expense deduction
could be substantially increased 'With little consequence for the required tax on
income. Thus. for example. if it were demonstrated that relatively high marginal
rates of taxation (direct and indirect) have a significantly negative impact on the
labor force participation of secondary family workers (primarily women). then the
contribution of the Pell Grant program to these high rates of taxation could be
significantly reduced by increasing the employment expense offset; the required
increase in the general tax rate on income would be trivial by comparison to the effect
of the higher ceiling on the employment expense deduction. especially for low-wage
secondary workers.
Figure 5.4 explores the relationship between the proportion of earnings deducti-
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ble as an employment expense {holding the ceiling on the deduction at $1.500) and
the tax rate on income. Clearly, an increase in the deductible proportion of earnings
could be achieved with trivial consequences for the income tax rate. Thus, increasing
the deductible proprotion to 100 percent (up to earnings of, in this case, $1,500) would
require an income tax rate of less than 10.6 percent, 0.1 percentage points above the
base rate. Conversely, lowering the deductible proportion to 30 percent would permit
only a minor 0.1 percentage point reduction in the income tax rate, while elimination
of the deduction would (as discussed with reference to the employment expense ceil-
ing) permit the income tax rate to be reduced only to 9.6 percent.
While increases in the employment expense ceiling and the deductible proportion
of earnings could each be achieved at the cost of only marginal increases in the
income tax rate, the two possible changes would have a very ditrerent incidence.
Increases in the ceiling would benefit only those lower-earning spouses or single indi-
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o lIlcreasesTfi the eductible
proportion of earnings (holding the ceiling constant) would concentrate the benefit at
the lowest earnings level (below $3.000 as the deductible proportion was raised above
50 percent). Thus. very ditJerent distributional impacts would be implied.
Tradeoffs between the general level of the family size offset and the income tax
rate are examined in Figure 5.5. The family size offset parameter in this and the fol-
lowing figure is simply a factor by which the base family siize otJsets are scaled. Thus.
a value of 1.5 indicates that the otJset for each family size is increased by 50 percent.
As can be observed. increases in the general level of the family size offsets would
require substantial increases in tax rates on income. Thus. for example. to increase
these offsets by 50 percent would require a virtual doubling of the income tax rate
(from 10.5 percent to 19.2 ｰ ｾ ｲ ｣ ･ ｮ ｴ Ｉ Ｎ while an increase in the offsets of 70 percent
would require more than a tripling of the income tax rate (to 31.6 percent). Con-
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L FRM. SIZE OFFSET ｐｒｒｾｍｅｔｅｒ TOTRL OUTLRvS = ＤＶＰｾＮＷ MILLIONversely. slgnl cant reductIons In the Income tax rate WOUIQ De permltteu. y a reduc-
tion in the family size offsets. Thus, a halving of the offsets could be accompanied by a
reduction of about one-third in the income tax rate (to 7.2 percent). However. further
reductions in the offsets would have only marginal effects as the income tax rate
asymptotically approached about 5.5 percent.
A similar finding is revealed in Figure 5.6. in which the iso-outlay relationship
between the level of family size offsets and the wealth tax rate is indicated. Again,
increases in the various family size offsets would necessitate draconian increases in
the wealth tax rate. For example, a 20 percent increase in all family size offsets would
require a doubling of the wealth tax rate. While not indicated in Figure 5.6. an
increase of 50 percent in the offsets would have to be accompanied by a six-fold
increase in the wealth tax rate (to 29.9 percent), and an increase of 60 percent wOU\d
require an almost-confiscatory wealth tax rate of 43 percent. As in the case of the
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income tax ratl!';""Wealth tax rate redlic"t"tons could oe aCDlevea lf l.lie- aml y slze offset
were reduced. However. in this case. elimination of the wealth tax would be permitted
by a reduction in the family size offsets of only 50 percent. and a 25 percent reduction
in the otfsets would permit more than a 60 percent reduction in wealth tax rates (to
1.9 percent).
Obviously. a number of more complicated tradeoffs in greater-than-two-
dimensional- space could be examined Also. for some purposes it would be desirable
to examine the effects of changes in various programmatic parameters for program
outlays. diverging from the iso-outlay analysis pursued. here. However. given the basic
analytical structure developed for this study. any specifiable changes in parameters of
the program could be examined Also. as indicated above. the important question in
many of these cases concerns their ultimate distributional impacts. an issue which is
also addressable on the basis of the data and analytical st.ructure developed for this
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study. The importance of a systematic, empirical approach to this issue can be appre-
ciated on the basis of the differential distributional analysis presented in Chapter 4.
3. Pell Grants and the Comprehensive IPotential Accounting Systems
Although the previous section provides an introduction to perhaps the most practical
uses of the data base and analytical system developed as part of this study, the con-
ceptually most interesting aspects involve the comparison of the conventional
current-money-income accounting system to the comprehensive system and to the
potential-income and potential-wealth systems developed from it. This section pro-
vides an overview of the apparent implications of the biases incorporated in the con-
ventional accounting system by comparison to more comprehensive and
behaviorally-neutral accoun ting systems.
The manner in which these alternative measures of income and wealth were
incorporated into the Pell Grant formula has been described previously. However, it is
useful here to briefty summarize that discussion. For each of the alternative systems
consistent measures of total income and wealth have been developed. In each case
total income can be decomposed into labor, capital and transfer components. The
capital income measure is dependent upon the wealth measure employed, while the
measure of wealth may be dependent on the measure of labor income utilized. The
measure of transfer income is common to all accounting systems (including the con-
ventional current-money-income system).18 PP Given mutually consistent measures
of (a) total income (comprehensive, potential), (b) labor income (for each spouse), (c)
capital income and (d) wealth, it is possible to replace the Pell Grant money-income
16m principle, receipts of transfer payments, especially public transfers, should have been modified in each
case in which a measure of potential income (e.g., potential labor or capital income) replaced actually re-
ported income. Thi. is because most public transfer programs are mellDS tested, i.e., the level of payment is
inversely related to the levels of income from other sources and of as8ets. Because of the lack of detail con-
cerning transfer payments, which would be required to decompose these into payments functionally related
to other items of income and payments not so related, of the apparent importance of the latter class of pay-
ments (e.g.• pensions), and of the relatively small number of families the finances of which would be dected,
tllis issue was not addressed empirically. Thus, transfer receipts are assumed to be invariant with respect to
other elements of income and to wealth.
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concept of total income by the alternative. to replace reported money labor income of
the approriate spouse by the appropriate spouse's comprehensive or potential labor
income in the derivation of the employment expense offset, and to replace actual
wealth by the alternative measure of wealth in the application of the wealth com-
ponents of the Pell Grant formula. The only significant complication involves the
derivation of the appropriate level of Federal income taxes to correspond to the poten-
tial income measures. Because Federal income tax liabilities, as derived here. are
identical in both the current-money- and comprehensive-in<;t..4ue accounting systems,
the assumption is made that adjusted gross income in the case of the potential
income and wealth accounting systems would exceed adjusted gross income under the
other (conventional and comprehensive) accounting systems by the (positive)
difference between the potential and comprehensive measures of total income. per-
mitting the appropriate derivation of non-interest deductions and hence of the total
lax liability.
3.1. OuUay and Eligibility Implications of the Alternatives
The consequences of applying these procedures to the comprehensive accounting sys-
tem and to the five potential income/wealth systems are briefly summarized in Table
5.3. For comparison purposes, relevant statistics are also given for the conventional
accounting system (underlying the "actual" Pell Grant program). These summary
resulls are, in fact, quite stunning. Thus, consider the proportion' of the enrolled
population actually eligible to receive Pell Grant awards. Under the actual program
(relying on current money income) 39 percent of 1980 high school graduates enrolled
in postsecondary education are determined to be eligible for an award (in excess of
$150). In contrast. with the comprehensive accounting system, which ditIers from lhe
conventional system primarily by including in income implicit rental income on
owner-occupied housing and secondarily by c1ed:u.cting interest expense from gross
income, the granl-eligible proportion of the populalion declines from 39 percent lo 34
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percent. Although the mean grant. contingent on eligibility for an award remains vir-
tually conslant (declining from $955 to $936). as a result of the contraction in eligibil-
ity total outlays 'Would decline from $600.7 million to $521.0 million, or by more than
13 percent.
Table 5.3
Pelt Grants Under the Alternative Measures of Financial Capacity
Income/Wealth Percent Mean Total Percent
Measures Recipients Positive Outlays Savings
Grant (Millions)
Y, W 36.6% $955 $600.7 0%
AY,W 34.4 936 521.0 13.3
PAWAY,W 34.6 942 526.4 12.0
PCAWAY, W 29.9 650 412.2 31.4-
PLCAWAY, W 29.6 635 403.1 32.9
PCWAY. PCW 32.1 947 492.0 18.1
PLCPWAY, PLew 26.1 649 359.2 40.2
This result for the comprehen9ive income measure deserves particular emphasis.
]n contrast to the various potential income/wealth accounting systems. to which
objection might be made on grounds of both practicality and principle, the
comprehensive system is effectively unassailable on grounds of principle and would in
fact be relatively easy to implement operationally. Obviously. because grant awards
decline, the effect of incorporating implicit rental income on owner-occupied housing
is overwhelming the effect of deducting interest expense. While providing for the
inclusion of the former would be somewhat more complex than prOViding for the
deduction of the latter. the operational issue of including implicit rent is not exceed-
ingly complex. ]f property can be assessed sufiiciently adequately for real estate tax
puposes, then an estimate of rental income (if only a reasonable interest rate multi-
plied by the market value of the housing) can certainly be derived. In fact. this com-
ponent of income has indeed been subject to income taxation in several jurisdictions
historically.I7 And, as noted. not only is this reform quite practical: It is also
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unassailable on grounds of equity. Moreover. the equity issue extends beyond renters
versus owners peT se. As Kain and Quigley18 have convincingly demonstrated. perhaps
the primary explanation for the observed differences in wealth between otherwise
comparable black and white .families is the barriers to home ownership confronted by
black families. since owner-occupied housing is not only the most important asset of
most families (aside. perhaps. from their human capital) but is also the asset which
historically has had the highest rate of return (especially as a result of financial
market regulations which have discriminated in favor of home owners at the expense
of persons whose savings are held in financial assets. especially non-horne-owning
savers who lack the resources and/or sophistication to invest in alternative.
comparably-favored financial and real assets). Thus. it is hard to imagine any serious
argument against the inclusion of an estimate of implicit rental income on owner-
occupied housing. If the current system adequately measures the financial status of
renting families. then a modification ｾ ｯ incorporate implicit rental income would ade-
quately measure the financial status of owners. Either the current system overstates
the financial positions of renters or it must understate the financial positions of home
owners. In short. a virtually unobjectionable change in the current system could
reduce tolal outlays by in excess of 13 percent.
Somewhat surprisingly. by comparison to the comprehensive income measure
incorporation of potential capital income conditional on actual wealth (as refiected in
the PAWAY measure of total income) would slightly increase both potential participa-
tion (the grant-eligible proportion of the population). to 34.6 percent (from 34.4 per-
cent) and the mean positive grant (from $936 to $942). thus reducing the savings in
total program outlays from 13.3 percent to 12 percent. This superficially unexpected
17Thuli• pr:lor to the early 196011 "implicit rental income on owner occupied housing Wall subjected to income
tuation ill the United Kingdom.
18John F. Kain !lDd John II. Quigley, Hounng 1Ia:r*ds cuui 1a:IciGt Dtscrimin.atiDn: A AlLcro8conomic AnalJPi,s
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).
Dresch, Stowe at Waldenberg 5.22 27.5.84
and contradictory result in fact can be easily explained. The primary positi ve adjust-
ments to income made by the measure are at the upper income levels, where wealth is
substantial but unrealized and/or unreported capital income is a substantial propor-
tion of total capital income. Thus. a small number of individuals are removed from
the grant-eligible rolls as a result of these positive changes in income. Note. however,
that this measure also results in negative adjustments to income, specifically, in the
case of interest expense in excess of interest income. Since this is more likely to be
the case for low income families. children of which are already eligible for grants. the
effect is to raise the grants for which they are eligible. AJ3 reflected by the increase in
the mean (postive) award. this etJect outweights the slight reduction in eligibility at
the upper income levels. In short. this measure increases grants at low income levels
but reduces or eliminates grants at high income levels.
Replacement of actual by potential current labor income, as reflected by PCAWAY,
'WOuld have a further. very substantial impact on eligibility and outlays. Thus. the pro-
portion of the population eligible to receive a grant would decline to 29.9 percent (by
comparison an actual estimate of 38.8 percent). for a total contraction of the rolls by
almost 25 percent. While the mean grant (conditional on receipt of a grant) would
decline by only 11 percent. to $850. total outlays would decline by 31.4 percent. to
$412.2 million. AJ3 can be observed. the effect of moving from potential current to
potential lifecycle labor income would be marginal. reducing elgibility from 29.9 to
29.8 percent. the mean grant from $850 to $835. and total outlays from $412.2 million
to $403.1 million (increasing the relative reduction in outlays from 31.4 to 32.9 per-
cent).
As expected, given (a) the generally low levels of wealth. (b) the relatively large
wealth deductible (asset reserve). and (c) the relatively low wealth tax rate. imputa-
tion of lower quartile potential wealth (leaving labor income una1Jected, i.e., equal to
that actually observed) would have a substantially lesser impact on total ｯ ｵ ｴ ｬ ｡ ｹ ｾ than
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'Would imputation of lower quartile potential labor income. Thus. outlays would
decline only to $492 million (or by 16.1 percent). by comparison to $403.1 million (or
32.9 percent) with lifecycle potential labor income. The proportion of the population
eligible for grants would rise (again by comparison to lifecycle potential labor
income), from 29.6 percent to 32.1 percent. while the mean positive grant would rise
from $635 to $947. Thus. it is apparent that the primary effect of this adjustment is
exerted at upper income levels. for which the impu tation of wealth results in a decline
in eligibility and in award Ie,' __ ｾｳＮ
Finally, the imposition of lifecycle norms for both labor force participation and
savings. as reftected in the PLCPWAY measure. would result in a dramatic decline in
eligibilities and outlays. The proportion of the population eligible to receive an award
would drop to 26.1 percent. implying a reduction of about one-third in the number of
eligible recipients from the 1980 status quo level. This effect would be magnified by a
decline of about eleven percent (to $849) in the mean award {conditonal on eligibility},
implying a decline of 40.2 percent in total outlays. from $600.7 million to $359.2 mil-
lion.
In summary. the discrimination of the existing program in favor of homeowners
and against those with interest expenses (not in excess of interest income) accounts
for about 13.3 percent of total program outlays and 11. 3 percent of eligible individuals
(comparing AY to Y). Failure to tax unrealized and/or unreported capital income is
approximately offset by the failure to permit individuals to deduct net negative
interest expense (comparing PAWAY to AY). Ending discrimination in favor of parents
whose current labor force participation is below the norm would result in a further 12
percent reduction in eligibility and a 20 percent additional reduction in outlays (com-
paring PCAWAY to AY). Imposing labor force participation norms over the lifecycle
would have virtuallyno effect on eligibility but would reduce outlays by a further 1.5
percent. If, instead of imposing Dorms on labor force participation. norms for ｷ ･ ｡ ｬ ｾ ｨ
Dresch, Stowe ac WaldenbeTB 5.24 27.5.84
accumulation were imposed. the effect (comparing PCWAY to AY) would be to obtain
only an additional four percent reduction in eligibility and an additional five percent
reduction in outlays. Finally. terminating discrimination in favor of parents whose
life cycle labor force participation and savings behavior diverge markedly from the
norm would result (comparing PLCPWAY to AY) in a substantial additional reduction in
both eligibility and outlays. with the former falling by more than 21 percent further.
the'latter by a further 27 percent. The overall effect of simultaneously imposing all of
these changes designed to reduce discrimination (positive and negative) is thus to
dramatically reduce the scope and cost of the Pell Grant program. wilh the eligible
proportion of lhe population falling from 38.8 percent to 26.1 percent and with outlays
falling from $600.7 million to $359.2 million (or by 40.2 percenl).
3.2. Implications for Parental-Contribution and Grant Distributions
Implications of the alternalive accounting systems for the dislribution of the expected
parental contribulions are indicated in Table 5.4. As can be observed, subslantial
effecls are exerled on the proportion of parents expected to make no contribution al
all (Which declines from over 11 percent in the case of actual Pell Grants. Y. to less
than 5 percent in lhe most extreme case. potential lifecycle labor income and poten-
tial lifecycle wealth. PLCPWAY. for a decline of aboul 45 percent in the number of stu-
dents expected to receive ,no parental contribution). On the other hand, the propor-
tion of sludents expected to receive very substantial contributions (in excess of
16.750) also rises significantly. in the extreme by more lhan 50 percent (from 6.9 per-
centlo 10.6 percenl. comparing Y and PLCPWAY).
The distributions of Pell Granl awards implied by these parental contributions in
conjunction with actually-incurred schooling costs are indicaled in Table 5.5. Under
the program as actually legislatively structured and administered. 7.2 percent of all
students receive granls of between $1.400 and $1.750. This high-grant group would be
modestly reduced (to between 5.6 and 6.1 percent, or 1:1y about 20 percent) as a result
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Table 5.4
Alternative Expected Parental Contribution Distributions
Contrib. Y AY PAWAY PCAWAY PLCAWAY PCWAY PLCPWAY
Zero 11.3% 9.6% 9.7% 5.1% 4.8% 9.5% 4.6%
$ 0- 750 20.2 18.9 19.0 17.6 17.3 18.2 16.5
750-1.500 19.6 17.8 n.3 19.0 19.2 16.5 17.6
1.500-2,250 13.9 13.8 13.7 15.1 15.1 13.6 14.5
2.250-3.000 B.9 9.7 10.0 10.9 11.1 10.2 11.7
3.000-3.750 6.4 7.3 6.9 7.6 7.5 6.9 7.5
3.750-4.500 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.7 5.9 5.7 6.4
4.500-5,250 3.3 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.5
5.250-6.000 2.4 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.1 3.6
6.000-6.750 1.8 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.4
6.750- 6.9 8.2 8.6 9.3 9.4 9.4 10.6
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
Ranges exclude lower bound.
Estimates based on weighted sample.
of utilization of either the comprehensive (AY). the potential capital income (PAWAY)
or the potential current wealth (PCWAY) measures. Moreover. the prevalence of large
grants would be dramatically reduced under all other alternative accounting systems
(specifically. those imposing either current or lifecycle norms on labor force partiei-
pation. with or without imposition of savings norms), falling to 3.8 or 3.9 percent of
the total student population.
Given the constrained range of actual grant awards (truncated at $150 and
Sl.750). perhaps the best measure of the dispersion of awards (conditional on actual
receipt of an award) is provided by the interquartile range (expressed in dollars). By
comparison to the actual program (Y) the alternative accounting systems would have
relatively little impact, with the interquartile range varying between $577 and $622
.(versus an actual-program range of $610). Because the alternative accounting sys-
tems would result in general reductions in the median award, the interquartile range
relative to the median would rise in all cases. from 61.9 percent under the actual pro-
gram to an extreme of 75.4 percent when lifecycle norms for both labor income and
savings are imposed.
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Table 5.5
Alternative Pell Actual Grant Distributions
Grant
Range Y AY PAWAY PCAWAY PLCAWAY PCWAY PLCPWAY
$ Zero 61.2% 65.6% 65.4% 70.1% 70.2% 67.9% 73.9%
150- 400 5.0 4.5 4.5 5.3 6.1 4.1 5.3
400- 600 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.7 3.8 3.3
600- 800 5.0 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.5 3.7 3.6
800-1,000 5.6 5.0 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 3.8
1,000-1,200 8.8 7.9 7.9 5.4 5.3 7.4 5.2
1,200-1,400 2.8 2.6 2.7 1.8 1.4 2.5 1.2
1,400-1,600 3.5 2.8 2.9 1.8 2.0 2.7 2.0
1,600-1,750 3.7 3.0 3.2 2.1 1.9 3.1 1.8
For Grant> 0:
Mean $955 $936 $942 $850 $835 $947 $849
Std. dev. 436 434 438 420 426 439 434
Coef. var. 45.6% 46.4% 48.5% 49.4% 51.0% 46.4% 51.1%
Q3 - Ql $610 $602 $608 ｾ Ｕ Ｗ Ｗ $610 $609 $622
% of median 61.9% 63.2% 63.0% 69.9% 73.9% 62.0% 75.4%
Percentiles
5th $271 $233 $235 $231 $222 $232 $230
10th 349 347 350 310 274 341 289
25th 619 598 603 497 465 609 467
50th 985 952 965 825 825 982 625
75th 1,230 1,200 1.211 1,075 1,075 1,218 1,089
90th 1,588 1,575 1.575 1,450 1,450 1,575 1,450
95th 1,750 1,750 1,750 1.654 1,665 1,750 1,697
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundingl
Ranges exclude lower bound.
Estimates based on weighted sample.
